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ABSTRACT 
The literature on information processing approaches 
to emotion is surveyed. It is concluded than an approach 
that looks at the way ·in which the emotion system employs 
the cognitive system has merit. 
In Chapter two Miller's (1978) criticism of abstract 
system theory is applied to personality theory. It is argued 
in the light of this criticism that psychologists should 
identify the cognitive microprocesses associated with emotion 
as the first step in a concrete theory of personality. 
Chapters three, four, and five, detail a series of 
experiments towards identifying the microprocesses of 
emotion. Chapter three details how perceptual defence was 
found to decrease with increased levels of arousal. Chapter 
four details an investigation of the effects of emotion upon 
the semantic network. Some indication of subject differences 
in th~ processing of threat related material was obtained. 
In chapter five, experimental evidence of attention biasing 
towards affect congruent material is outlined. Momentary 
affect states seem to have a strong influence on attention. 
A theory of emotions as problem solving heuristics is 
put forward in Chapter six. The theory is formulated in 
the terminology of Anderson's (1983) ACT model of cognitive 
skills. It is used to account for experimental and 
phenomenological data. 
Lastly, the promise and limitations of the ACT model 
of emotion are noted in Chapter seven. It is concluded that 
research into the influence of emotion on information 
processing might be an essential component of a 'concrete' 
theory of personality. 
xv 
Note to the Reader 
The reader of this thesis will be assisted if they 
adopt the same meaning of the words affect, emotion and mood 
as has the author. As much as possible, throughout the 
thesis, these terms have been used interchangeably to indicate 
enduring emotional states. When momentary emotional states 
are considered, these are indicated by the use of the word 
momentary. 
As well as the use of the three terms to label states 
of consciousness, they have also been used to label stimulus 
material. Again, the terms are used interchangeably. For 
instance both the term 'emotionally significant word' and 
the term 'affectively significant word' indicates a word 
that designates an object or an event highly associated with 
an emotional experience. 
1 
Chapter One: An introduction to approaches to the 
study of emotion from an information processing perspective. 
This chapter deals with the psychological literature 
on emotion which is either in the form of an information 
processing account, or is material which should be accounted 
for within an information processing model. The aim is 
not to provide an exhaustive review of all the relevant 
literature, nor to provide a total systhesis of the theories 
and frameworks reviewed. Rather the aim is to highlight 
the issues of emotion research that a comprehensive 
information processing theory of emotion should incorporate, 
and to do so by discussing the manner in which extant 
theories and paradigms have succeeded or failed in addressing 
the problems in the field. The chapter ends with a 
recommendation for research goals, and a general framework 
for incorporating research. A chain of connecting issues 
is presented with no particular issue having paramount 
importance, although a clearly discernible subfield of 
memory research will be addressed in a unitary manner. 
(That is, the issues most central to human information 
storage and retrieval under emotion will be looked at 
successively). 
It is perhaps obvious that emotions are not just 
phenomenological experiences, but are important determiners 
of the course of action. For Arnold (1960) the felt 
tendency toward or away from the object of emotion is 
critical to the phenomenology of emotion. Thus Arnold 
argues that following perception and appraisal, there is 
an action tendency that is felt as emotion. Such a tendency 
2 
should be manifest in the correlation between reported. 
emotional experience and actual and desired behaviour. 
There have been various demonstrations of c6rrelations between 
experimentally induced affect and behaviour. For example 
several studies (e.g. Barden, Garber, Duncan & Masters, 1981, 
Alderman 1972) have demonstrated an effect of mood state on 
the tendency of children to engage in helping behaviour. 
These mood states also affect learning and have been shown 
to produce emotion state dependent learning effects 
(e.g. Masters, Barden & Ford 1979). Such studies, taken 
together with everyday observational evidence that emotion 
and action covary would be convincing evidence to a naive 
observer that emotions are determiner~ of the course of 
action. However, the scientific observer should not confuse 
covariation with causality and so in the case of studies 
that are purported to establish the influence of emotional 
states on behaviour, it is important that observation of the 
emotional state can be established prior to extensive change in 
the behaviour being influenced. To ensure that such a 
temporality occurs, is to ensure that measures of emotionality 
are purely measures of emotional experience and are 
uncontaminated by inferences about what everyday emotions 
would be responsible for behaviour. Inferences based upon 
implicit theories of personality organisation have been 
shown to be very unreliable (Shweder, 1982) and implicit 
theories of emotion are unlikely to be better. Unfortunately, 
there is a great difficulty with approaches in psychology 
that seek to obtain pure 'unbiased' measures of cognitive 
and emotional states. The very act of attempting to obtain 
measurements Ql states unreferenced to the environment 
3 
responsible for the state induction, may be removing an 
essential component of the meaning of emotion. Thus, we 
may find ourselves in the position of attempting to build a 
psychology of real-world emotion, from laboratory findings 
based upon quasi-affective states. Consider for example 
four major methods of affect induction: 
(a) Drug induced arousal states and an appropriate 
Situational context for emotion. (e.g. Schacter 
and Singer, 1962; Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979) 
(b) Mood induction by having subjects repeat self 
referent statements. (e.g. Velten 1968; Sherwood 
Schroeder, Abrami & Alden 1981; Natale & Bolan, 
1980) 
(c) Mood induction by hypnosis (e.g. Bower 1981; 
Bower, Gilligan & Montero 1981; Bower, Monteiro 
& Gilligan 1978). 
(d) Emotional states produced by winning or losing 
in a game situation, or by an unexpected event 
(e.g. Isen 1978, Isen & Means, 1983; Boggiano 
& Hertel, 1983). 
Of these methods, the first and the last require interactions 
within the emotion eliciting situation and will thus be 
partially contaminated by inference processes that operate 
on the situation. Even for (b) and (c), it is unlikely 
that the affective intensity obtained will be independent 
of the environmental parameters. For example, if the 
hypnotic induction is to produce anger, it is likely that 
the anger will be more intense, if the situational context 
is frustrating. Thus, the case of hypnotically induced 
emotion is possibly one in which the hypnosis acts by 
4 
triggering an emotionally significant behavioural sequence 
upon which an inference process acts resulting in the 
attribution of an emotional state. In short, while there 
is evidence that behaviour and reported emotional states 
are highly correlated, it is hard to establish that this is 
because of the influence of emotional states over behaviour. 
Indeed, when evidence is collected purely from the 
behavioural domain one can argue that any influences reported 
can just as readily be attributed to dissonance reduction 
(Festinger, 1957) as to the influence of emotional states. 
Such a position receives support from the work of Robinson 
(1981) who shows that prior cognitive contexts (in terms of 
evaluation judgements), can affect the rating of the 
emotionality of personal memories. Such a result is 
consistent with Robinson's conclusion that remembered affect 
does not consist of an unmediated report of affect memories, 
! 
but that it can be more properly viewed as the product of 
judgement processes. While this conclusion is for judgements 
of the affective intensity of life experience memories, it 
does highlight the possibility that the internal physiological 
symptoms of different emotions are not readily discernible, 
and what is used to assess the intensity and direction of 
affect is cognitive construals based on situational inputs 
(cf Mandler, 1975). 
The referencing of affective state to the inducing 
environment, is the subject of much research of the kind seen 
in emotion misattribution experiments. (e.g. Deinstbier 1979; 
Kelley and Michela, 1980; Liebhart, 1979 for reviews). While 
there is difficulty in replicating affects such as the 
selective quiescence paradigm (Valins & Ray, 1967), most 
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researchers conclude that the effects showing the situation-
ally obtained misattribution of arousal are real. Nisbett 
and Wilson (1977) criticise much of this research on the 
grounds that verbal reports are very unreliable indicators 
of change. We argue here however, that the demonstration 
that judgements of emotional states are influenced by 
situational factors (mediated by cognitions), indicates that 
emotional states are inferred states, and are not immediately 
reportable. If this is the case, then the question of the 
relationship between emotional states, and behaviour is to 
be resolved by acknowledging that emotions are indefinable 
without reference to behaviour, and thus it is tautological 
to suggest that they are a cause of behaviour. This does 
not mean that emotional states are not important variables 
in the prediction of subsequent behaviour, merely that their 
status derives from socially defined (or conditioned) rules, 
and like implicit theories of personality, they cannot be 
assumed to have predictive utility. 
Meta-Theory and Theory 
The possibility that emotions are not just innate 
physiological responses that occur to evolutionarily 
programmed situations is put forward in the most direct form 
in the constructivist theory of emotion of Averill (1980, 
1983). Averill (1980) defines emotions as 'Transitory social 
roles (socially constituted syndromes) that are based on 
the individual's appraisal of the situation and that are 
interpreted as passions rather than as actions.' (Averill, 
1980 p.312). The social-constructivist position advanced 
has it that meaning or structure is imposed on events, and 
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emotions are a particular class of social event construction. 
One of the most significant aspects about emotions for 
Averill, is that we classify the syndromes associated with 
emotion as passions rather than actions. Thus, emotions 
correspond more to a classification of subjective passivity 
than subjective control. This way of looking at emotions 
places the essential function of emotion at the social and 
not evolutionary-biological level. The theory then, directs 
us towards research which seeks to encidate the patterns 
of social meaning that support emotional acts, rather than 
concentrate on the physiological processes that permit 
emotion. The theory thus acknowledges the three-way 
interaction between verbal responses, physiological arousal, 
and the experience of emotion put forward by Schacter and 
Singer (1962), but instead of concentrating on emotional 
plas.ticity it seeks to elucidate the social rules that 
support the emotional syndromes. It escapes the criticism 
that it is a theoretical framework from which 'reasons' 
are excluded in favour of analysis of variance corroborated 
'causes'. In the terminology of Semin (1980) who devastatingly 
criticises the ideological status of attribution theory, the 
theory recognises the importance of the socio-logic of 
everyday life. 
The distinction between theories that take as their 
starting point 'raw data', and theories that require a 
phenomenological analysis of causal attribution arises in 
the discussion of the last paragraph. This is an important 
meta-theoretical issue to be faced by emotion researchers. 
On the one hand, there is a tradition dating at least to 
Kant (1978) that makes purposes and reasons an integral part 
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of emotional acts, and on the other hand, there is an 
approach exemplified in Descartes that places emotion as 
arising outside of mind, but exerting influences on it. The 
Kantian approach is expressed in: "Passion always 
presupposes a maxim of the subject according to a purpose 
prescribed to him by the inclination. Consequently it is 
always connected with his practical reason, and passions 
cannot be ascribed to mere animals, any more than (they can 
be ascribed) to purely rational beings." (Kant (1978) 
p.266). The emphasis is on purpose and the ascription of 
reasons based on non coerced rules. These rules are absent 
in animals and so they do not share the complexes termed 
passions in humans. For the more mechanistic approach of 
Descartes however, the agitation of animal spirits that 
produces passions is a purely bodily function that only 
appears to occur in the mind. The two divergent approaches 
find their modern exemplars in the emotion attribution 
paradigms (Deinstbie~ 1979), and the constructivist theory 
of emotion already outlined. The issue is not as trivial 
as whether cognitions are regarded as phenomena or 
epiphenomena: the methods of investigation, and the language 
of explanation are determined by which approach to the 
theory of emotion is adopted. A rationalistic approach 
will attempt to make reasons not just coincidental to 
emotional experience but also the distinguishing features 
of emotions. Also, following from this, the patterns of 
culture that furnish the reasons need to be studied and 
understood, since the cycle of causation is not static but 
arises from a historical context of need states, and their 
cultural solutions. Figure 1-1 contrast§ the cycle of 
FIGURE (1-1). 
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(a) Rationalistic Theories of Emotion. (b) Mechanistic Theories of Emotion. 
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causation in rationalistic theories of emotion with that of 
more mechanistic theories. The main difference between 
the two types of theory is that 1(a) includes cultural forms 
and motives in the cycle of emotion directed processing and 
behaviour whereas the mechanistic type of theory (1-1(b)), 
regards cultural forms and motives as being important only 
in the attribution of feeling (and consequently the 
direction for appropriate behaviour). Rationalistic theories 
view culture as being a necessary condition for emotion 
instigation, mechanistic theories will tend to view culture 
as unnecessary for the instigation of emotional experience, 
and necessary only for its categorisation. At least one 
major theorist in cross-cultural psychology (Binnie-Dawson 
1982) provides a metatheory congruent with the rationalist 
position. The final choice of which metatheory will prove 
most useful will have to wait until the analysis of emotion 
becomes fine-grained enough to distinguish the predictive 
utility of the two approaches. Both metatheories provide 
a framework sufficient for the explanation of presently 
studied phenomena. 
The Importance of Culture and Content 
One problem that is highlighted in the discussion of 
which kind of meta-theory to adopt, is the likelihood that 
the range of hUman emotions is not fixed, and cannot be 
studied without reference to the content of emotions. Tuan 
(1979) points out that specific fears are often learned, 
and will differ from culture to culture. He points out 
that fear of external nature tends to decline as it is 
subdued, but civilisation does not reduce the malevolence 
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ascribed to human nature. Tuan reviews evidence of 'fearless' 
societies, and points out the specific cultures and 
environmental characteristics which produce such a relative 
paucity of fear in their members. Such evidence again 
highlights the difficulty in generalising the results of 
specific experiments across cultures: the paradigms that 
induce emotions, and demonstrate the influence of emotion 
on response or recall processes are not likely to be immune 
from cultural factors. This will be so in spite of the fact 
that the specific induction procedure used to produce the 
emotion is chosen to be efficacious within the culture of 
the induction group. 
The culture will also be defining in the case of the 
appropriate response processes (which cannot be seperated 
from the emotion complex). For instance Beigel (1951) 
traces the origins of romantic love and shows that it 
derives from courtly love but that it differed in that it 
transformed the ideal from that of love after marriage to 
that of love before marriage. Such socially prescribed 
behavioural mores are likely to be inte~~al parts of the 
social schema, that allow the evaluation of social interaction 
processes. They are emotion defining (love versus lust), 
and emotion directing. The later point is made by Pope 
(1980) who traces the changing focus of romantic love from 
that of knowing, to that of union and finally today to 
participation in a shared life. These focuses determine 
the ideal action sequences and cognitive strivings between 
lovers and so will dictate the direction of romantic 
experience. For instance Pope uses as a prototype of the 
ideal notion of love for the early period, the relationship 
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between Odysseus and Penelope from the Iliad. He points 
out that on Odysseus's return, it is the process of 
reaquaintance in a 'knowing' sense that is pursued, and the 
fond embrace comes much later. 
A final example of how it is impossible to divorce the 
study of emotion from the content of emotion is taken from 
Schoeck's (1970) theory of social behaviour mediated by 
envy. Schoeck points out that for feelings of envy to arise 
we have to experience a state of impotence with respect to 
the possession of the envied, and the envied has to be 
experienced as the cause of the failure to have the possession. 
Here, the view of the world will have an important influence 
on whether or not envy is experienced; some cultures attribute 
ill health to witchcraft by an envious party, and Schoeck 
argues that where equality is supposed to be the natural 
order of things, inequalities in an attribute will be prone 
to envy. Thus, culture and custom will determine what are 
possible cases for envy. If psychologists attempt to study 
an emotional state without its concommittant content, the 
danger is that they overlook specific culture-state linkages 
that make an emotional state unique to a culture. The 
psychology thus derived could be more one of description of 
common tendencies than the analysis of naturally occurring 
categories. 
Schema Invariance Assumptions 
The relationship between socially transmitted schema 
and emotional experience raises several issues about the 
kinds of information that such schema operate on, and the 
extent of schema uniformity across subjects. For example 
a number of studies have investigated the relationship 
between expressive tende,ncies and emotional experience, 
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and important differences in people have been obtained. The 
division of people into those that tend to facially express 
changes of emotion (expressors), and those that are facially 
non responsive (inhibitors) has been made (the terminology 
is that used by Notarius and Levenson (1979), although 
other labels have been used to characterise these different 
groups). The evidence supports the explanation that the two 
groups attend to different kinds of information during 
emotional epidodes; expressors attend more to self produced 
cues; inhibitors tend to give precedence to situational 
cues. Consistent with this interpretation, Laird and 
Crosby (1974) found that expressors tend more than inhibitors 
to see emotion as closer to a sensation than a cognition. 
Laird, Wagener, Halal and Szegda (1982) show that only 
expressors show material expression congruity effects in a 
series of experiments on the effect of emotion on memory. 
These results cannot be interpreted simply as indicating 
that facial feedback is the critical source of emotional 
experience as some researchers would have it (e.g. Izard, 
1977; Tomkins, 1962). This is because other research 
has indicated that inhibitors tend to be more autonomically 
liable to threat than expressors (Notarius and Levenson, 
1979). Further, under some circumstances greater expressivity 
can be accompanied by a reduction in reported affect (e.g. 
Leventhal and Mace, 1970, Cupchik and Leventhal, 1974). 
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Yet other researchers have shown that man~pu1ation of facial 
expressiveness is correlated with autonomic responses and 
subjective reports of emotional experience (e.g. Zuckerman, 
K1orman, Larrance & Spiegel, 1981). The important lesson is 
that results in the research literature on expressivity and 
emotion are not integrable unless the assumption of emotion 
schema invariance is dropped. 
The fact that individual differences in the use of 
emotion cues are apparent aAd important, highlights that 
emotion researchers should be very cautious in drawing 
general conclusions from specific paradigms. It is of course 
desirable that psychologists should strive towards broad 
theories. The results discussed above point towards two 
serious sources of error for theories that are too tied to 
particular experimental procedures: 
a) There are acute dangers of lack of generality because 
subjects are not properly sampled. In information processing 
theory based research, the tende~c is towards smaller 
samples of volunteer subjects, and it is quite possible that 
the typical method of obtaining volunteers produces an over 
representation of externa1isers or interna1isers in the 
sample. Notarius et.a1. (1979) report that externa1isers 
score significantly higher on an empathic tendency scale, 
and obviously if persons differ in terms of personality 
dimensions, preference for taking part in unexplained 
experiments is likely to be different. 
b) Small differences in experiments are likely to produce 
quite markedly different results. This is most dramatically 
demonstrated by the influence of an object in the experimental 
situation that biases subjects towards self focused attention. 
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Scbeier & Carver (1977) showed that the presence of a mirror 
in the experimental setting made subjects more responsive to 
their transient affective states. Other studies have called 
into question some predictions (~.g. McDonald, Harris, & 
Maher, 1983) but in view of the pervasiveness of self 
directed attention effects (e.g. Scheier and Carver 1981, 
Scheier and Carver 1982), it is more likely that such 
minor deviations just show the sensitivity of results 
to small paradigm shifts. Recently, Hoover, Wood and Knowles 
(1983) have demonstrated that a brief early interaction that 
induced self-focused attention had considerable influences 
on ongoing behaviour tendencies. This result indicates that 
even slight changes in subject briefing between experiments 
can conceivably have major effects on experiment outcomes. 
Self Schema and Emotion 
The discussion on the problems that arise because of 
individual differences, and within-subject differences 
implicates the importance of self schema for an understanding 
of emotion. Epstein (1979), has a theory which combines the 
self schema with the world view in development of affective 
responses. While Epstein does not provide direct evidence 
linking self schema and affect, his evidence for temporal 
stability of emotion Epstein,(1982), is consistent with a 
self schema component in affective processes. The utility 
of the kind of emotional profiles that are obtained from 
individual subjects, and whether they can be connected to a 
self structure will provide surer evidence of the theory 
(if obtained). Linville (1982) has reviewed several 
experiments which indicate that the l~~ complex a persons 
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self-representation, the more extreme affective responses 
seem to be. This result mirrors earlier work by Linville 
(1982), in which it was established that evaluation of out-
group members was more extreme the less complex the rater's 
schema for the outgroup was. Once again the self schema 
seems important to the study of affect. Linville's results 
relate to the intensity of affect. Other research has been 
done on the relationship between cognitive complexity and 
the range of affect. Sommers (1981) has found a positive 
relationship between emotional range and cognitive complexity 
in the description of persons. This raises the possibility 
that Linvilles results are artifacts of using scales that 
do not encompass the full extent of evaluative reactions 
that a subject may experience. However, even if this last 
explanation is correct, there is no question that the extent 
of the self schema is implicated in affect patterns. 
On the other hand, there are formulations which suggest 
that the relationship between self schema and affect, is not 
integral, but rather the interaction between two function-
ally distinct systems. Roger (1981) in reviewing his work 
on memory and reaction time to self referent statements' 
provides a two factbr theory with the self prototype 
providing the analytic nodes wbich are amplified by emotional 
reactions. Further empirical evidence for the sep~ratness 
of the self-schema and the emotion system is to ~be seen in 
a series of studies by Mueller, Heesacker, Ross, and Nicodemus 
(1983) which shows that for face recognition, encoding faces 
via decisions about similarity of target face to the face 
of the encoder, is inferior to encoding the face via 
decisions about emotional qualities. An experiment which 
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co~bined emotional quality decisions and self-referent 
judgement, failed to improve performance above that of 
self-referent judgements alone. This implies that for facial 
recognition, the activation of the self schema ensures an 
encoding and retrieval route independent of emotional content. 
(That conclusion applies only for pictorial material; for 
verbal material Mueller et.al. replicated the recall 
superiority of self-referentially encoded material found by 
Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker 1977). 
The literature which relates affect induction to the 
self schema provides the link which could allow the integration 
of the apparently conflicting claims about emotion and self 
schema. Sherwood, Schroeder, Abriami and Alden (1981) 
predicted that in accord with Weiners (1974) attribution 
theory, self-referent statements would induce a higher level 
of experienced affect than would non-self-referent statements. 
This prediction was confirmed, suggesting that self-reference 
of material may enhance its ability to trigger affect. 
However, any differential memory effects are likely to result 
from two factors; firstly the extent to which the information 
may be processed by the existing cognitive schema; secondly 
the degree to which emotion schema are called into play by 
the relevance of the information to salient aspects of the 
self-schema. Thus, it is understandable that individual 
differences (Linville, 1982) in the extent of the self-schema 
are correlated with recall by the first mechanism mentioned 
above. The second mechanism can explain the lack of a 
superiority in self referred face recognition over attribute 
referred face recognition (Mueller et.al., 1983) if we regard 
personal facial feature attributes as not being an integral 
17 
part of the self schema. Lord (1980) has reviewed evidence 
that suggests the distinction between self-schema and self-
image, and the face recognition results relate to the latter. 
Finally, the study by Sherwood et.al. (1981), and another 
study by Riskind, Rholes and Eggers (1982) confirm the 
importance of the self-schema in moderating affect. But 
as well, these two studies demonstrate that it is not just 
that material needs to be in the same content area as the 
self-schema for affect to occur; the material needs also 
to be related to the self schema. This is consistent with 
the two principles by which we have explained the results 
of this section. 
Detachment of cognitions and Emotion 
A major issue that emerges out of the previous section 
on emotion and the self schema, and an earlier section 
questioning the causality of emotions is the extent that 
emotional processes can be viewed as sepQrate from the 
attendant cognitions. Zajonc (1980, 1984), for example 
suggests that affect and cognition are under the control of 
sep~rate ~nd partially independent systems, and that the 
output from the 'af-fecti ve subsystem precedes that of the 
cognitive subsystem. Lazarus (1982, 1984) takes issue with 
Zajonc over whether it is possible to have affect without 
a cognitive encoding. He concludes that Zajonc1s conclusion 
about the partial sepqrabi]ity of the affective and cognitive 
subsystems is based on the incorrect assumption that 
cognitive processing occurs, through sequential stages. Since 
this is a dated version of cognitive processing, he argues 
that Zajonc1s results of affective judgements capable of 
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being made before other judgements does not indicate anything 
more than a judgement made via a partial cognitive encoding. 
Leventhal (1980, 1982) takes a middle position between 
those put forward by Zajonc and Lazarus. While acknowledging 
that some components of the emotion experience are handled 
by a subsystem devoted exclusively to emotion, he argues 
that two other processing levels are also called into play. 
Firstly, he postulates emotional schema which integrate 
the perceptual codes of emotional experience and form an 
emotional memory. Secolldly, Leventhal has a conceptual 
component in the interactions defining emotion, which 
operates by attributing causes to typical emotional episodes 
and also by following emotional scripts which can regulate 
emotional life. These two processing levels (schematic and 
conceptual), interact with the more fundamental levBl of 
expressive-motor behaviour to produce emotional experience. 
It is clear that while the above three theories seem 
to be making widely disparate claims, they have certain 
elements in common. None denies the fact that there are 
cognitions and judgement processes attendant to emotional 
experience, and therefore comprising part of the experience. 
Nor do any of the theories question that emotional experience 
can be relegated to 'nothing but' cognition. The real 
issues seem to be those of degree and not of kind. 
Explicitly -
a) To what extent a cognitive involvement is 
necessary for emotional experience? 
b) To what extent does the analysis of an aspect 
of emotional experience (e.g. schematic, 
conceptual) require reference to other aspects 
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of emotional experience for the development of 
a psychology of emotion? 
Issue a) separates Lazarus who suggests that cognitive 
mediation is always a necessary condition for emotion from 
Zajonc whose experiments purport to demonstrate that 
affective significance can arise prior to knowing. Issue 
b), is one which will determine at which level our scientific 
efforts are pitched. For Leventhal, it is necessary to 
incorporate considerations of all three components of 
emotional experience in order to understand emotion in 
everyday life. For example Leventhal (1982) recounts an 
example of a cancer patient who gained joy from the act of 
being capable of obtaining a glass of water. This example 
does require an understanding of schematic and conceptual 
levels to appear sensible. But, to a large extent issue 
b) is also a non issue because as becomes evident from 
considering other fields of science such as general systems 
theory (e.g. Miller, 1978) has done, it is necessary to study 
both at the level of the organism as a concrete system, and 
also at the level of the subsystems that are components of 
the system. The polemic that arises because of issue b) 
(theorists differing in their levels of analysis), is 
unjustified. 
There is one area though, where the detachment of 
cognition from emotions has been specifically researched. 
This is the area of anxiety; specifically-test anxiety. 
Liebert and Morris (1967) put forward a conceptualisation 
which divides anxiety into the components of worry (the 
cognitive element) and emotionality (the physiological 
element). In a recent review (Morris, Davis and Hutchings 
1981), it was concluded that the two components are probably 
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maintained by different aspects of stressful situations. 
They concluded that worry mayor may not accompany the 
emotional component. Other researchers question whether 
test anxiety is best conceptualised in terms of the two 
component theory. For instance the review by Morris et.al. 
notes that there is much evidence that worry may be reduced 
without a reduction in the emotionality component. Finger 
and Galassi (1977) provide evidence that interventions that 
should act exclusively on one or other component, tend to 
act on both, and that performance measures were unaffected 
by changes in the scores of the components. Thus the 
question remains of whether the cognitive component (worry) 
is requisite, or whether it is just an undesirable 
accompanying phenomena to the emotional state. The position 
that seems most likely is that meanings given to the test 
situation are necessary conditions for the experience of 
test anxiety (e.g. Weiner 1982). However, once a pattern 
of affective responses to test situations is established, 
cognitive evaluations need no longer be consciously processed. 
Restating this a little differently - the interplay between 
affective states and cognition must be acknowledged, and 
the question of whether overlearned affective responses 
retain a cognitive component should be bypassed. (Until 
psychologists are prepared to distinguish clearly between 
cognitive structures and cognitive acts.) 
Arousal 
(a) Arousal as a Theoretical Construct 
Closely akin to the question of whether cognitions 
are detachable from emotions, is that of the role of arousal 
in emotional processes. The two factor theory of emotion 
21 
best exemplified by Schachter and Singer (1962) or Mandler 
(1975) has arousal as one of the factors of emotion, the 
other factor is cognitive, involving assessment of the 
situation for explanation of the arousal. Two factor 
theories such as these assume that cognitions are essential 
to emotion. They are conditio sine qua non for emotion. 
Such theories in general, do not concentrate on the details 
of the processing that underlies the cognitive evaluations 
but tend to concentrate on attribution paradigms e.g. (Kelley 
and Michela, 1980; Zillman, 1978). Plausible processing 
mechanisms are often put forward (e.g. Mandler 1975), but 
to date the specifics of the cognitive processes have not 
been investigated. Instead, two factor theorists have 
tended to concentrate on trying to understand the conjunctive 
rules that tie together situations, arousal and behaviour/ 
experience. 
Some typical examples of the social psychology experiments 
that take their germ from the two factor theory are now 
detailed. Dutton and Aron (1974) showed how the implications 
of two factor theory are confirmed in the area of inter-
personal attraction. They showed that male subjects 
produced more sexual imagery to TAT stories when they 
approached attractive females on high bridges, as compared 
with low bridges. The same effect did not occur with males 
as the stimulus person. The result is completely in accord 
with the predictions of two factor theory; the results 
indicate that the extra fear associated arousal from a 
higher bridge, is attributed to the stimulus person, and 
this produces the higher level of attractiveness rating, 
and sexual imagery. 
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Another study that operates within a two factor frame-
work is that undertaken by Gibbons and Wright (1981). They 
showed that high sex guilt subjects when confronted with an 
erotic stimulus, chose to attribute the arousal to a bogus 
source (non existent drug effects). Interestingly, in spite 
of the greater attribution of arousal to placebo effects, 
the high sex guilt subjects showed no corresponding reduction 
in sexual arousal. Gibbons and Wright attribute this last 
result in terms of two factor theory. They suggest that 
in spite of different causal attributions for their arousal, 
subjects did not assign a different emotional label to it. 
Finally, Clark (1982) has conducted research that calls 
into question the explanation of experiments investigating 
two factor theory. She induced arousal in subjects through 
exercise and later had subjects rate their courses either 
after positive feedback, or neutral feedback. The results 
which she obtained showed that subjects in the high arousal, 
positive feedback condition rated their courses more 
positively than subjects in any of the other conditions. 
This result is not entirely encompassed by two factor theory, 
which does not predict that arousal can lead to access to 
more affectively toned memories. Thus, the two factor 
theory would assume that subjects in the high-arousal 
positive condition, would misattribute the arousal to the 
positive feedback, and that they would be no more inclined 
to rate the courses as positive than any other group. 
Clark's challenge to two factor theory, highlights the 
difficulty that psychology has in differentiating between 
plausible (and predictive) mechanisms, and actual mechanisms. 
Clark, Milberg and Ross (1983), present additional evidence 
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that arousal acts as a cue for arousal related material in 
memory. This suggestion has considerable implication for 
the utility of two factor theory as an explanative theory. 
The results mentioned earlier of Dutton and Aron, could 
entail mediating memories that link fear and sexuality. 
Certainly, changes in arousal are likely to be coincidental 
with the heights of the bridges that subjects crossed, but 
this in itself is not an argument for the validity of two 
factor theory. Without a more extensive study of these 
classical experiments it can only be said that this account 
is plausible. Equally plausible is the proposition that 
any emotional state will have ongoing consequences for 
subsequent emotional states. The fact that arousal accompanies 
each emotional state does not ensure that it is the carrier 
of the influence of one state on another. Besides some 
researchers (e.g. Marshall & Zimbando, 1979; Maslach, 1979) 
have suggested that unexplained arousal biases subjects 
towards negative affective states. 
(b) Arousal Influences on Information Processing 
Aside from the issue of whether arousal states are 
explanatory in the psychology of emotion, there is the 
question of what consequences arousal has for human 
information processing. The question is important because 
arousal has been posited as an accompanier of most emotions 
and understanding of arousal-information processing 
interactions thus forms part of the understanding of the 
total consequences of emotion. 
There are numerous way in which arousal might affect 
information processing. Already the work of Clark et.al. 
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(1983) indicating that arousal does have an effect on the 
accessibility of arousal related material in memory, has 
been noted. Another way in which arousal effects have been 
shown to influence cognitive processes is the relative 
strength of short term memory and long term memory. Eysenck 
(1977) reviews the effects that arousal has on the recall of 
to-be-remembered lists. Considerable data comparing the 
recall of emotional/arousing material with neutral material, 
are explanable in terms of action decrement theory (Walker 
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1958). The theory suggests that higher levels of arousal 
make for greater trace consolidation which results in better 
long term recall for list items, but worse short term recall. 
Several different procedures have been used, and they have 
come up with results that are broadly interpretable in terms 
of action decrement theory. For instance, Kleinsmith and 
Kaplan (1963) had subjects listen to lists of paired 
associates, and they recorded skin resistance to index the 
level or arousal associated with to-be-recalled items. 
Berlyne, Borsa, Craw, Gelman & Mandell (1965), Berlyne, 
Borsa, Hamacher & Koenig (1966) used a different procedure 
which associated arousal with items by bursts of white 
noise. Other experimenters using paired association have 
had subjects associate to either neutral or emotional words 
(e.g. Levinger & Clark, 1961; Parkin, Lewinsohn & Folkard, 
1982). 
There has been quite an impressive measure of support 
for action decrement theory as a predictor of effects, but 
Eysenck (1982) suggests that there are enough unpredicted 
effects to warrant alternative hypotheses about the relationship 
between arousal and memory. He suggests that noise induced 
25 
arousal may act by reducing contextual encoding, and biasing 
against a semantic encoding of material. The explanation 
is plausible but it tends to downplay explanations in terms 
of arousal in favour of explanations in terms of the effects 
that noise has on processing. New explanations might not 
just be necessary for experiments dealing with noise induced 
arousal ana memory, but might also be needed for experiments 
where arousal is manipulated in other ways. Eve.,", results which 
are in accord with Walkers hypothesis might need reexamination. 
For example, Kennan, MacWhinney and Mayhew (1977) found that 
high interactional content sentences in natural conversation 
are better remembered than low interactional content sentences. 
Subsequent investigation by MacWhinney, Keenan and Reinke (1982) 
revealed that such sentences were more arousing than low 
interaction sentences, but that there was very little relation-
ship between arousal and memory. It is therefore concluded 
by them that factors other than arousal underlie their 
original results. Another way that arousal affects information 
processing, is through attention processes. Easterbrook (1959), 
has suggested that high arousal produces a restricted range 
of cue utilization. That is usually taken to mean that the 
aroused system devotes a higher proportion of its' resources 
to the intake of information from dominant sources, and less 
to intake from relatively minor ones. There is much 
evidence that supports this hypothesis. For example the 
presence of· white noise concurrently with to-be-learned 
words resulted in an improvement in ordered recall, and a 
decreased ability to recall incidental details such as word 
space location (Hockey & Hamilton, 1970). Andersen and 
Revelle (1982) predicted that high arousal would reduce 
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sensitivity to interword proof reading errors (which require 
a broad range of cue utilisation), but that sensitivity to 
intraword errors (requiring only a minimal range of cue 
utilisation) would be unaffected. Their results were 
consistent with predictions and the Easterbrooke hypothesis. 
Eysenck (1982) has suggested that the Easterbrooke 
hypothesis be embellished to avoid the 'Easterbrook 
paradox'; ' .... Since subjects attend more and more 
exclusively to task cues as arousal increases, it follows 
necessarily that the more intense white noise becomes, the 
less it is attended to.' (Eysenck, 1982, p.167). To get 
around this paradox, Eysenck suggests that as well as 
increasing attentional selectivity, noise reduces attentional 
capacity. This reduction in attentional capacity places 
demands on subjects for a voluntary reallocation of attentional 
resources, and for the adoption of new strategies which 
involve a more restricted monitoring of the environment. 
Eysenck argues that the introduction of an arousing stimulus 
will affect two arousal systems; a passive arousal system 
that at high levels of arousal operates in accord with the 
Easterbrooke hypothesis; an active cognitive control system 
that operates 'effortly' and so can compensate for suboptimal 
levels of the first arousal system. Eysenck's is one 
solution to the finding that the effects of arousal on 
performance have not been integrated to the point where a 
one factor model can account for the effects of arousal. 
(Not even when restricted to only the data of noise induced 
arousal). 
There have been other efforts, and within the literature 
of the effects of noise on performance, Poulton (1977, 1978, 
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1979), Broadbent (1978), and Hockey (1979), stand out. 
One of these, Broadbent puts forward a theory much akin to 
that of Eysenck's, and another, Hockey has put forward a 
theory that identifies the specific processing components 
that noise facilitates or debilitates. The approach taken 
by Poulton on the other hand, emphasises the effect that 
noise has on the stimulus. He assumes that arousal increases 
alwaYB affect performance positively, but that these 
performance effects are counteracted by the acoustic masking. 
The approach taken by Poulton is an exemplar of attempts 
to understand performance effects in experiments where 
arousal is the variable of interest, in terms of nonequivalence 
of stimulus conditions. The approach if correct threatens 
to reduce the corpus of knowledge about the processing 
influences of arousal to a corpus of artifact. If correct, 
then the results of the arousal literature should be 
carefully sep~rated from the results of the emotion literature, 
because of the divergence in the paradigms that attempt to 
study the respective influences on processing. This is an 
important question for emotion theorists. 
Finally, there is at issue whether arousal should be 
regarded as a unitary phenomenon, or having multiple 
components. Royce and Diamond (1980) suggest that the 
classic relationship between arousal and performance (the 
Yerkes-Dodson Law (1908)), is curvilinear because of the 
operation of two arousal systems. They suggest that 
reticular arousal is associated with an ascending curve 
(greater arousal better performance) and that limbic arousal 
is associated with a decending performance curve (greater 
arousal poorer performance). Eysenck (1982) has also followed 
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the possibility of two arousal systems, but whereas Royce 
and Diamond identify the characteristic of the second 
system as emotional, Eysenck identifies the second system 
as effortful. Thus there is complete disagreement between 
the theories as to whether a high arousal level of the 
second system will lead to performance decrements or 
improvements. Not only does this provide problems in 
interpretation of Yerkes-Dodson functions, but the implica-
tions for emotion theory are immense. If it is necessary 
to posit more than one functional arousal system, which is 
the system that operates during emotional activity (if 
indeed any system need be operating (cf. Linton and Hirt, 
1979). The need to answer this question is evident when we 
consider results such as those reviewed by Gilbert (1979) on 
the emotion reducing effects of nicotine. In general 
nicotine increases physiological arousal and yet decreases 
emotionality. Gilbert puts forward several possible 
explanations for the result including the possibility that 
this provides support for the two arousal system model of 
Routtenberg (1968). Certainly, such results are inconsistent 
with the simple arousal model that most emotion attribution 
theorists derive their predictions from. Since other 
research (e.g. Williams (1980)) has found evidence that 
nicotine strength can produce the classic inverted U shaped 
performance function, researchers should be required to tie 
their predictions to a theory of the stimulus conditions 
necessary to elicit arousal. As this research shows, and 
the call for two arousal theories shows, arousal is not 
just an increase in heart rate. Perhaps it is time to 
inspect the psychological significance of the classical 
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arousal manipulations in two factor theory paradigms. 
Attention 
The effect of emotion on attention processes is an 
area of research that is only just beginning to be explored. 
The previous section noted the work which had been done on 
the relationship between arousal and attention, here the 
question is broadened to what we know about the relationships 
between affect and attention (and vice versa). Hamilton (1980) 
has suggested a relationship between affect and attention 
that has it that positive mood is characterised by a close 
match between the actual information available to a person, 
and the optimal information level of that person. The 
optimal information level of a person is approached by 
means of what Hamilton refers to as attention regulators. 
These attention regulators (A.R.) augment or reduce aspects 
of environmental or internal information. Without a close 
match between external information, and the information 
capacity of a person, processing may be too effortful, or 
be uninteresting. This theory concentrates on the influence 
of attention on mood, although Hamilton acknowledges the 
reciprocal effect of mood on attention. 
Another theorist (Klinger, 1982) emphasises the 
relationship between affect and attentional processes. In 
doing so, he does not state explicitly a controlling 
qt\-e."tio" 
influence of emotion over. (indeed he discusses 
1\ 
controlling emotion via attention training). Emotion and 
attention are both characterised by being operational within 
the field of 'current concerns'. Current concerns are ongoing 
concerns that ~emain psychologically alive and reflect 
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underlying behavioural and physiological goals of the 
organism. Klinger argues that the evolution of a capacity 
for current concerns has been accompanied by the evolution 
of affective responses that reflect the direction of progress 
towards the goal. The relation between attention and 
emotion, is that they are both components of a behavioural 
response pattern designed to ensure that goal striving 
succeeds. Attention processes permit the detection of 
information related to concerns, and emotion is an evaluative 
response which permits the tagging of action and event 
sequences with evaluative significance. 
What both theories emphasise, is that there are 
functional advantages to be gained by a linkage between 
emotion systems and attention allocating systems. There 
is however a paucity of specific research that demonstrates 
the linkage between the two systems. What evidence is cited 
tends to be evidence showing that emotionally significant 
stimuli are processed differently to emotionally neutral 
stimuli. Hamilton for instance refers to the work on 
perceptual defense begun with Bruner and Postman (1947), and 
McGinnies (1949). Klinger refers to the work of Corteen and 
Wood (1972) in which skin responses changed to words that 
had been previously shocked and were fed into a supposedly 
unattended channel. Both theorists in putting forward their 
plausible theories have not provided experimental evidence 
that the actual process of emotion can alter attention 
allocation. The closest to such a demonstration is the work 
of Hoelscher, Klinger and Barta (1981), and Klinger, Barta, 
and Maxeiner (1980) which show that dream and thought 
contents are influenced by current concerns. 
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There is some other more recent evidence that the 
emotional content of information has consequences for its 
processing (e.g. Nielsen and Sarason 1981; Bargh 1982), but 
still the emphasis is on the content of the stimulus 
material rather than on the emotional state of the subject 
influencing processing. Perhaps the closest to demonstrating 
an effect of affective state on attention is an experiment 
by Erdelyi (1973) in which Jewish subjects showed a deficit 
in recall of presented items, which there was a subliminal 
swastika at the centre of the presentation field. It can 
be argue~ in accord with Zajonc (1980), that this situation 
produced rapid affective reaction, and this reaction has 
consequences for the encoding of the other information in 
the display. However until research is done that m~nipulates 
emotional states and examines attentional consequences the 
specific interaction between emotions and attentional 
processes will not be fully understood. 
Process Analysis or Sep~rate System? 
So far, the question of whether it is possible to 
reduce emotional experience to cognitions plus arousal, 
and the question of whether cognitive components are 
separate from affective components have been looked at. The 
issue addressed now is whether it is best to view emotion 
within the processing framework which has proved useful in 
other areas (see for instance the work of Sternberg (1983), 
or do we attempt to characterise emotion as a consequence of 
a seperate processing structure. Unfortunately this question 
has been considered at the level of metatheory rather than 
theory. Take for instance the controversy over whether 
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affect precedes cognition (Zajonc, 1980 and Lazarus, 1982). 
Here, as outlined before, Lazarus takes issue with Zajonc's 
outdated metatheory of sequential processing and argues 
that his results when the sequentiality constraint is dropped, 
do in fact indicate that cognition is necessary for affect. 
But if Sternberg (1983) is right then metatheories are not 
falsifiable but furnish the constructs that are a language 
or formalism for theory. Ultimately, choices between 
metatheories must be made on the basis of their plausibility, 
completeness, specificity, generality and parsimony. 
Bringing Sternberg's insights to bear on the question of 
whether emotional processes are just reorganisations of 
continuing somatic, perceptual and cognitive processes, or 
are a consequence of a sep<:.\ratel~ acting system; the critical 
issue is one of whether the extant cognitive process 
metatheories make the data of emotion researchers more 
comprehensible, or whether an additional framework need be 
called in. 
As an example of the way in which the lack of an agreed 
metatheoretical framework can hamper research, consider the 
recent developments of research on the lateralisation of 
emotion. Campbell (1982) reviews the research and admits 
that " .••• we lack a coherent framework in which the processes 
involved in interpreting and displaying emotion are 
consensually defined and in which patterns of laterality 
are fully understood." (p.95). The lack of a coherent 
framework is evidenced throughout the research on the 
effects of emotion state or content on laterality. For 
instance Campbell in discussing the case of a brain damaged 
patient who could recognise and identify unfamiliar faces b~ 
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th~ir expressions suggests that this result is not predicted 
by Zajonc's (1980) proposal that affect may be processed 
prior to identification and independently of it. Campbell's 
claim is only true for a sequential processing meta theoretical 
framework, certainly not true for a parallel processing 
framework. 
Graves,Landis, and Goodglass (1981), in a study relating 
the ability to recognise words to laterality, conclude that 
if left visual field performance differs quantitatively from 
the right visual field performance, then there is evidence 
of two or more distinct processing systems (one in each 
hemisphere). This reasoning contrasts with that of Campbell 
(1982), who concludes that hemispheric differences in 
emotional sensitivity or expression seem to relate to 
hemispheric differences in cognitive processing. Safer 
(1981), also suggests that hemispheric differences result 
from differential access to (cognitive) codes for emotion; 
the left hemisphere specialising in verbal codes; the right 
hemisphere specialising in imagery codes. Leventhal (1980, 
1982) takes the evidence for hemisphere lateralisation as 
supporting his idea of schematic-emotional mechanism. Even 
though such a mechanism would be part of the cognitive 
system, its autonomous nature as a sep~rate processing 
structure is emphasised. 
All in all, the interpretation of lateralisation 
experiments has met severe difficulties when the question of 
whether there is a discrete system for processing emotion 
is approached. To some extent this is because lateralisation 
experiments result in very general measures of localisation, 
and these on their own are insufficient to answer questions 
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about functional autonomy/seperation. (This problem is also 
considered in the next chapter where the distinction between 
abstract and concrete systems is discussed.) But the most 
significant difficulty is that the analysis of the 
consequences of emotion in terms of the existing componential 
cognitive meta-theories, does not answer the question of 
whether the meta theory could be substituted by a more 
extensive meta theory. The distinctions between 
(a) Emotion encoding 
(b) Emotion codes 
(c) Emotion(al) encoding processes 
are not readily made within a purely cognitive meta theory. 
Consider some examples from contemporary cognitive 
psychology research. Posner & Snyder (1975) have produced 
evidence that congruent emotional tone facilitates adjective 
matching times. Posner (1978) concludes that this indicates 
that there are two memory structures or codes involved in 
impression formation. This result and conclusion has been 
supported by research by Strongman (1982,Note 1) who has 
demonstrated that target words within emotional sentence 
frames benefit at recall compared with the same targets 
presented in neutral frames. Working within the framework 
of cognitive metatheory, these results are indeed inter-
pretable in terms of specific emotion codes as an adjunct 
to the other codes associated with an item. However, the 
two storage model is such that it cannot distinguish between 
emotion codes as a facet of ordinary human information 
processing, or whether these emotion codes emerge because 
of a system adjunctive to the cold cognitions system. 
Certainly, the cognitive psychology meta-theory lends itself 
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to the identification of a seperate store for emotion, but 
it can be argued that similar stores can be found for any 
semantically encoded attribute. The dual storage model 
could just be a consequence of the same processes posited 
for 'cold cognitions'. The problem is that phenomenologically 
there is good evidence that states of emotion are different 
from states of minimal emotionality (Leventhal 1980), yet 
the ability of a cognitive information processing meta-
theory to account for this is limited. Much of the problem 
lies with the limitation of an information processing meta-
theory; the limitation that has been pointed out by Fodor 
(1981) is that modern cognitive science's de facto choice 
of proceedural semantics as a theory of semantics is plainly 
an inadequate theory at this stage. Different stores, 
different processing pathways (in the sense of different 
levels of elaboration, decision processes etc), still leave 
the problem of how the real world relates to the encoded 
representation that processes operate on. 
Lest the reader wonder where the questioning of 
cognitive metatheory leads apart from the abandoning of the 
most scientifically acceptable way of studying mental 
processes, the endeavour will be concluded now. The previous 
discussion has not been to disuade researchers from 
approaching the field of emotion through information 
processing methodologies. But rather the previous arguement 
has been against reducing the data of emotion to being just 
the result of the encoding afforded information in the 
cognitive subsystem. 
To be a useful theory of emotion (even if the theory 
remains predominantly cognitively rooted), the theory must 
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not deal with isolated cognitive processes and structures, 
but must deal with the total nexus of emotional influences 
on information processing. Fodor, 1981b), in considering the 
functionalist approach to mental processes illustrates the 
approach with reference to a soft drink vending machine; the 
danger commented on here, is akin to that which arises if 
we only observe the coin rejecting ability of a machine, 
without also taking in the drink vending component. A true 
understanding of the designers intent and structure can be 
gained only by coordinating the observations from the various 
'windows' of measurement. In the case of emotion-cognition 
interactions, a wide data-base of observations of the 
influence of emotion on the component processes needs to be 
integrated before useful advances in theory will be made. 
In short, characterising emotion in terms of cognitive 
processes and structures, is not the same thing as explaining 
the influence of emotion on cognitive processes and structures. 
Much of the material reviewed in this chapter 
characterises emotion. For example in one influential 
theory emotions are characterised by nodes in semantic 
memory (Bower, 1981 ). Thus, on this score emotion 
acts no differently to any other concept with a node in 
semantic memory and it will enhance the activations of related 
events and concepts. Recently Bower and Cohen (1982) have 
acknowledged the incompleteness of the network theory of 
emotion. They note that the theory leaves unanalysed how 
emotions are aroused in the first place. Their blackboard 
model with its emotional interpretation rules is a major 
advance, and the incorporation of goals (that direct 
processing in the system) is a step towards explaining the 
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influence of emotion on cognitive processes. Unfortunately 
most of the researchers in the field are still operating the 
old way and have not yet confronted the limitations of 
their theoretical/metatheoretical frameworks. Accordingly 
for most of the remaining discussion particularly in the 
area of emotion and memory, data will be emphasised in 
preference to theory. 
Emotion and Memory Data 
(a) Congruity of presented material with current 
mood at encoding: 
Several investigators have demonstrated that where 
material is presented after an affect induction, later recall 
is influenced by the mood at encoding. Research indicating 
an encoding effect includes Nasby and Yando (1982), Bower, 
Gilligan and Monteiro (1981), Breslow, Kocsis and Belkin 
(1981), Jsen, Shalker, Clark and Karp (1978). Other research 
has found that facial cues produce significantly better recall 
to cue consistent information. (Laird, Wagener, Halal, 
& Szegda, 1982). At least one pair of researchers has 
attempted to differentiate between encoding mood induced 
response bias and discriminative ability (Natale and Hantas 
(1982». They found that mood affects both discriminative 
ability (lower discriminability of positive material when 
depressed), and also response bias (subjects show less bias 
against the recall of negative self descriptions when they 
are depressed). 
(b) Congruency between recalled material and 
retrieval mood: 
Most researchers have failed to obtain an effect of 
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retrieval mood upon the extent to which congruent material 
(recently learned) is recalled. For instance Bower et.al 
(1981) showed that inducing mood during recall produced no 
selective recall of happy vs sad incidents. One notable 
exception to this pattern of no effect with recently learned 
material is a study by Teasdale and Russell (1983), who did 
find significantly better recall of retrieval mood congruent 
words. 
Another exception to the lack of influence of 
recall mood on recall, is where the recalled material is 
personal experiences. Teasdale and Fogarty (1979) 
demonstrated that when subjects were depressed, the time to 
retrieve pleasant memories relative to unpleasant memories 
took significantly longer as compared with the time for happy 
subjects. Teasdale, Taylor and Fogarty (1980) extended this 
research by employing a design that had the same subjects 
experience each mood state. Again, the previous findings 
were confirmed, and it was found that extremely unhappy 
memories were far more likely to be retrieved in a 
depressed mood than in an elated mood. These results are 
not just a consequence of affect induction since similar 
results were obtained from patients using naturally occurring 
diurnal variation in depression as the affect manipulation 
(Clark and Teasdale 1982). Other studies showing that 
current mood affects retrieval of life experiences includes 
that of Natale et.al. (discussed in section (a)), Madigan 
and Bollenbach (1982), and Synder and White (1982). The 
last mentioned study tested the alternative hypothesis that 
the results which showed subjects reporting more affectively 
congruent information was due to experimental demand or 
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attribution processes. The results indicated that affect 
induction had to work in order that differential remembering 
of positive or negative events occur. 
(c) Congruency between moods at encoding and 
retrieval 
Bower, Monteiro and Gilligan (1978), Bow€7(1981) report 
that where' subj ects are required to learn more than one list 
of words, and where the learning is conducted under different 
moods for each list, that there is superior recall for lists 
in which recall mood is the same as learning mood. Bartlett, 
Burleson and Santrock (1982) have demonstrated similar 
results in young children, and have also demonstrated that 
the congruency superiority does not persist, when the subjects 
are given relaxation exercises prior to the experiment. 
Bartlett and Santrack (1979) also showed a mood congruency 
effect in children for free recall conditions. Finally, 
Leight and Ellis (1981) obtained state-dependent retention 
in the delayed recognition of letter sequences. Other 
results they obtained, indicated that encoding strategy was 
different in depressed vs non depressed mood; this might 
mean that at recognition there are advantages of the 
perceptual and retrieved information having undergone similar 
encoding processes. Certainly the Leight and Ellis study is 
the only one in this area, where there are obviously 
divergent encoding strategies available to subjects (at 
a presemantic level); this might be a factor in why unlike 
Bower, state dependent effects were demonstrated without 
the same subjects having to learn material while in each of 
two contrasting emotional states. 
(d) The emotional content of remembered material 
A few studies have looked at the kind of memories which 
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different kinds of subjects recall. Strongman and Beatson 
(1981) found that subjects have poor recall of past emotional 
experiences when in an interview situation. Predomin~ntly 
memories were of negative childhood experiences. Kihtstrom 
and Harackiewicz (1982) found that a younger student group 
retrieved more traumatic experiences than an older student 
group, when asked to recollect their earliest memories. 
Robinson (1980) demonstrated that the latency of report is 
inversely related to the intensity of feeling. Robinson 
(1981) demonstrated that assessment of the level of affect 
associated with retrieved memories, is affected by the 
prior cognitive context. Robinson accordingly argues that 
remembered affect might be regarded as the product of 
judgement processes rather than a straight report of encoded 
memories. 
(e) The emotional structure of stimulus materials. 
Some recent studies have demonstrated that the emotional 
content of stimulus materials can influence aspects of recall. 
Strongman (1982) showed that words within emotional sentence 
frames were better recalled than those within neutral frames. 
Strongman (Note1) replicated that effect, but some aspects 
of the study cast doubt on whether it is the emotional or 
the categorical structure of the stimuli that is responsible. 
Drtony, Turner and Antos (1983) found that in recognition 
tests, affectively negative foils that had not been seen 
before, had a higher rate of correct rejections than had 
affectively positive foils. Elmos, Dye and Hendelin (1983), 
raised the possibility that the well known affect of spacing 
on recall (e.g. Glenberg,1979), might be because of different 
levels of positive affect associated with the spacing interval. 
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They failed to substantiate their hypothesis, but their 
results did show that there was no spacing effect when the 
words to be studies were connotatively good or bad. Eysenck 
and Eysenck (1982) showed that when a monetary incentive 
was associated with words that had to be recalled, high 
incentive words obtained more processing and were better 
recalled. Finally, it should be noted that there is a 
complex relationship between stimulus materials and recall 
data. Highlighting this is the finding by Manning and 
Goldstein, (1976), that experimental conditions which result 
in generally poor performance and low rates of clustering 
increase the recall advantage enjoyed by taboo words over 
neutral words. It seems possible that emotional content will 
lead to apparently contradictory research results unless 
levels of difficulty are matched from experiment to experiment. 
(f) Other emotion related factors 
Several other factors have been found to produce effects 
on memory, or encoding. Firstly, unexpectedness or mental 
shock has been found to produce memory deficits. For example 
Loftus and Burns (1982) had subjects view a film and found 
that fewer details of the film were remembered when an 
especially violent event occured in the film. They found 
that mental shock was responsible for this - not just 
unexpectedness. Another example is a study by Runcie and 
O'Bannon (1977) in which it was found that a picture of a 
nude person inserted in a sequence of to-be-remembered 
pictures significantly reduced recognition accuracy. 
Interestingly, a skin conductance measure of arousal was 
unrelated to recognition accuracy. 
Secondly, a uniform result across many studies is that 
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depressed subjects tend to show a deficit in the recall of 
positive events. Cole (1980) found that whereas nondepressed 
subjects recalled positively toned material better than 
negatively toned material, depressives remembered both types 
of material equally well. Ingram, Smith and Brehm (1983) 
found tha.t depressed subj Bcts did not respond to success 
feedback ~y recalling more favourable self-references, 
whereas nonaepressed subjects did. Dobson and Shaw (1981) 
attempted to reduce depressives distortion in recall of 
positive feedback by having them reality test; they found 
that the distortions in recall remained, and under some 
conditions were even accentuated by reality testing 
Zuroff (1980) found negative biases in recall which were 
introduced by failure feedback, only in formerly depressed 
students, not in currently depressed or never depressed 
students. This result is consistent with that of Ingram et.al. 
~q~~, in that it indicates that schema activating conditions 
might differ for depressives and normals. 
Not all studies have found evidence of selective memory 
for negative events among depressives. Roth and Rehm (1980) 
found no evidence of selective memory for negative events 
during depression, although they demonstrated that depressives 
tend to choose negative feedback and to negatively distort 
self monitoring. Some research has questioned whether it is 
distorting schema or schema absence that produces negative 
bias for recall in depressives. Davis (197~) found only 
that there was a deficit in depressives for organisation 
of self-description adjectives. However, earlier work by 
Davis (197~) indicated that a self-schema for depressives 
does develop over time. 
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A last finding in the affect and memory area worth 
mentioning, is the non equivalence of results when differing 
affect histories precede the current (recall) affect. For 
instance Barden, Garber, Duncan and Masters (1981) found 
that a second affect-inducing experience did not remediate 
the behavioural consequences of a prior one. The effect of 
emotion on recall was not evident when prior to induction 
relaxation proceedures were employed (Bartlett, Burleson & 
Santrack, 1982). These studies confirm that the contrast 
effect of the order of presented emotion inducing materials 
reported by Manstead, Wagner and MacDonald (1983), has an 
effect on cognitive processes as well as reported affect 
intensity. 
Limitations in the Research 
The research listed above in the area of the effect 
of emotion on memory is still embryonic and working within 
the limitation of heuristic and often post hoc models. 
Little attempt has been made to analyse the phenomena in terms 
of the microprocesses postulated by cognitive psychology. 
While this has the virtue of ensuring that some studies 
retain their relevance to real life cognition and emotion 
(see Neisser (1982) for a discussion of this virtue), the 
unfortunate consequence is that emotion has come to be reduced 
to just a code in the cognitive system when it comes to 
explanation. The cognitive system almost certainly does 
employ emotion codes (see the evidence of Posner (1978) 
mentioned earlier). Rather than employing a conceptualisation 
that has the cognitive system employing emotion codes, it 
would be preferable to conceptualise results in terms of the 
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emotion system employing cognitive codes. Such a 
reconceptualisation promises to overcome some of the inherent 
weaknesses in most current approaches to the study of 
emotion and memory: 
(1) Present studies confuse the representation of an 
emotional episode with the cause of experienced emotion. 
(~ CoheA) 
BowerA (1982) has admitted that this is a ,weakness of his 
network model and has put forward a blackboard model which 
allows the distinction between emotion concept activation and 
emotion activation. 
(2) Present studies emphasise the cognitive basis of 
emotion, and emotion related memory phenomena, at the expense 
of the study of emotional control processes that regulate 
cognitive operations. Thus emotion-material congruity 
effects abound, but little has been done to examine subject 
material preferences, or encoding levels employed on less 
emotionally relevant material. 
(3) Investigation is not systematically looking for 
differences at all levels of information processing. Rather, 
it is tacitly assumed that the additional encoding of 
emotional material via activation of an emotion node is the 
only embellishment necessary to the processing system for 
cold cognitions. There has been very little attempt to 
find a process (as compared with a structure), focus for 
results. 
Reconceptualisation of the investigation to one of 'how 
does the emotion system employ cognitive codes', will 
encourage a more broad ranging investigation of emotion-
cognition interactions. The investigation of emotion clearly 
becomes the investigation of the interactions between two 
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systems, and not just demonstration of an emotional 
representation in memory. As well, the reconceptualisation 
lends itself to a theoretical linkage between cognitive 
functioning and evolution via emotion. In prospect is an 
account of cognitive sequences in terms of the behavioural 
objectives (evolutionarily determined) that they meet. 
Plutchik (1980) provides a useful typology of such objectives. 
The Influence of Affect on Decision Processes 
There are a number of studies that demonstrate 
influences of affect on human decision making. These studies 
amplify the point made in the last section, that the 
influence of emotion is not just on the accessibility of 
material, but is also on the processes employed on 
information. Toda (1980) provides the elements of a frame-
work for examining the role that emotions play in decision 
processes. Firstly, emotion makes a certain class of 
behaviours and decisions readily available, and usually these 
primed behaviours are suitable to the invoking environment. 
Secondly, Toda suggests that we may use anticipatory emotions 
to provide the costs and the rewards to be associated with 
particular decision outcomes. 
Isen, Means, Patrick and Nowichi (1982), also suggest 
that current affective state may be important in behavioural 
decisions and demonstrate that current positive affect 
reduces the tendency to take options that might risk such 
current affect. Isen and Means (1983) obtained evidence from 
a task that required subjects to choose the best of a 
number of alternativ~s, that elimination by aspects was more 
prevalent among happy subjects than among control subjects. 
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Within this task, such a strategy resulted in an increase in 
efficiency and Isen et.al. (1982) provides other evidence 
than an increase in creative problem solving ability may 
also accompany positive affect. Affect has also been shown 
to produce a global influence on estimates of risk that does 
not derive from the relatedness of the affect inducer to the 
situation which is being estimated (Johnson and Tversky 1983). 
Along similar lines momentary affect has been shown to 
influence judgements of life satisfaction (Schwartz and 
Clore, 1983). 
The conclusions of Schwartz et.al. are similar to those 
of Johnson and Tversky; both suggest that momentary 
affective states are used in computing other assessments, 
and accordingly we make judgements compatible with our current 
mood. Such results which implicate current emotional state 
in the assessment of other matters suggest that emotional 
assessment may be an important, albeit hidden, factor in a 
wide range of judgements. Seen in this light, Toda's 
suggestion of the use of anticipatory emotions in behavioural 
decisions, is merely an extension of the utilisation of 
emotion in the assessment of the present. Thus there is 
some empirical support for his suggestion, although more 
research must be performed in this area. 
One other area where emotion is of relevance in 
decision making is in how emotionally encoded material 
can influence normal reasoning processes. Revlin, 
Leirer, Yopp and Yopp (1980) have examined the effect 
of controversial premises on categorical inference. They 
found that there was evidence for a converted encoding-of 
premises that could account for the 'belief-bias' effect. 
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(The 'belief bias' effect is the tendency for solvers to 
adopt solutions to categorical syllogisms that are congruent 
with the solvers favoured belief, in preference to correctly 
deduced solutions). Thus, Revlin et.al. argues that 
Americans will have the tendency to encode "All Bolshevicks 
are Russians" as "All Russians are Bolshevicks". Evans, 
Barston and Pollard (1983) controlled for conversion and 
still found belief bias was a significant factor that was 
more marked on invalid than on valid syllogisms. Hammond 
(\q7b ) working within a different framework, points out that 
there can be considerable conflict between parties with 
fundamentally the same decision function. He argues that 
such disagreements can arise because of the limited capacity 
of the decision maker involved in quasirational judgements. 
In short, Hammond downplays the influence of non cognitive 
forces in human judgement distortions. Yet here what is 
being downplayed is the extent of Freudian rationalisation 
in reasoning processes. Hammond is still consistent with 
the observation of Einhorn & Hogath, 0981), people interpret 
stimuli rather than respond to them; here stored affect 
must be thought important. 
A study which emphasises the way in which affective 
factors may be important in influencing the way that new 
information interacts with old and alters conclusions is 
that of Sherman and Voss (1982). They showed that the 
information recalled from a prose passage about the USSR, 
was influenced by the attitude of the subject, when the 
passage was congruent with the established beliefs of the 
subject. When the passage was incongruent with the subject's 
expectations, then the subject's knowledge of USSR was 
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predictive of passage recall. Taking these results together, 
there is evidence that an affective predjudice dominates and 
facilitates encoding with new information under some 
conditions. 
Attitudes taken into a situation can also be critical 
for the processing that occurs in the situation. Boggiano 
and Hertel (1983) demonstrated this in an experiment where 
an initial attitude towards a task was found to produce a 
differential ability to recall information that was congruent 
with the attitude. Thus, it must be concluded that for 
decision processes working with stored information and new 
input, the decision procedure is likely to be prone to 
effects deriving from the encoded attitude. A major perhaps 
defining difference between the concept of attitude and the 
concept of stored information is the affective component 
postulated for attitudes (e.g. Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). 
There is also another path whereby stored information 
may influence decision, and that is, if the content of the 
stored information is congruent with an irrational belief 
system, then negative affect might be triggered and produce 
resulting changes in decision processes. Rohsenow and 
Smith (1982) have demonstrated that the extent that subjects 
subscribe to the irrational belief set of Ellis (1977), 
predicted the daily emotion ratings of the subjects. So as 
well as the influence of affective markers stored with 
information, the actual content of information stored will 
have consequences for emotional activity and decision 
processes. 
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Implications of the Emotion-Decision Making Research 
The effects of emotion on decision processes can be 
regarded as consistent with the well known effects of emotion 
on action tendencies (e.g. O'Malley & Andrews 1983, Masters, 
Barden, and Ford, 1979, Aderman 1972). The study of 
emotion-decision process interactions is a necessary part 
of the study of the effects of emotion on behaviour. This 
is because decision processes are the precursors to actions 
and except in non reflective actions, can be considered to be 
determining. Since such well defined consequences of 
emotion can be demonstrated, the possibility of a theoretical 
linkage between emotion theory and evolutionary theory is 
raised. The memory data may become more predictable within 
such a scheme. 
For instance Tversky and Kahneman (1973) put forward 
as a factor in decision making the'availability heuristic', 
and they show that one estimates the frequency of a class 
by the ease with which its instances are brought to mind. 
This heuristic becomes highly functional if at times of 
danger or threat, previous negative experiences are more 
readily brought to mind, and the associated behavioural 
options are more frequently avoided than at low risk times. 
The effect of emotion state memory effects in combination 
with the availability heuristic is to avoid the compounding 
of risk factors in situations of threat. By similar reasoning, 
risk factors will be underestimated at times of comparative 
advantage, and the exploration of new behavioural options 
is more likely at such times. 
The evolutionary significance of emotion has long had 
a place in the explanation of the form and function of 
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emotions (e.g. Darwin, 1872). However, apart from studies 
on the universality of expressions and their interpretation 
across cultures (e.g. Ekman and Friesen 1971, Izard 1977), 
psychologists have tended to study emotion within the 
cultural context rather than the biological context. To 
an extent this reflects the fact that the significance of 
emotions is to be found in various strata of the organism. 
For instance, it is possible to trace the effects of emotion 
on the physiology of the organism, on behaviour, on 
phenomenology, to name a few of the possible levels of 
analysis. But not all strata are equally relevant to a 
biological-evolutionary perspective, and the psychologists 
pre-occupation with defining stimulus-invariant behavioural 
sequences places explanations in terms of situations and 
responses at a premium - to the expense of a more biologically 
relevant approach. The problem is that contemporary emotion 
theories (with some exceptions) devote themselves to the 
analysis of all situations where affect is encountered, and 
does not make two fundamental distinctions in the data base 
of emotion: 
1) To divide performance into incidental and invoked 
performance. 
2) To divide competence into designed competence and 
obtained competence. 
The first dichotomy above divides emotion data into primary 
and secondary components of performance. For example, 
changes in arousal states are ubiquitous for emotions yet 
these are merely enabling aspects of emotion and do not 
contain any consequences for interaction with the 
environment, except those consequences carried by the action 
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sequences with which they correlate. Contrast arousal as 
a secondary performance component, with facial expression 
which carries information and will provide responses from 
cohabiters of the environment. In as much as facial 
expressions alter the environment, they are a primary 
component of performance, and of great interest. This first 
division separates the data of relevance to an evolutionary 
perspective on the design of emotion systems from data that 
is incidental to such a perspective. 
The second dichotomy is less straight forward, and 
requires dividing the compentencies underlying performance 
into those of an evolutionary origin, and those of a social 
origin. Of course, the dichotomy is partly false since it 
has been pointed out that the interaction between inheritance 
and experience is important in accounting for behaviour 
(e.g. Woodward 1982, Patry 1983). The important distinction 
between these two competencies is that those of a social 
origin are available only with the correct learning sequence, 
whereas there is a degree of innateness about the evolved 
competency. (See Schilcher, ~982) for a discussion of the 
limitations of the innateness idea). Innateness as used 
here does not mean unlearned, because most behaviours and 
psychological processes have a learned component. Rather, 
innateness is ascribed when the competency is not part 
of a socially evolved solution to an environment. Any 
socially evolved solution will of course be dependent on 
biological components (even if only because the physiological 
structure making movement possible is genetically determined). 
It is very important then to show the historic origins of 
behavioural complexes because they can demonstrate what 
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aspects of the complex are socially evolved. 
The residue from excluding incidental performance and 
obtained competence is the data base for developing an 
emotion theory linking psychological and biological substrates. 
The suggestion developed in the previous paragraph 
that emotion theory base itself on the consideration of data 
with particular characteristics is developed more fully in 
the next chapter. The fundamental idea is (as the 
section on the affective influences on decision making 
highlights) that there are few situations in person-environment 
interactions where affect is not implicated in the decisions. 
But, while affective influences are pervasive, it is best to 
develop separate theories about the design of emotion, systems, 
and about the utilisation of emotion systems. Psychology 
has to admit its cultural determinants and divide its efforts 
between discovery of principles that need no referencing to 
the culturally determined learning environment, and between 
a contentful psychology that is referenced to the meaning 
structures within a culture. 
The division of the data base has been advocated in 
the light of the impressive demonstrations of the effect 
of emotional states on decisionmaking does not just carry 
implications for a biological-functionalist theory of emotion. 
It also suggests that we take seriously as a separate question 
just how we can use assemblages of mental structures tied 
together via cultural symbol systems to produce desired 
behaviours. That is to say, as well as the question of 
adaptive psychological structures with respect to the 
general idea of environment, there is also the question of 
specific information processing abilities and response 
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sequences to particular environments. Binnie-Dawson (1982) 
in outlining a bio-social approach to environmental psychology 
notes the interaction between biological and social influences 
on the psychological system and that " ••• the functionalists 
were concerned with the study of adaptive acts in relation 
to the general concept of environment, they were not concerned 
with adaptation to specific environments" (p.407). In line 
with Binnie-Dawson's recognition that many processes are 
bio-social in origin, and also consistent with theorists 
who suggest gene-culture co evolutionary processes (e.g. 
Wilson and Lumbsden, 1981), it is acknowledged here that 
biological-functionalist theories of emotion are not on 
their own sufficient to account for human behaviour. They 
I 
I 
must be supplemented by theories that account fo~ the 
learned adaptations in human capabilities. 
Chapter Overview and General Discussion 
This chapter has looked at a wide range of research 
from that of the emotion attribution literature to the 
influences that emotional states have on human decision 
making. Emotional states are very difficult to measure, 
and there is a cultural input to what people recognise as 
an emotion, making the study of the effects and functions 
of emotion extremely difficult. The distinction between 
emotions and the behavioural consequences of emotions is 
to an extent fostered by the scientific and therapeutic 
convenience of such a scheme, and might not be the best way 
of understanding emotion. Considerable controversy has been 
engendered by the artificial and too general categories 
being employed by emotion theorists. The dispute over whether 
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cognition is necessary for affect is one such non issue 
which has been considered in this chapter. Another area 
where emotion theory might be suffering from the breadth 
of a used construct is in the two factor theory arousal 
attribution approach. 
When the influences of emotion, and the processes 
comtemporary with emotion, on cognitive processes were 
considered, it was evident that much of this research is 
piecemeal in nature. The outline of the conclusions of 
Eysenck (1982) in the area of arousal and memory, demonstrated 
that simple theories such as Walker's (1958) action decrement 
theory provide ready interpretations when it comes to 
single experiments, but are inadequate to integrate the 
findings across the entire field. It was also questioned 
whether more complex cognitive theories that originate from 
a componential cognitive meta-theory are adequate for 
explaining emotion. It was suggested that most of the 
research conducted in the area of emotion and memory suffered 
from the lack of a theoretical structure with which to 
organise the results by. An acknowledgement of the 
inadequacy of the most employed semantic network model of 
emotion processing by its author (Bower and Cohen op cit), 
demonstrates this point. The work on the influence of 
emotion on decision processes was considered significant to 
the development of emotion theory. Firstly, it is not tied 
as tightly as the memory research to a cognitive structure 
account of its results,and secondly the connection of these 
results with the functional significance of emotion (in a 
biological sense), seems possible and explanatory. 
There is no clearly advantageous approach or meta-theory 
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that has emerged out of the issues in this chapter. 
However there is the suggestion that emotional processes are 
best conceptualised as operating on and changing the nature 
of normal cognitive functioning. It is also clear that the 
self-schema plays an important part in regulating affect 
and conversely affect is important in the ongoing operation 
of the self-schema. Thus there seems to be some evidence 
for Epsteins (1982) suggestion that emotions emerge out 
of events of significance for the personal theory of reality 
incorporated within the person. Epstein suggests that the 
personal theory of reality arises out of the need for the 
infant to maintain a favourable pleasure/pain ratio, and is 
thus intimately associated with the experience of emotions. 
He suggests that emotions typically occur when a theory of 
reality suceeds or fails in its functions of assimilating 
experience, maintaining a favourable pain/pleasure balance, 
and maintaining a favourable level of sel~ esteem. It is 
suggested here that a theory such as this one is a useful 
aid to the organisation of the results reviewed in this 
chapter. 
In Figure (1-2) a slightly expanded representation 
of Epsteins theory is presented. An unconscious self schema 
directs encoding by referencing input to itself, and that 
input is then represented in the cognitive system. The 
object-person representation in the cognitive system may 
not correspond to the object-self relation in actuality 
because it is arrived at after the mediation of other 
material stored in memory. Thus for example I might not 
have a conscious representation of teacher as self imperiling 
because that is not congruent with the culturally determined 
FIGURE (1-2). A DIAGRAH OF A flODIFIED VERSION OF THE HODEL OF EPSTEIN (1982). 
STHWLUS 
AFFECT 
,SELF 
ENCODING ------~ EPRESENTATION 
SCHEHA 
ACTIONS 
The self-schema influences object encoding. The encoding process results in a representation 
of a situation. Processed elements of the situation are related via the self-schema, and 
may result in affective states that will influence encoding and response tendencies. Actions 
are decided on through both conscious heuristics that operate on representations ,and 
unconscious heuristics that are applied via the self-schema. 
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description of teachers as wise and helpful. Nevertheless, 
other information processed automatically will be monitored 
by the self schema, and will influence the fundamental) 
approach-avoidance tendency. For instance, teacher's 
posture, gestures, tone of voice will be sum~edby th~ self 
schema, and approach avoidance tend ncies d~terciined. 
Affects then can be regarded aB the sensatlonal basis whereby 
the 'primitive' self system experiences the worl'd. Affects 
are relational in the sense that they form an experience 
between subject and object or subject and world. (This 
has been suggested elsewhere by Riveral (1977)). Affects 
are actional in that they carry evolutionary significance 
and produce action tendencies and also representational 
tendencies. That is, affective states will induce the 
cognitive system to emphasise relational encodings congruent 
with the affective state.' 
This sketch of a theory of emotion will be expanded in 
a later chapter, but here, it should only be noted that data 
can be organised about a number of categories that derive 
from this model. 
(a) Stimulus influences on affect. 
It has been suggested that some stimuli invoke 
genetically determined responses (e.g. Kartsounis and 
Pickersgill (1981)). These stimuli do not derive their 
affective significance from learning experiences. 
(b) Affective influences on encoding and representation 
Here much of the literature on emotion and memory lies. 
For instance, the work of Bower et.al. (1981) which showed 
superior recall for material congruent with mood at encoding. 
(c) Situational encoding by self schema 
This is an incidental category that would include the 
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evidence of Bower (1981), Bower et.al (1978) for emotion 
state dependant effects. It would also include much of the 
emotion attribution literature. Non attributed arousal is 
monitored by the self schema and can give rise to genuine 
affective states which in the case of Bowers memory experiments 
can operate as event markers. 
(d) Representational influences on affect 
This interaction is predicted from figure ~7~.The self 
schema operating on the object representation and automatically 
encoded situational information will produce a fundamental 
approach-avoidance action tendancy that will be affectively 
coloured by the object-self relationship which it is primed 
to react by. Certain representations will lend more support 
to self-schema interpretations and thus will lead to 
greater affect. For instance, Lang (1979) found evidence 
that greater arousal was obtained from image response 
training than image stimulus training. 
The significance of these categories is to remove data 
from reference to experimental paradigms and into relation-
ship to theory. Also, the categories emphasise that the 
self-emotion system can be regarded as a system that utilises 
the cognitive system and must be regarded as non reducible 
to the properties of that system. 
The suggested categories do not amount to a new 
conceptualisation of emotion, nor should they be regarded 
as the best way of dividing research issues deriving from 
Epsteins theoretical position. They are put forward at this 
point of the thesis; partly to provide an example of an 
alternative to the piecemeal way emotion research is 
presented within the dominant cognitive meta-theory; partly 
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because the categories exist also as questions which must be 
answered by emotion researchers. The categories will thus 
be addressed again later in chapter 6 which looks at the 
development of a theory of emotion. 
We conclude again emphasising that the review presented 
here has found that the study of emotion by cognitive 
psychologists has raised some interesting phenomena, but 
that cognitive metatheory has to date not provided a useful 
understanding of affect. This thesis emphasises that the 
question of emotional codes within the cognitive system 
should not supplant the study of how the emotion system 
employs cognitive codes. 
Chapter Two: Genetic Systems, Emotion Systems, 
Personality Systems. 
Introduction 
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This chapter concerns itself with the question of how 
a theory of personality can be developed that is capable of 
explaining personality processes through an understanding of 
behavioural, physiological, and genetic processes of 
structures. Miller (1978) suggests that there are emergent 
properties which are characteristic of complex systems and 
are more than the sum of lower order system outputs. These 
he suggests are not to be discussed in vague and mystical 
terms, but must be understood with reference to the concepts 
used in the understanding of lower level systems, with other 
necessary new concepts added. If we regard personality as 
an emergent property of the interaction of the various 
emotional, motivational, cognitive, action, and perceptual 
systems that playa part in human information processing, 
then it is necessary that the influences which each of the 
subsystems has on personality processes be studied. 
Otherwise a purely trait based personality psychology falls 
into the trap of equating a measure of behavioural regularity 
with an explanation of that behavioural regularity (Hampshire 
(1953), Buss and Craik (1983)). While the role of traits in 
scientific explanation is not totally settled (e.g. Hogan 
(1983), Rorer and Widiger (1983)), it would be hard not to 
agree with Posner (1981) when in calling for an approach 
to individual differences that links theoretical concepts to 
underlying biological mechanisms he wrote: " •. . the 
attractive part of the psychobiological approach to individual 
differences appears to us to rest on its promising of 
61 
information about the relative organisation of internal 
mechanisms within an individual, rather than being merely 
a means to compare people on some attribute •.•• If 
intraindividual differences in the structure of mechanisms 
can be combined with a detailed information processing frame-
work, we might be able to develop a more satisfying approach 
to the problem of individual behaviour." (p.34-35). In line 
with this hope, the present chapter looks at the nature of 
explanation in extant personality theories, and outlines 
some of the considerations needed in the development of a 
unified psychology of the human being. 
The Structure of Personality Theory 
Maddi (1976) differentiates the parts of a personality 
theory into core statements, developmental statements and 
peripheral statements. As well, personality theory contains 
connections between these higher order statements and data 
statements about the thoughts, feelings and actions of the 
individuals who the personality theory is used to make 
more comprehensible. Such different levels of personality 
theory can admit the involvement of biological, motivational, 
emotional etc, subsystems, primarily through its core 
statements, and its peripheral statements. Developmental 
statements are taken to be statements about the interaction 
of core tendancies and characteristics of the outside 
world. They involve the structures and processes identified 
+0 
by the core statements,~which they add those conditions 
of the world that influence developmental processes. 
Developmental processes produce the periphr~ of 
personality that mainfests as personality type~ and 
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characteristics. 
In terms of the biological and biologically correlated 
functional systems of the person, developmental statements 
involve the characteristics of the subsystem, and the 
characteristics of the environment in their nexus of 
explanation. The range of peripheral personality possibilities 
is limited by the nature of the biological subsystems, with 
the environment the determinant of which subset of the range 
of possibilities becomes the persons operating characteristics. 
The peripheral statements are dependent upon the interactions 
between the processes identified by core statements and the 
formative processes identified in developmental statements. 
It is thus clear that in assessing the degree to which a 
personality theory can be an integral part of a general 
theory of living systems, the evaluation is possible by 
surveying the extent to which the core statements can be 
linked to statements about other subsystem processes and 
structures within the living organism. 
In surveying Maddi's listing of the statements 
concerning the core of personality, one finds that most of 
the theorists he covers have core statements that do not 
totally rule out the possibility of statements linking the 
existence of functioning of organismic subsystems to the 
emergence of personality processes. In agreement with this 
observation Miller (1978), finds it possible to draw 
parallels between the theory of living systems and the 
personality theories of Murray, Freud, and Menninger. The 
druw3 
parallels that MillerAbetween his theory of living systems, 
and these personality theories, could be extended to a large 
number of other theories of personality. The extension 
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would be bounded by existential theories of personality 
such as those of Binswanger (1963) and Boss (1963) who call 
for existential psychology to remain with experienced and 
experienceable facts and phenomena. Miller does distinguish 
theories of personality from his theory of living systems; 
extant personality theories deal with abstracted systems, 
whereas the approach that Miller takes works with concrete 
systems. Miller argues for the advantages in working with 
concrete systems, so it is worth considering why the study 
of personality processes has fallen within the theoretical 
framework of abstract systems. But first the distinction 
between abstract and concrete systems will be outlined. 
Concrete and Abstract Systems 
11 A concrete, real or veridical system is a nonrandom 
accumulation of matter-energy, in a region in physical 
space-time, which is organised into interacting interrelated 
subsystems or components. 11 (Miller 1978, p.17). 
lIThe uni ts of abstracted systems are relationships 
abstracted or selected by an observer in the light of his 
interests, theoretical viewpoint, or philosophical bias. 
Some relationships may be empirically determinable by some 
operation carried out by the observer, but others are not, 
being only his concepts. 11 (Miller 1978, p.19). 
The fundamental distinction between an abstract and a 
concrete system can be demonstrated by contrasting the kinds 
of statements about system properties under the two approaches. 
In concrete systems the scientist discovers A that has the 
property r, whereas in abstract systems the problem becomes 
one of finding an A that has the property r. The practical 
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reasons for preferring concrete over abstract systems which 
are given by Miller are: 
1) Concrete systems embedded as they are in space-time 
coordinates, adhere to the concrete world which we 
experience. This makes the theory of concrete systems 
easier to comprehend and develop than the theory of abstract 
systems. 
2) Total system variance is composed of variation in 
relationships, and the variations produced by individual 
units. Only concrete system theories allow for the variance 
associated with uniqueness of the individual unit. 
3) Concrete system theory is more complete, because it is 
constrained to take into account the markers that transfer 
information from system to system. (For example, abstract 
system theory has no way of integrating the contemporaneous 
change in the abstract systems of roles (citizento prisoner) 
and sustenances (steak to bread).). 
4) Cutting across the lines of cleavage of a concrete 
system in obtaining the c~nceptual boundaries of abstract 
systems, threatens conceptual confusion when it comes to 
reconstitute the total system from its abstracted subsystems. 
5) Natural sciences work with concrete systems, and if 
the social sciences were to take the same course, then the 
unification of all the sciences would be accelerated. 
Lorenz (1981) points out that just as the physicist, 
so the biologist proceeds from the bottom to the top, or 
from the particular to the more general. Thus Lorenz (1981) 
states: 
liAs investigators of behaviour, we hope in the end to 
trace the phenomena which we study back to physical and 
65 
chemical processes such as those that take place at the 
synapses, among the electrically charged cell membranes, 
and in the conduction of excitation" (p.17). The point 
being made here is that the behavioural scientist moves 
from particular behaviours, to the explanation of the 
behaviour through reductionism. This should not be regarded 
as trivial, for as Chance (1980) points out, in the moving 
from behaviour to physiology in the case of the investigation 
of the orienting reflex, behaviourists have neglected doing 
a complex behavioural investigation of the specific nature 
of the orienting reflex. The lack of investigation at the 
behavioural level Chance argues, has led to an imperfect 
scientific understanding of the phenomena. 
Personality theorists with the possible exception of 
theorists of a behaviourist persuasion, have started with the 
careful study of the phenomena that require explanation. 
These phenomena include behaviour patterns, thought and 
feeling patterns, imagery and cognitive structures. In 
Lorenz's terms personality theorists have started with the 
particular. However, it is argued here that they have been 
seduced through employing abstract systems, into not 
attempting to relate the specific behavioural and thought 
patterns discovered, to a more general theoretical framework. 
They have used the embarrassing richness of the contents 
of personality phenomena to provide abstract systems with 
which to account for subsets of personality phenomena. They 
have then attempted to extend their systems by overgeneralisa-
tion, or by increase in the number of orientations that the 
abstracted relationships are derived from. 
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Examples of Abstract Personality Theory 
Some justification of the strong statements of the 
last sentence are needed. Since the order of generality is 
such that most of the personality theories of the last 
hundred years are included by implication, a fair and 
exhaustive justification is beyond the bounds of this chapter. 
Instead, it will be shown that two major exemplars of 
personality theory have incurred costs by remaining 
abstracted system theories, and it is argued that most 
personality theories lie on a continum of which the two 
chosen theories form poles. As well, evidence will be 
presented that many modern personality theorists are aware 
of the impendance to the development of trully comprehensive 
theories of personality. These theorists are moving away 
from abstract systems, and although they do not voice their 
concerns in these terms, there is a developing trend in 
modern personology towards theories of personality that 
integrate the theory of personality with knowledge derived 
from the scientific investigation of biological systems. 
A personality theorist who stands at a methodology driven 
end of personality theorising is R.B. Cattell. Cattell (1977) 
has asserted that trait based explanations are necessary in 
the set e rm s : 
"The question of whether traits exist in the meaning 
given here - that of a correlation cluster (surface trait) 
or of a unique invariant factor (source trait) in behaviour 
manifestations, as correlated over time or over people -
is a matter for experiment and calculation, not apriori 
theories." (p.167). 
It is clear from this statement, that given that 
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psychological variables exhibit any kind of correlational 
structure at all, that thi~ approach by virtue of its 
methodological necessity, will yield traits to embellish a 
theory of personality. The emphasis that Cattell places on 
the inductive nature of hypothesis formation also testifies 
to his concern for a ready account of the surface structure 
of his data. It would be unfair to Cattell to claim that he 
totally dismisses the importance of deduction and experimental 
confirmation in his approach to theory building, neither is 
it true to say that he has regarded empirically invariant 
factors without reference to the wider body of psychological 
knowledge, to be sufficient for theory building. The approach 
that Cattell takes though, is nevertheless guaranteed to 
generate a structural model of personality and personality 
processes, and the nature and completeness of the model is 
dependent on the nature and completeness of the personality 
domain samples. Pervin (1975) has summarised this and a 
number of other objections to the validity of Cattell's 
empirically driven approach to personality theory. When the 
problems of sampling are aligned with the problems in 
assuming that factor analytic categories represent underlying 
structures (cf Overall, 1964), then the obvi~us danger is 
that Cattell's system has managed to contain the variance 
rather than explain the variance. The extent to which the 
inductive factor analytic approach of Cattell has been 
adequate in terms of being a coherent and comprehensive 
theory of personality will not be considered here, but the 
point being made is that his methods generate an abstract 
system theory, which overgeneralises explanatory concepts 
at places, and is not initially constrained to cut the 
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planes of organismic functioning in accord with the structure 
of the physical system. 
A second personality theorist whose theory derived from 
clinical experience is in contrast with that of Cattell, but 
has had an even greater impact on personality theory is Freud. 
In spite of his early formulation of a project for a 
scientific psychology (Freud 1966a), in terms distinctly 
similar to modern nodal network theories (Wicklegren 1979, 
Collins and Loftus 1975, McClelland and Rummelhar~ 1981), the 
later Freud was content to state that the location of 
mental life was the brain, but that " .•. our acts of 
consciousness, which are immediate data and cannot be further 
explained by any sort of description." (1966 p.144). Freud 
saw the more extensive knowledge of the neurological 
substrate as merely providing a localisation of acts of 
consciousness and as being of no help in the understanding 
of these acts of consciousness. On the other hand, the 
identification of the id with " ... everything that is inherited, 
that is present, at birth, that is laid down in the 
constitution . .. ", points towards the acknowledgement of the 
importance of neurological organisation and function in 
explicating (Freud 1966b, p.145) the unconscious areas of 
psychic life. Indeed this importance of biological factors 
on the determination of conscious life is the second 
fundamental principle of psychoanalysis (Freud 1966b, p.158). 
It is thus, hard not to come to the conclusion that Freud 
was committed to a psychology that rooted the causes of 
consciousness in the biological substrate. He saw that the 
processes of scientific observation and inference should be, 
used on " .. . the breaks in the sequence of psychical 
t 1". d t even s... ,In or er 0 understand the nature of the 
processes that give rise to consciousness. Freud's 
committment to the formulation of his theory of personality 
in a manner which allowed a strict psycho-physical parallelism, 
certainly is evidence that it was the intention of Freud 
to develop concrete rather than abstract system theory. 
Unfortunately the expressed committment to psycho-
physical parallelism, did not result in Freud's development 
of his personality theory in a form which made it possible 
to tie together the contents of experience, and the biological 
substratum in any tangible manner. This is reflected in the 
degree to which the psychological structures thought to be 
important in the ebb and flow of mental life received 
personification in Freuds writings. There are many instances 
of this metaphorical quality in Freuds papers, a typical 
example is found in his lecture entitled 'Dissection of the 
Personality', given in 1932, where he discusses the nature 
of id-ego relations: 11 The relation to the external world 
has become the decisive factor for the ego; it has taken on 
the task of representing the external world to the id -
fortunately for the id, which could not escape destruction 
if, in its blind efforts for the satisfaction of its instincts, 
it disregarded that supreme external power. 2". OQvidsOn and 
Neale (1978) also observe the reification of this metaphorical 
characteristic in Freuds writing, and Mischel (1976) 
notes also the difficulty of integrating some of Freuds 
picturesque language with scientific psychology. 
Given then, that Freud employed metaphors that frequently 
used the personification and animation of his theory's 
1 Freud 1966b p.159 2 Freud 1966c p.75 
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Psychological structures to convey the dynamics of 
psychological functioning, does this of necessity remove 
Freudian theory from being aligned with the concrete systems 
theory advocated by Miller? Freud's psychology as exemplified 
in the examples cited here certainly has the problem that 
the markers that transfer imformation from one system to 
another are not specified. The famous reference (Freud 
1966c p.??) where Freud compares the relation of the ego to 
the id with that between the rider and horse exemplifieB the 
deficiency in the language in which his theories are 
formulated. While important relationships are afforded by 
the analogy, and the range of relationships offered by the 
analogy might well encompass the range of relationships 
observable in everyday living, the parsimony offered by the 
analogy in describing behaviour, in no way compensates for 
the inability to infer organic processes from such descriptions. 
Freud of course moved freely between the personification of 
his constructs, and the language of cathexis and instinctual 
energies. But while energy conservation was an important 
restraint in his model, energy relations, and the topological 
regions of personality, can hardly have been said to form 
a bridge between Freuds abstract analysis of psychodynQ~iL 
processes and the biological ~onstraints of the functioning 
system. 
The brief discussion of the personality theories of 
Cattell and Freud, has demonstrated that there is a major 
gap between theories of personality, and other theories of 
behaviour. Such a gap is not necessarily undesirable, given 
the complex influences of socialisation and culture on the 
development of the personality. However, what is most 
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undesirable is the demonstrated prospect that in formulating 
theories of personality, the divide between this area of 
scientific endeavour, and the areas of scientific endeavour 
outside of personality theory grow irreconcilably large. 
Unless there is a commitment, based on good evidence, that 
evolutionary processes and their concommittant biological 
structures and predispositions are of no influence in those 
behaviours that form the data of personality theory, then 
any approach that threatens to divorce personality theory 
from the rest of human psychology must be looked at with 
alarm. 
The comments just made on the wide seperation between 
personality theory, and other subareas of psychological and 
biological science, reflect a general disquiet amongst 
psychologists as a whole about the relevance and scientific 
status of much personality theory. Posner (1981) has 
highlighted the potential of the information processing 
framework in conjunction with the knowledge of biological 
mechanisms as an approach that might be more satisfying in 
terms of understanding individual behaviour than that 
provided by cognitive style, psychometric, or pure information 
processing theories. He concludes that t1 ••• goa l s in both 
developmental and adult research may best be realised only 
if research in information processing is linked to biological 
mechanisms of attention.t1 
Amongst other more mainstream investigators of 
personality and individual differences, a recent important 
volume contains two calls to place personality theory with 
respect to biological and evolutionary processes. Bem 
(1983) argues that 'personological theorists' in order to 
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have a common set of variables for characterising all persons 
must refer to genotypic features rather than what he 
describes as " .•• the phenotypic hybrids of person and 
environment that abound in the lay persons lexicon, for 
these are precisely the kinds of descriptions that have 
varying relevance across persons and, hence are useful only 
for characterising subsamples of the population." (p.207). 
In the same volume, Hogan (1983) notes that the various 
personality theories are projections of their author's own 
biographies which their authors claim to be universal 
afflictions. Hogan argues for a point of view on personality 
that has a more impersonal perspective. He puts forward a 
socioanalytic theory of personality that is considerably 
influenced by evolutionary theory. He posits certain fixed 
biological motives being very important in forming the core 
of "human nature", and the stuff of person variation. 
It is thus becoming clear that the subjectivity of 
traditional personality theory is of concern to contemporary. 
theorists. There is a widespread recognition that one way 
of overcoming this subjectivity is by referencing theories 
of individual differences to theories relating to the 
underlying biological sUbstrate. Unfortunately there is a 
fatal logical flaw in the way in which some of these 
proposals are formulated, and this will be discussed in the 
section relating genetic systems to personality systems. 
First, two other approaches to the study of personality of 
contemporary origin will be briefly examined, because they 
represent the most significant alternatives in the field 
besides the call to biological-evolutionary naturalism. 
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Some Recent Developments in Personality Research 
The act frequency approach to personality has recently 
been advocated by Buss and Craik (1983). They regard 
dispositions as natural cognitive categories, with acts as 
members. Dispositions function as summaries about behaviour 
up to the present, and by the implication of character 
continuity, these summaries should be good for the future 
as well. In adopting this approach, Buss and Craik argue 
that they are distinguishing the distinct scientific 
endeavours of mapping regularities in conduct, and that of 
providing casual or explanatory accounts. The act frequency 
approach however goes beyond merely ·being a method, its 
position is that dispositional constructs are categories of 
acts emerging as a consequence of sociocultural evolution. 
By following this line, the act frequency approach shifts the 
endeavour of explanation from that of predicting behaviour, 
to predicting perceptions. The major demonstration of the 
act frequency approach is that of high composite reliability 
of prototypicality ratings for act categories. This shows 
that taking all observers together for a given reference 
person, there is likely to be a high degree of social 
consensus about that person after a comparatively short 
period of time. Such a possibility suggests a large number 
of new ways of studying personality (for instance the 
consequences of repeated act incompatibility on trait 
ascription, the consequences of trait ascription on act 
frequency), but it does not substantially address the 
question of whether there is at some level, fundamentally 
different organismic structures, that differentiate 
personality types. With the act frequency approach to 
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personality, the question of "whether personality types 
underlie act categories still awaits a theoretical basis. 
This is acknowledged by Craik & Buss in their paper when 
they suggest that the a,ct frequency approach and various 
explanatory systems could offer an important road to the 
revival of theoretical discourse in personality. Even 
though the approach reflects a major shift in emphasis for 
personality theory and its agenda during the next few years, 
Mischel, 1983; Epstein, 1979, 1983; exemplify others that 
use new methods to obtain reliable act categories), it does 
not contradict a call for a biological-evolutionary approach 
to theorising about individual differences. Rather it 
promises to enhance such an approach with more reliable 
measures of individual dispositions. 
A second major approach to studying personality which is 
gaining momentum as a potentially fruitful way of approaching 
the problems of personality theory, is the systematic 
distortion hypothesis framework. Schweder (1982) in 
discussing the relationship of the systematic distortion 
hypothesis to trait based classifications says: "The 
systematic distortion hypothesis is a critique of the 
validity of personality classifications induced from memory-
based personality ratings, implicit personality theory, or 
conceptual association judgements. The hypothesis implies 
that if one were to eliminate error and systematic bias from 
memory-based personality data one would not discover global 
traits, broad syndromes, or general factors, but rather a 
complex of context-dependent truths, person by situation by 
response mode statistical interaction effects, and unstable 
intercorrelations among events, or alternatively said, that 
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which is accurate in personality ratings would not support 
a global trait approach to individual differences in conduct." 
(p.82). The statement above ties the systematic distortion 
hypothesis to the criticisms of trait theories and measure-
ments initiated by Mischel (1968). It goes further than 
these criticisms, in that it posits the existence of 
systematic distortions in the memory based ascription of 
traits, which is an addition to the problems of cross 
situational stability and temporal reliability. 
The question that must arise with such a radical departure 
from the global trait model, is what does this approach 
leave the personologist to do? In its most radical form, 
the systematic distortion hypothesis would argue that there 
is no nec~ssity nor is it desirQ~\e , to posit traits and 
because of this, it easily can be aligned with a behaviouristic 
formulation of personality. But in fact, Schweder acknowledges 
the existence of traits, but argues that they predict too 
few of the people too much of the time, and that our memory 
based ascriptions of trait are systematically distorted. 
The systematic distortion hypothesis does not 
represent a new thrust in theorising about personality, 
rather it points out the inadequacey of existing theories 
working within the frameworks provided by concepts taken from 
the traditional trait lexicon. Much of the data that it has 
given rise to demonstrates the lack of correlation between 
actual and rated behaviour (e.g. D'Andrade 1974, Shweder 
and D'Andrade 1980). It is clear then, that systematic 
distortion theories represent a significant critique of 
traditional trait theories, and can also be seen as a 
recommendation for the biological-evolutionary approach to 
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be outlined here. 
The brief look at two significant trends in contemporary 
personality research, has demonstrated that a biological-
evolutionary approach to the field of personality is not 
incompatible with some current trends in personality theory. 
The next section will outline some of the framework of such 
an approach, and also contrast the framework with that used 
by other genetically orientated approaches to the study of 
personality. 
Sociobiological Insights 
Sociobiology has been defined as "The systematic study 
of the biological basis of all forms of social behaviour, 
including sexual behaviour and parent-offpsring interaction, 
in all kinds of organism" (Lumsden and Wilson 1981, p.382). 
While it has received extensive criticism (e.g. Cooke, Cooke, 
Fuller, Griffiths, Orbach, Schwarts and Young 1976, Caplan 
1980), as being ideological and essentially untestable, its 
influence on current theories of anthropology has been waxing 
(e.g. Bixler,1981 Chagnon, 1980). No complete 
justification for its theories can be given here, (nor 
should be), but there should be no hesitancy in accepting 
that legitimacy of a scientific investigation of the extent 
to which forms of social behaviour are biologically determined. 
The insights of sociobiology promise to be very relevant 
to the field of personality for two reasons. Firstly 
because as is pointed out by Hogan (1982), & Jung (1953), 
much of what we call personality emerges in the course of 
social interaction and the presentation of self in the 
context of social behaviour. Sociobiology in being addressed 
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to the biological determinents of social behaviour, can 
encompass personality as the manifestation of regularities 
in individual social behaviour. A second reason for the 
relevance of sociobiology, is that it promises to provide a 
theoretical base which can incorporate the findings of various 
existing personality theories. For instance Leak & Christopher 
(1982) find impressive parallels between sociobiology and 
Freudian theory. The ability to integrate theoretical and 
empirical findings within a more pervasive framework, is an 
important characteristic of major scientific advance (Kuhn 
1970), and while the fruitfulness of the new framework must 
be evaluated, the prospect of a more comprehensive basis for 
psychological theory is exciting. 
I Evolutionary Stable Strategies: Implications for 
Personality Theory 
One useful tool or concept that personality theory can 
borrow from sociobiology, is the application of game and 
optimisation theory which can be used to demonstrate that 
particular behaviours constitute evolutionarily stable 
strategies (ESS). Dawkins (1980) defines an ESS as a strategy 
that " ••• if, given that more than a critical proportion of 
the population adopts it, none of the alternative strategies 
does better." (p.332). While this definition is suggestive 
of behavioural invariance across the members of the species, 
elsewhere, Dawkins makes it clear that the term can be applied 
on a population basis and in this case ESS refers to the 
population mix of the various kinds of behaviours. The 
distinguishing feature of an ESS, is that the viable strategy 
set is frequency dependant and will tend to stablise on the 
ESS solution. That statement is best illustrated by an 
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example taken from Dawkins (1980): In a world peopled by 
hawkish people who fight viciously until seriously hurt, or 
they win, Q~~ dovish people who fight formally, and always 
surrender to hawks, the factors leading to the ESS mixture 
of types in the population can be illustrated. In a world 
peopled only b~ hawks, a lone dove will have a greater 
inclusive fitness than the average hawk, because the chance 
of serious injury for the dove is minimal (although 
presumably the dove will also have less access to the 
resource base). On the other hand, in a world peopled 
exclusively by doves, the lone hawk will have greater 
exclusive fitness than the average dove because it can have 
total control over access to the resource base, with zero 
chance of this access costing physical injury. From these 
two extreme possibilities, it can be seen that different 
rates of reproductive success for hawks and doves, will mean 
that there will be a shift to an optimal proportion of hawks 
and doves (given the existence of the two alleles in the 
population). 
As regards personality theory, one benefit which the 
notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy has is in 
providing an heuristic for understanding the genesis and 
stability of genetically determined personality types. It 
promises more than just this genetic justification of 
personality typologies. Dawkins (1980) has extended the 
concept of evolutionary stable strategy, to the domain of 
the single life cycle, and has shown that such stable 
strategy concepts are useful in the understanding of animal 
behaviour, and cultural trends. One particular example is 
to be found in the behaviour of pigs in a skinner box. In 
/ 
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such situations, it is found that the usually dominant pig 
does a major part of the bar pressing, and the submissive 
pig could accordingly get a major share of the food (Baldwin 
and Meese cited in Dawkins, 1980). Dawkins argues that the 
particular arrangement in this situation is an example of a 
developmentally stable strategy, because the only other 
strategy which is to have the submissive pig bar press would 
not be viable, since the submissive pig would not get access 
to the reinforcer due to the presence of the dominant pig 
at the feeding trough. The stable strategy is stable 
because the dominant pig can obtain some reinforcement after 
bar pressing by pushing aside the submissive pig. 
The concept of developmentally stable strategy can be 
applied to the domain of personality development, and it 
promises to yield a more sophisticated understanding of the 
relationship between genetic tendencies and situational 
factors than that put forward by many genetically oriented 
personality theorists. Eysenck for instance postulates a 
high heritability for personality (Eysenck 1980, 1979, 1977), 
and while he acknowledges that variation cannot be totally 
attributed to either environmental or genetic factors, the 
call that he makes " ..• to partition the total variance in 
any situation in such a way as to lay bare the various genetic 
and environmental factors involved in it 111 , points to a 
concern with attribution of the developmental course, rather 
than a dynamic approach. A dynamic approach would show how 
the environment interacting with the genotype defines the 
personality-type distributions that different developmental 
1 Eysenck (1980) p.123 
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environments might produce. 
It is not surprising that Eysenck's work on heredity 
and personality has recently been questioned by Masqud (1981), 
when he found that there was no relationship between children's 
scores, and those of their parents on Eysenck's E,N and P 
constructs, except for the correlation between the child and 
the parent to whom they were attached. The suggestion which 
Masqud makes, is that the findings substantiate a hypothesis 
of Sears (1965), that personality characteristics are the 
products of the child's identification with his parents. An 
explanation on such as this is in line with an account of 
the results in terms of developmentally stable strategies: 
use as a model, the most significant care giver because in 
so doing the more significant care of this giver is likely 
to be 'captured'. There are several reservations that one 
might make about this specific study, (the homogeneity and 
size of the sample, and the likely increase in measurement 
errors using an instrument with English standardisation in 
Pakistan). However, Masqud's study does provide hints of 
the type of interaction that might underlie the repeated 
finding of specific within-family environmental influences 
as components of the structural equation partitioning total 
variance (Eysenck 1980, Rowe and Plomin 1981). Within family 
influences are also implicated in a review by Henderson 
(1982) who concludes that a simple model for kinship data 
in the personality domain, incorporating only additive 
genetic components, and specific environment components does 
reasonably well in accounting for much of the data. 
The specific environment component provides a general 
area of significant influence for which further research 
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should provide the processes which can account for such 
influences. The developmentally stable strategy concept is 
likely to provide a useful tool for generating hypotheses to 
account for this source of variation. 
II Social Orientation and Processing: Implications 
for Personality Theory 
Another major insight that sociobiology and human 
ethology can provide, is the way in which patterns of 
behaviour reflect the genetically encoded strategies for 
survival as they manifest in the structure of social 
behaviour. Chance (1980) makes a fundamental distinction 
between agonistic behaviour modes and hedonistic behaviour 
modes, the former being characterised by a continuous 
alertness to danger, whereas the later mode is characterised 
by an ability to control and direct attention to objects in 
the environment. Such a differentiation of behavioural modes 
is correlated in primates with different types of centric 
society; for predominately agonistic species there is 
spatial se~~~tion (territoriality), with continuous attention 
\"J/ 
to a dominant individual; within predominately hedonist 
societies, there is close contact and attention is allocated 
periodically and only to socially central figures in the 
event of display. Human beings can exist in either response 
mode, and the suggestion is that prototypic agonistic mode 
is capable of being agonistically buffered, by behaviours 
derived from the hedonistic response mode. For example in 
the human infant, prototypic rejection (by the withdrawal of 
mother) is capable of being buffered by allotypic influences 
of other significant care-givers (e.g. being hugged by Uncle 
and Aunts). Agonistic buffering which Barash (1977) suggests 
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is the nonhuman equivalent of "don't hit a man with glasses", 
has been documented by human ethologists (e.g. Irenaus Eibl 
Fibesfeldt 1980), and has as its most primitive strategy 
the smile. The insight that Chase provides, is that 
corresponding to two different types of social relations 
there are different types of referent relationships, and 
very likely different processing pathways involved. The 
formulation provided by Chase received support from the 
neurophysiological research of Adams (1979) who finds 
evidence for separate pathways involved in the processing of 
motivation stimuli as compared with releasing stimuli. There 
is also a parallel to be found in the distinction that 
Primbram (1980) makes between processes taking the organism 
out of motion (emotion), and those processes that result in 
effective behaviour (motivating). 
The convergence of ethological and neurophysiological 
outlined above relates to the systematic development of 
personality theory, because it demonstrates the existence of 
evolved processing modes that should be differentiated in 
accounting behaviour. It is thus, important because it 
places considerable constraints on the personality processes 
that might be used to explain patterns of social interaction. 
Given a social group, the evidence outlined, suggests that 
there are good reasons to break the data of behavioural 
interactions down into interactions where the activated 
pathways are those of an agonistic nature, versus interactions 
where the activated pathways are those of a hedonistic 
nature. For example, one would distinguish between the 
interactive processes that occur between the child and a 
very strict teacher, and the child and their very best friend. 
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While the first situatio~ should (in Chase's scheme), 
involve agonistic arousal, and the continuous attention to 
the teacher, the second situation will show (in the absence 
of distracting stimuli), just as intense attention given to 
the other person, but here the arousal accompanying and 
sustaining the interaction will be hedonic. If the agonic-
hedonic distinction is valid, (and a recent paper by Fromme 
and O'Brien (1982) finds some support for the superiority 
of the ordering of emotions by this model as compared to 
Plutchik's (1980) model), then it is no longer desirable to 
equate these behaviours where a purely behavioural analysis 
seems to reveal similitude. 
To illustrate the danger which can arise in ignoring the 
distinction between agonistic arousal and hedonistic arousal, 
consider a psychologist who rates a person on a personality 
attribute such as attentiveness to others~ In this case, if 
because of social circumstances the rated person is less 
prone to agonic arousal than hedonic arousal, then the 
consequent, apparent behavioural inconsistency will discourage 
the further development of the trait 'attentiveness to others'. 
(Hedonistic arousal is less likely to produce attentiveness 
to a dominant person than will agonistic arousal.) This 
example demonstrates how formulating sets of trait behaviours 
in terms of their everyday definitions can discourage the 
development of a theory of the ontogenesis and function of 
this trait in the overall personality structure. 
In the light of the above example, there are reservations 
about Epstein's (1979b,198J) recent attempt to develop a 
theory of personality which incorporates a theory of emotion. 
Such an attempt is well merited, because besides the construct 
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of anxiety, there is a decided lack of theory which will 
relate the organisation of the personality, to emotion system 
characteristics such as emotional lability, dominant emotional 
tone etc. Unfortunately, Epstein's theory, falls into the 
abstract system category discussed earlier, in that while he 
claims to decide upon his primary emotion on the basis of 
their interspecies commonality and the adaptive advantage 
bestowed by the emotion, he ignores the ethological research 
discussed earlier. In doing so he takes the study of emotion 
and personality away from the biological processes that 
determine them. There is a grave danger that the formula of 
accepting as an emotion whatever society defines as an 
emotion, ~hich Epstein (1983) emphasises as a practical 
solution for the determination of what constitutes a 
secondary emotion) has also been used in the determination 
of primary emotions. The consequence is that the set of 
cultural categories for emotions is being used to encode 
behaviour and be a basic construct of theory. Biological 
categories, not cultural categories should be the starting 
point for theory. 
Ideally, a theory relating emotion to personality 
should start without assumptions about what are the fundamental 
set of emotions. Instead, what is seen as emotion can be 
regarded as the consequence of complex physiological, cognitive 
and perceptual determinations on behaviour. These are 
constructed out of innate processes and produce behaviour 
patterns that are determined by the learning environment 
and epigenetic rules that assemble humanly invariant processes 
and behaviours into culturally varying behavioural and 
phenomenal complexes. This definition of emotion requires 
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researchers to search for emotion boundaries, by the usual 
methods (e.g. expression differentiation, the phenomenology 
of feeling states, somatic and neural patterns of arousal), 
but also to relate such states to the emotion invoking 
environment, and the patterns of social interaction 
engendering that emotion. The ethological work of Chance 
and Eibl-Eibesfeldt and the functionalistic approach of 
Plutchik (1980), by retaining the natural environmental 
evoking conditions as part of the classification scheme for 
emotion, promises a valid list of primary emotions, and the 
benefit of a natural base from which to build a theory of 
emotion and personality. 
Genetic Classifications and Concrete Personality Systems 
To this point, we have demonstrated that in terms of 
building scientific theories, there are a number of costs 
associated in the deviation from a concrete living system 
theory, and that researchers in the psychological domains 
of affect and personality have built their abstract theories 
in the face of such costs. In this section, it will be 
argued that one way of ensuring that personality theory is 
rooted in a concrete theory of living systems, is to evaluate 
personality constructs with biometrical analysis designed to 
demonstrate significant inherited components of such constructs. 
Such an analysis is not meant to be put forward as a 
conclusive test of the usefulness of a personality construct, 
but the demonstration of a significant inherited component 
of the total variation exhibited by persons for a particular 
personality construct, would be an important source of 
validation of the construct. Even when such an analysis 
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produces no evidence that a particular characteristic has 
any genetic component, and therefore it has no innate 
biological basis, the analysis answers in very general terms 
the important question of how. the behavioural disposition 
came into being. (viz In the present case it must have 
been learnt). The knowledge of how the behaviour related to 
a personality construct came into being is essential for 
deciding future research priorities. 
The personality theorist, in postulating a set of 
constructs will have had several goals, among which will be 
the prediction of ongoing behaviour by the use of these 
constructs. Thus, it is not necessary that the constructs 
that a theorist uses be part of the normally accepted 
constructs of a culture, only that it be predictive and 
measurable (and ideally have some explanatory power). There 
are two ways that processes which underlie the construct 
may originate; they can be learnt or they can be genetically 
predetermined. Often without genetic criteria it is 
difficult in the extreme to differentiate between the genetic 
basis of a disposition and the environmental basis of a 
disposition. For example Anderson, Kline and Beasley (1980) 
argue that there may be a single set of learning processes 
underlying all learning including language ae£~~~on. and 
that these and not the special biologically based mechanisms 
proposed by Chomsky (1957) are responsible for language 
acquisition. 
The implications for the personality theorist of the 
two different origins of dispositional tendency are quite 
distinct. While personality processes arising from both 
kinds of origin may become quite rigid and opposed to change 
(as in the example of a tautological belief system), 
conventional wisdom about the fixedness of genetically 
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encoded characteristics, would recommend that a personologist 
should accept the non-modifiability of personality dispositions 
that can be shown to be genetically encoded. The fundamental 
point though is that the personologist should be able to 
point towards the specific origin of a personality disposition, 
in order to be able to build an integrated theory of 
personality. The identification of a disposition as 
genetically encoded, then permits the theory development to 
proceed towards placing the behavioural disposition into a 
sociobiological and evolutionary context. The lack of a 
genetic origin demands that the specific life course 
developmental strategy and environment sequence that has 
been responsible for the behavioural disposition be plotted. 
Too much personality theory has not found it necessary to 
pinpoint the origins of the personality structures thought 
to underlie behaviour, and have opted to attribute the 
behaviours to social learning (e.g. Mischel, 1976; 
Bandura, 1969). 
The fact that social learning can influence behaviour, 
is not to be disputed, and is very important when it comes 
to a theory of therapeutic intervention. However, formulating 
the explanation of a particular behaviour in terms of social 
learning theory, and demonstrating the efficacy of the 
social learning process, is not tantamount to the scienti£ic 
validation of the social learning theory explanation of a 
behavioural disposition. The research is flawed and 
inconclusive on two counts; firstly because social learning 
theory with its behaviourist legacy does not explain 
dispositions, rather only discreet behavioural acts; 
secondly because the demonstration that social learning 
processes occur, is not the same as a proof that social 
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learning processes underlie the behaviour that the personologist 
wants to explain (at the time and situation). As an example 
of these reservations, consider the experiment in the delay 
of gratification conducted by Bandura (1965), which showed 
that a live model who delayed gratification, produced a 
similar delay of gratification in children who observed his/ 
her behaviour. Clearly, such a demonstration merely 
addresses itself to the plausibility of the social learning 
explanation of other instances of delay of gratification. 
Ultimately it must be evaluated in terms of the extent to 
which all instances of delay of gratification may be explained 
in terms of the hypothesised social learning processes. 
Of course a biometrical analysis which indicates that a 
behavioural disposition is largely ,inherited, does not exempt 
the personality theorist from the analysis of the environment 
necessary for the ontogenesis of the inherited tendency in 
behaviour. It should however terminate any attempt to find 
the cause of behavioural differences solely in the learning 
histories of the subjects being studies. 
It is clear then that biometric analysis is an important 
tool for ensuring that the right level of explanation is 
utilised for explaining personality constructs. By different-
iating between those constructs which are derived from 
genetic determinants (given appropriate developmental 
environments), and constructs which are derived from 
environmental determinants (given genetically determined 
information processing structures), the analysis ensures 
89 
that the explanation of personality remains linked to the 
explanational nexus of other levels of the concrete system. 
However, biometrical analysis in itself is not sufficient 
to ensure that the lines of cleavage of the concrete system 
are adhered to, and the problems and solutions to these 
problems are considered next. 
Biometrics and Personality Factors 
Typically, in human behavioural genetics, biometric 
analysis yields a coefficient of heritability on some trait 
or attribute, and divides the rest of the variance into that 
which is purely environmentally determined and that which 
is a result of the interaction of environmental and genetic 
influences. However, obviously it is possible to take any 
measurement of a personality construct, and subject it to 
biometrical analysis; the analysis does not guarantee the 
usefulness of the construct. This problem of what constitutes 
a useful classification of organismic attributes has recently 
been considered by behavioural geneticists. The solution 
would be simple, if each gene controlled a single behavioural 
expression, but as is pointed out by Fuller (1979), a change 
at a single locus is capable of influencing a wide range of 
behaviours, whilst a variation of a polygenic system may 
influence only a small part of the behavioural repertiore. 
Fuller, in light of these considerations, advocates regarding 
factors as real, and accepting that these inferred psychophenes 
will be useful in the study of genetically determined 
behavioural organisation. 
Henderson (1979) identifies several levels at which 
genes can act, and suggests that in the case of animal 
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experimentation most research has been pitched at the level 
of 'characters' (such as open field ambulation, brightness 
discrimination etc), and that this might be the least 
appropriate level to operate if the object is to understand 
natural selection and behaviour. Henderson advocates the 
use of factor analysis at the level of characters, and a 
comparison between the results of a genetic analysis of 
characters with those of a genetic analysis of 'super 
characters' (factor scores). If there is a factor, that can 
be considered sufficiently essential to survival, to be 
genetically encoded, then Henderson suggests that the status 
of such a factor can be detected by the fact that its ratio 
of variance accounted for by dominance 1 effects, to the 
ratio of variance accounted for by additive effects, will be 
larger for a composite factor measure, than that ratio for 
the individual items. Henderson points out that there will 
be factors related to the structure of the organism as a 
manifestation of its evolution reflecting genetic code, and 
other factors relating to the significance of its structure 
to the laboratory environment. The dominance ratio test 
proposed is a rule of thumb to distinguish between the two 
kinds of factors, and its necessity highlights the fact that 
in terms of genetic research through biometric analysis, it 
is not sufficient to rely on procedures such as factor analysis 
to obtain organismically informative constructs. Extensive 
1 The estimation of additive and dominance variance involves 
respectively using the mean of parent scores to predict 
offspring scores versus using the highest scoring parents 
score to predict offspring scores. 
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validation of the factors must also be performed in order to 
distinguish evolutionarily significant processes. 
As well as the variance ratio test of the ev~lutionary 
significance of a construct, there are a number of other 
methods proposed by behavioural geneticists. These include 
the correlation between viability and a characteristic 
selected for (e.g. Broadhurst (1970), the analysis of genetic 
correlation 1 matrices for factors (Fulker 1979; De Fries, 
Kuse and Vandenberg 1979), and the sep rate factor analysis 
of test items that show a maximal rmz - rdz difference 
(Loehlin 1965). These tests of evolutionary significance of 
behavioural traits are important to the present discussion, 
because they highlight a paradox of the use of personality 
inventories. The paradox is that such inventories when 
derived by the consideration of factors that maximise the 
explained variance, result in the emergence of dimensions 
of maximal variation, that. whiie they may be expected to 
exhibit high heritabilities, are also most unlikely to have 
been subject to much selection pressure, and consequently 
are likely to be incidental aspects of the organism. 
The present approach to the study of personality using 
inventories of objective test items, is to select from an 
initial item pool those items that load highly on the factors 
that account for the largest amount of variance (e.g. Eysenck 
1969, Cattell 1977). This practice, has many pitfalls as 
1 The genetic correlation between two scores, is the 
correlation between the genetically determined components 
of the scores. 
The formula is ra = 
(COVPXpyl)(covPyPX I ) 
cov(PxPx l ) cov(PyPy') 
offspring, 
where Pare 
k the phenotypic 
scores. 
Unprimed are 
primed are parent. 
pointed out by Cattell (1973), including the danger of 
replacing broad factors by what Cattell refers to as 
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'bloated specifics'. This danger is a consequence of a 
biased sampling of life areas in the preparation of the 
psychometric instrument, and its results in the occurrence 
of instrument specific factors much akin to the laboratory 
specific factors discussed earlier. As well as factors 
emerging that are specific to the measuring instrument, 
frequently used non exhaustive orthogonal factor analyses are 
likely to result in the emergence of pseudo-second order 
factors, which Cattell (1973) argues is the case for the 
Eysenck questionnaire. Thus the unreflective use of factor 
analysis in itself is no guarantee of parsing the collection 
of constructs that we use into those that reflect biological 
lines of organism, even when we perform the factoring on 
the genetic correlation matrix as suggested by Fulker (1979) 
and De Fries et.al. (1979). 
How should we interpret estimates of heritability of 
the range .4 to .75 for the personality traits in the studies 
reviewed by Henderson (1982)? There is an obvious inclination 
to allow the statistical significance of the heritability 
estimates argue for the biological significance of the 
behaviours being reviewed. Unfortunately, high heritabilities 
are neither sufficient to establish the biological significance 
of the behaviour considered, nor are high heritabilities 
necessary for biological significance. The non sufficiency 
follows from the fact that substantial heritabilities are 
often found in traits that are irrelevant to survival. For 
instance, Von Schilcher (1982) points out that the amount 
of white spotting in Fresien cattle is highly heritable, 
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because it has not been subject to selection pressure, and 
has little biological significance. The lack of necessity 
is a consequence of the fact that there are many genetically 
determined characteristics that do not exhibit a range of 
alleles. Directional selection has (for all purposes), 
removed genetic variation in these attributes. This kind of 
attribute with a specific allelic optima can be exemplified 
by traits such as conception rate where the directional 
selection associated with a beneficial allele rapidly ensures 
universality throughout the genepool. 
Given then that high heritabilities do not of themselves 
allow the dissection of significant dimensions of personality, 
what is to be made of the heritability coefficient? The 
best that can be made of it would be that it can be used to 
obtain a measure of the innateness or otherwise (open program 
or closed program) of these personality dimensions via a 
formula such as 
Vg 
Jacobs (1980). 1 Vg + Ve (1 - 1) 
Where I is a coefficient of innateness. Such a utilisation 
of the hereditary coefficient is not trivial, because as 
mentioned earlier it constrains the theories of the 
development of behaviour into formulations in terms of 
epigenetic rules, and these in terms of learning occurring 
via environmental interactions. Significant advances are 
made in understanding processes underlying behavioural trait 
formation once a general locus of behavioural variation can 
be identified (e.g. Rowe and Plomin 1981). 
We are still left with the question of - given the trait 
extraversion-introversion, should we dispose of it in the 
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same way as we dispose of other "genetic junk" (Theissen 
1972). Alternatively should we regard it as an example of 
stabilising selection which favours the average phenotype 
at the expense of more extreme phenotypes? The answer will 
depend on the result of convergent evidence of to what extent 
the behavioural complexes described and measured by the 
trait instrument amount to be more than "bumps on the head", 
and have very real consequences for social organisation, 
group harmony and individual integration. The likelihood 
is that if behavioural complexes which have such consequences 
are found, then there will also be evidence of genetic codes 
influencing the behaviour. In as much as the example we 
have been discussing has received considerable convergent 
validation (e.g. Eysenck 1969, 1977, 1979, 1980), then we 
can regard it as an example of stabilising selection, and 
should retain it as a significant component of personality. 
There are other examples of personality constructs that 
one would be less inclined to retain, in spite of a relatively 
high degree of genetic determination. For instance the 
Premsia-Harria dimension of the 16PF (Cattell 1973), is 
purported to have a heritability of about .60, but it is 
unclear precisely how this trait relates to biological 
determinants or to selection pressures. The possibility is 
that this trait is a trait deriving its reality not from 
the pattern of organisation in the observed, but rather from 
the categorising tendencies of the observer. If the biological 
validation of Premsia-Harria proves to be intractable, then 
the construct might be retained for social and organisational 
purposes such as selection, but it should not be retained 
as a fundamental construct for the purpose of personality 
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theory. Instead, the organisation of personality processes 
that underlie the genetic stability of the Premsia-Harria 
dimension should be approached through a reduction to more 
fundamental dimensions of personality processes, and their 
effects on the Premsia-Harria dimension. 
Non Selected Traits 
So far, in contrasting Introversion-Extraversion with 
Premsia-Harria as dimensions of personality, it has been 
suggested that if there is evidence of stabilising selection 
then we should admit the construct as a desireable element 
in a theory of personality. It is not always possible 
though, to put forward arguments that a particular 
characteristic has been- subject to selection pressures. This 
raises the question of whether strict adherence to identifying 
the biological processes that underlie personality 
characteristics, will result in an impoverished theory of 
personality incapable of explaining in detail the complex 
patterns of interpersonal communication and action that is 
characteristic of homo sapiens. To get around this difficulty, 
it must be allowed that the taxonomy of personality processes 
which is subscribed to, include processes peculiar to a 
particular environment and which have not themselves been 
the subject of a significant degree of natural selection. 
For example, the trait of punctuality might be put forward 
as an example that is unlikely to have been subject to 
selection pressures, and yet contains a significant quality 
of the consistency that individual's show in their behaviours 
across situations or times. This trait of punctuality, 
while it is likely to have been subject to minimal selection 
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pressure, will still quite possibly exhibit a significant 
heritability related as it is likely to be to theCattellian 
trait of desurgency (Cattell 1973), which shows a heritability 
of .6. The personologist in developing a taxonomy of 
individuals, is likely to want to include the descriptor of 
punctuality, because this construct is significant to 
individuals in terms of their self concept. Punctuality is 
also significant to others interacting with the individual, 
because it is a component of many socially prescribed roles. 
So, because the personologist is developing a theory to meet 
the needs of the individual and of society for an account 
of personal actions it is desir "ble ~ that the theoretical 
language used, is capable of retaining those questions 
which first gave rise to the press for a theory. 
Therefore, a trait such as punctuality might well be 
regarded as a useful construct to add to the technical 
language of the personologist but, to avoid a plethora of 
convenient constructs eliminating the parsimony of personality 
theory, it is necessary to impose side conditions on the 
constructs which will form the basis of personality theory. 
The position being developed here, argues that as well as 
having explanatory utility on a social level, personality 
constructs must be validated by tying their dimensions to 
underlying biologically determined processing structures, 
which in interaction with the developmental environment, 
provide the motor for the personality invariances that are 
noted. Thus, for the example of punctuality, a full 
validation might require its integration into the extant 
theory of self monitoring (e. g. Snyder, 1979) and 
elucidation of the attention processes that underlie self 
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monitoring, as well as the description of the developmental 
environment, that will bias the degree of temporal self 
monitoring in the direction of punctuality. 
l·~ g 
Validation of Traits 
Such an extensive validation of a personality concept 
necessary in order that an adherence to the lines of 
concrete system be maintained. Alternative, and less complete 
forms of validation such as behaviourism's relation of behaviour 
to the learning environment, or a total genetic reductionism 
to biological structures, are inadequate on two counts. 
Firstly, either partial validation is likely to omit certain 
emergent personality phenomena from the coverage provided by 
a validated theory; the e~ample of punctuality is likely to 
be omitted using only biological structure correspondences 
a " g a validation method, and for introversion-extroversion, 
purely environmental validation is likely to result in the 
omission of this very important personality construct. The 
second consequence of using only one of the two means of 
validating a construct, is that when used alone, either of 
the validation criteria discussed here are likely to be 
misleading in distinguishing core personality tendencies 
from peripheral personality tendencies. Used seperately, 
the iden~ification of learning history, or identification of 
biological structures producFs descriptions of the antecedants 
necessary for the occurrence of stable processes. However, 
stability of processes, is only one characteristic of core 
tendencies, the critical characteristic is the ubiquity of 
core tendencies as determinants of peripheral tendencies. 
In order to differentiate between the construct set associated 
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with core tendencies and the construct set associated with 
peripheral tendencies, it is necessary to demonstrate that 
peripheral tendencies arise as the product of the interplay 
between core tendencies, and unique historical and genetic 
factors of the individual. The rule of thumb that 
differentiates core tendencies from peripheral tendencies, 
will be the extent that the one validated construct is a 
necessary component of the validation of other personality 
constructs. 
Consider again the example of introversion-extroversion. 
Here the biological validation of the construct has taken 
the form of a demonstration of the basis of the dimension 
of individual differences being the level of cortical 
arousal (e.g. Eysenck, 1977). This core construct underlies 
a number of peripheral constructs such as sociability, and 
even aesthetic preferences (Eysenck, 1941). In order fully 
to account for the peripheral constructs, the core construct 
in interaction with other factors will be needed. The 
problem with restriction of validation is that in a number 
of cases, the pervasiveness of the influence of a single 
construct can not be assessed by a sampling from only one 
of the domains of validation. For example, a biological 
structure may have a considerable influence on the functioning 
of other biological structures that mediate learning and 
hence for the resolution of many emergent dimensions of 
personality. 
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Philosophical Justification of Validation 
What is being advocated here for the field of personality 
is very similar to the approach to science advocated by 
proponents of the philosophical school of transcendental 
realism (Bhaskar 1979). This approach to science is an 
alternative to empiricist epistemology and the paradigmatic 
approach of Kuhn (1970). It is characterised by the 
acceptance of levels of emergent phenomena which are dependant 
on the existence of a particular causal structure which it 
is the scientist's task to uncover. This philosophy of 
science stresses the fact that "Scientific explanation is 
not subsumption" (Manicas & Secord 1983, p.402), and opts 
for an analysis of scientific laws that bestows the status 
of law not on merely conjoined events, but on causal structures 
that underlie (sometimes) the conjoining of events. This 
formulation of the criterion for law corresponds very 
closely to the validation formula in the case of the 
identification of personality constructs which has just 
been discussed. Among the necessary conditions of lawfulness, 
is that " .•• one must have a theoretical understanding of 
the nature of the structure such that one can specify the 
conditions under which the dispositional property will not 
be realised." This bears a parallel to what Weinberg (1975) 
in setting forth general systems thinking refers to as the 
count to three principle: if you cannot think of three ways 
of abusing a tool you do not know how to use it. There is 
thus a convergence evident between the formulations of 
general systems theory, the transcendental realist philosophy 
of science, and the conclusions which have been arrived at 
in this chapter on the means to ensure that personality 
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theory develops along the path of concrete system theory. 
The common conclusion is that in order for scientific 
explanation to occur, phenomena have to be embedded in the 
causal structure that gives rise to them. (It must be 
emphasised that this is not tantamount to a strict determinism, 
because of the acknowledgement that a strict deterministic 
explanation is unobtainable in our world of open systems.) 
The discussion to date has indicated desirable 
properties that a coherent theory of personality should have, 
such as the adherence to the concrete system via an emphasis 
on the causal structures that underlie personality dispositions, 
but it has not yet looked at a specific program that will 
allow the study of personality within these guidelines. It 
has been suggested that an ordering of behavioural importance 
is necessary in order that personality theory envelopes 
those behaviours that are indicators of personal functioning, 
and that those behaviours although frequent and regular 
that do not contribute to personal functioning are excluded. 
(An example of these later incidental behaviours might be 
ear lobe tugging behaviour.) It has also been argued that 
in order that the personality constructs which are utilised 
for the purposes of explanation, have a close adherence to 
the concrete system (that is the organism), that personality 
constructs be related to the organisation of their causative 
factors. The causative factors in the case of personality 
phenomena are likely to be biological structures, processing 
pathways and the learning environment (which can modify 
stimulus representations and processing pathways). It is 
thus argued that the validation of a personality construct 
must involve an identification of the microprocesses that 
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are contributors to its manifestation in behaviour. The 
next section will examine a possible strategy for the 
development of a powerful personality theory. 
The situation facing the personologist developing a 
theory of personal dispositions is much akin to that of 
the ethologist who searches for the invariant sequences 
of behaviour that underlie more complex behavioural sequences 
in order that phylogenetic comparisons might be made, and 
the specific genetically coded behaviour adaptations of a 
species may be traced. Just as if the ethologist chooses 
too gross a level at which to derive the ethogram, then there 
will be a lack of distinguishing characteristics between 
species (as the case of the orienting reflex discussed 
earlier demonstrated), so also the personologist looks to 
break the units of investigation down into a level of detail 
that allow differention between persons in terms of minimal 
integral units. Underlying such minimal integral units will 
be processes and structures, either innate, or learnt that 
give rise to the units of personality. Thus the program 
which is envisaged, would be for a cognitive ethology which 
would include a number of fixed processing patterns that 
would be used to account for patterns of personality. A call 
for a cognitive ethology has already been made by Meichenbaum 
(1980) who envisages such a science as a set of procedures 
to capture the flow of cognitions, affects, and behaviours. 
The cognitive ethology advanced here goes further than that 
proposed by Meichenbaum because it requires more than an 
expression of the patterns of cognitions, affects and 
behaviours that correlate with personality types, it also 
requires an account of the processes that underlie the 
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characteristic cognitions. This requirement has the 
considerable virtue of ensuring that the causal conditions 
of personality are not found amongst those same characteristics 
that identify personality. Since cognitions in the form 
of utterances or behaviour are the data of personality 
categorisation, the requirement fulfills the function of 
validating traits through a deeper level of theory. 
Useful candidates for processes that result in human 
personality should demonstrate a fixidity (automaticity), as 
with fixed action patterns within the individual, and should 
be amongst the set of processes that are used in a wide 
range of information processing in normal individual-environ-
ment interactions. By fulfilling the above two conditions, 
the subprocesses (henceforth referred to as microprocesses 
after Posner (1978)), will be capable of explaining those 
apparent behavioural rigidities in important areas of life 
that have traditionally been ascribed to personality traits. 
It is fundamental to much of science, that emergent phenomena 
be classified with the aid of a knowledge of subprocesses 
that contribute to the phenomena, rather than purely in a 
gestalt manner. An example that perhaps parallels the 
situation of the personality theorist in that much of the 
theory must derive from non interventional observation, is 
that of the cosmologist. Here, a knowledge of subprocesses 
such as the effects of doppler shift on the observed 
frequencies of radiation, form an inference set whereby 
sense may be made of the form that the physical universe now 
takes. Just so, in the case of the normal emergence of 
personality phenomena in the course of social interaction: a 
personality theory requires a set of microprocesses that 
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can be assumed to underlie the observed behaviour patterns, 
form a causal framework with which to classify events, and Whic~ 
will admit naturally occurring behaviour in the study of 
personality. Such an approach is in line with the suggestion 
of Manicas and Second (1983) that explanation and prediction 
are not symmetrical, and that it is a valid exercise to 
ascribe causation to a nonpredictable interaction. 
This approach promises to mend the split between the 
two major methods in the development of personality theory; 
the clinical approach and the experimental approach. Both 
of these traditional approaches, used exclusively have 
limitations - one does not have a ready means of identifying 
fundamental processes that underlie observations, and the 
other does not embrace the full data base of personality 
interactions confined as it is to the closed system of the 
laboratory. The blending of these traditional approaches 
that is advocated here promises a more comprehensive 
personality theory. 
Are Emotions Microprocesses? 
A clue as to which microprocesses might be employed 
to account for personality comes from the work of Plutchik 
(1967, 1980 ), Plutchik and Schaeffer (1966), 
and Conte (1975). The series of studies reported in these 
papers demonstrate that personality terms appear to conform 
to the circumplex model of the primary emotions. Plutchik 
goes as far as suggesting that "In fact .••• all personality 
traits, when defined in terms of interpersonal relations, can 
be conceptualized as resulting from the mixing of emotions." 
(Plutchik 1980 , p.55). This then suggests that personality 
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differences may be a consequence of the characteristic 
level of the fundamental emotions within the individual, 
or as a consequence of the person attempting to maintain a 
characteristic level of input at the emotional level of a 
heirarchical control system as is suggested by Powers (1973, 
1978). 
Heise (1979) has approached the analysis of social 
situations and social roles using a control system model. 
His framework analyses the affective transients elicited 
by situations, and considers that events are structured via 
behaviours that take the form of plans and actions designed 
to return immediate feelings back to established or 
characteristic sentiments. The approach has been applied 
with some success to a wide range of behaviours including 
role analysis of courtroom, religious, university interactions. 
A problem with Heis~sanalysis is that it works with 
a limited set of affective dimensions furnished by the 
semantic differential. Thus, his analysis while reasonably 
predictive, in working within such a restricted state set 
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does not provide a validated state construct. What the 
analysis achieves is the substitution of inferred states 
for the usual personality descriptors of inferred traits. 
However, the processes that underlie the states are not 
defined, and the theory would seem to be utilising the 
semantic differential as a state measure for its measurement 
convenience rather than its theoretical usefulness. The 
major advantage of the state approach via the semantic 
differential compared to traditional trait approach, is that 
it is useful for characterising situations. But, while 
characterisation of the situation is important to personality 
theory (e.g. Bern 1982), a theory of the psychological 
processes that mediate between situation and state would 
seem to be necessary for this approach to carry more power 
than ordinary trait theories. 
The close relationship between emotion and personality 
suggested by Plutchik, and the suggestion that the person 
acts in accordance with maintaining emotion by Heise, point 
to the potential of developing a theory of personality via 
the analysis of emotional processes. Unfortunately it is 
not very easy to work out the personality-emotional process 
rules. This is because, just what is the best way to define 
an emotional state is extremely problematic. Plutchik 
(1980 ) has noted that emotion is not a subjective experience 
per se, but is rather a hypothetical state whose existence 
is inferred on the basis of a number of lines of evidence. 
Thus, while we might agree with Hebb (1946) that the 
subjective naming of emotional feelings is necessarily more 
accurate than the naming of the state by outside observers, 
nevertheless working at the level of gross emotion is beset 
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by measurement and definitional problems. It might be 
better to analyse emotions into more primitive components 
which can be studied within an information processing 
paradigm, and use these components as theoretical constructs 
in the development of personality theory. 
The Microprocess Assembly Model of Personality and 
Emotion 
The way in which emotion might interact with cognition 
in producing behaviour is depicted in figure 4-1. Figure 
4-1(a) is a full model of the way in which microprocess 
produced transformations, and mutually influencing subsystems 
might account for a person's behaviour in a particular 
situation. The model is not detailed, but it bears enough 
similarity to other flow diagrams produced by emotion 
theorists (e.g. Plutchik 1980, Fig 1.1, p.15; Leventhal 
1979, Fig 5, p.16), to claim that it does not misrepresent 
current thinking on the interactions between emotion and 
information processing. The full model has been dissected 
into two partial models in figures 4-1(b) and 4-1(c). The 
two partial mode~s can be thought of as two different 
research heuristics which might be adopted by personality 
researchers. The emotion characteristics model Fig 4-1(b) 
emphasises the influences of affective states on the 
decision processes that mediate situations and behaviour. 
It is exemplified by the kind of role analysis done by 
Heise (detailed above), where for his model decisions were 
made in an attempt to maintain patterns of characteristic 
sentiment. The microprocess assembly model Fig 4-1(c) 
places emphasis on the pathways that transfer and transform 
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information as determinants of behavioural organisation. 
Thus, the microprocess assembly model emphasises the active 
representation of a situation as the major factor in a 
person's behaviour, and seeks to explain personality 
differences in terms of the processes that lead to the 
active representation. 
The two models 4-1(b) and 4-1(c) are not mutually 
exclusive, but represent two different focuses on the one 
system. Both models will most likely be needed for a full 
account of human personality but it will be argued here that 
the microprocess assembly model of figure 4-1(c) is the most 
useful one to adopt as a research strategy at this point of 
knowledge. 
The microprocess assembly model is somewhat of a 
departure from classic interpretations of personality. Classic 
theories of personality do have processes put forward as 
part of the theory, but processes are core characteristics 
of the theories and are assumed common to all persons. The 
assembly model differs in that it asserts that differences 
in process are sources of differences in representational 
structure, and hence give rise to personality differences. 
In contrast, the structure and process distinction used by 
traditional personality theorists have tended to emphasise 
processes as principles that underlie all behaviour, but 
need to be conjuncted with environmental factors in order to 
explain variations in personality. Pervin (1975) for 
instance uses conscience as an example of structure, and 
the guilt that results as an example of process; thus, 
process accounts will show that human behaviour is partly 
oriented to minimising guilt, but ultimately the source of 
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variation stems from different levels of conscience. The 
microprocess assembly model makes the.e..)<.~\a.0D.~io~",. o~ 
S\\-ua.\-':Of'\Q\\~ manifested behaviours by recourse to the 
operation of microprocess assemblies unique to the individual. 
(It is only the assemblies of microprocesses that are unique 
to the individual, as the microprocesses themselves are 
taken to be a set fundamental to all emotional experience.) 
It is acknowledged that a large amount of variation 
within the population which has been used to describe the 
'personality' of people cannot be explained in detail by a 
microprocesses assembly theory. The microprocesses assembly 
theory's range of convenience is only those personality 
attributes that are biophysical in nature, and that derive 
their character from genetically determined characteristics. 
Totally environmentally imposed characteristics which are 
also very important for predicting a person's behaviour and 
in the biosocial characteristics of the person are not 
accountable in terms of the restricted microprocess assembly 
model alone. A more comprehensive theory of the person 
which integrates the approach here with a theory of how 
learning sequences can give rise to enduring processing 
structures (e.g. Anderson, 1983) would be an ultimate 
objective. 
Microprocesses and Microprocess Assemblies 
Before a more detailed examination of the nature of 
the microprocesses which could manifest as personality, it 
should be made clear what the criteria are for categorising 
a microprocess as genetically determined. Obviously a \ow 
hereditary coefficient (such as is enjoyed by the characteristic 
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of the number of fingers in one hand) may either indicate 
that the trait is varying according to environment, or is 
of such importance that it is dependent on a genetically 
encoded structure common to all people. Since the theory 
developed here is predefined to be based on information 
processing characteristics of emotional states, it is to be 
expected that such processes are found in all people. 
Furthermore, the kind of selection that is likely to be 
favoured is that of stabilising selection. Wilson (1975) 
gives as examples of stabilising selection based 
characteristics: aggressive behaviour, dominance systems 
and sexual behaviour. All of these characteristics are of 
a kind that are much akin to emotion and therefore it is 
likely that the forces that favour stabilising selection for 
the above characteristics, will also favour stabilising 
selection for the microprocesses of emotion. Accordingly 
the kind of genetic determinism expected of the 
microprocesses involved in personality and emotion is to be 
expected to manifest as moderate to large hereditary 
estimates in accordance with stabilising selection. Thus, 
it is suggested that an important step in the validation of 
a microprocess construct, would be to investigate the extent 
to which it is an inherited characteristic. 
The genetic determination criteria of a microprocess 
should not be taken as suggesting that this requires a high 
genetic determination of the microprocess assembly. Since 
a microprocess assembl~ can be formulated simplistically 
as a 'heirarchy of microprocess operations called into play 
in processing input, the microprocesses themselves can be 
genetically determined without necessitating that the 
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heirarchy also be determined this way. The microprocesses 
can be viewed as a set of available information transforming 
operations, and the level of importance which they receive 
will correspond to the extent that cognitive resource is 
allocated to their outputs. The control process or meta-
I 
components (Sternberg 1983 ) which allocate cognitive 
resource are the means whereby assemblies are implemented, 
and these are likely to be partially created out of the 
I 
learning experiences of the person. That is, microprocess 
assemblies are the consequence of sequential resource 
allocation strategiestthat by determining the characteristic 
sequence that the information from fundamental emotion 
relevant microprocesses is used, influence the personality 
characteristics of the person. While resource allocation is 
put forward here as the mechanism whereby assemblies are 
implemented, this idea is somewhat speculative. Logan (1978) 
has put forward a similar idea. His preparation model for 
character classification tasks, suggests that elementary 
processes involved in the tasks, are joined by the allocation 
of attentional resource. The possibility that assemblies 
are created by the allocation of limited cognitive resource 
to the outputs of automatic processes would seem to be an 
elegant way of conceptualising assemblies and is consistent 
with the pervasive influence across situations that 
personality is considered to exhibit. 
As well as a mechanism for the integration of the outputs 
of automatic processes into an activated representation, the 
theory put forward here should have plausible microprocess 
candidates. Unfortunately since almost all of the research 
into emotion and personality has followed trait based theories, 
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there is no set of microprocesses detailed. Within 
cognitive psychology, Sternberg (1983) has developed a 
componential approach to intelligence and details many 
component operations that have been found for different 
types of reasoning. Rose (1980) surveys a wide range of 
cognitive tasks for inclusion in an information processing 
test battery and lists eight operations which are sufficient 
to describe the processing requirements of the tasks. 
Frederikson (1980) also describes a series of operations in 
his component skills model of reading. These microprocesses 
are useful in describing the operating of cold cognitions, 
but in as much as they tend not to include mechanisms of 
information choice (as versus information recoding), it 
seems likely that the set is not adequate to a description 
of the evaluative function of emotion. 
It is part of the research objectives incorporated in 
this thesis to make some initial explorations in the 
identification of the microprocesses of emotion. 
Implications of the Model for Personality Research 
Before comparing this approach to the study of 
personality and emotion with extant approaches, it is worth 
noting that the form that explanation takes under the 
microprocess assembly model, differs considerably from that 
used in the major theories of personality. The fundamental 
difference between this model and a theory such as Cattell's 
factor theory, (e.g. Cattell, 1977) or Allport's conception 
of traits (e.g. Allport 1966) and dispositions, is that the 
present model proposes that a demonstration of the 
representational equivalence of stimuli (and thus their 
114 
functional equivalence to the individual), is irrelevant to the 
development of personality theory. Thus, the present model 
does not imply as 'the method of personality research', the 
finding of a correlative response structure to a particular 
set of items or stimuli. Instead, the present framework 
emphasises the necessity to demonstrate the sensitivity of 
a stimulus item to the emotional state of the individual. 
Part of the item validation procedure envisaged by the model, 
is to demonstrate a process related change in response 
patterns (be they reaction time measures or more contentful 
measures) as a consequence of the emotional state of the 
individual. So, the present model queries the founding of 
most factor models of per.sonality in a series of reliably 
obtained item scores that all load on the same underlying 
factor, and that all originate from the description of 
invariant behavioural dispositions. 
Figure 2-2, demonstrates how the linkage between emotion 
related microprocesses, and personality characteristics 
proposed by the model, means that changing emotional states 
so as to identify whether a measurement procedure is 
sen~itive to such a change, is fundamental to the identifica-
tion of the relevant microprocess set. Thus, the present 
model suggests a method of analysis which firstly starts 
with a process set with well defined operations; secondly 
submits such a process set to an analysis of the emotion 
state dependency of the operations; thirdly uses those 
operations that are emotion affected, and genetically 
determined to describe persons and generalise from such 
descriptions to a theory of personality. 
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FIGURE (2-2) 
METHODOLOGY OF PERSONALITY RESEARCH FOR THE 
MICROPROCESS ASSEMBLY MODEL. 
Step I: Obtain a process set. 
Si 
-----3>1>8 > Bi (Si,Bi Process measure.) 
Sj 
-----71>8 > Bj (Sj,Bj Process measure.) 
Note that MPl, MP2 are sets of assembled microprocesses that are 
unlikely to contain totally exclusive elements. That is, there is 
overlap between the microprocesses measured by the items. 
Step II: Retain the items that are sensitive to affect manipulations. 
El E2 
(a) Si 1I----7Bl Si B2 
(b) Sj l\-----7Bl Sj tr-----3>B 1 
That is, reject the most 'reliable' items which are not influenced 
by affect. (Reject (b) in the example above.) 
Step III: Use the retained microprocess items to characterise the 
person. That is, if -
Pi + Envl ~! I Items 
and 
Pi + Env2 >1 Items 
Then person Pi is characterised by microprocess assembly MPk. 
(Note: S = Stimulus conditions, B = Behaviours, E = Emotional states, 
MP = Microprocess assemblies, Env = Testing/Life environments. ) 
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Personality and Temperament are not Separable 
It should be appreciated that the method of theory 
construction outlined above is put forward as a method of 
developing a theory of personality, and not just a theory 
of temperament. Temperament as defined by Allport " ••• refers 
to the characteristic phenomena of an individuals emotional 
nature, including his susceptibility to emotional 
stimulation, his customary strength and speed of response, 
the quality of his prevailing mood, and all peculiarities 
of fluctuation and intensity in mood; these phenomena being 
regarded as dependent upon constitutional make-up, and 
therefore largely hereditary in origin." (Allport 1961, 
p.34). It is an assumption of the present approach, that 
the distinction between temperament factors and acquired 
characteristics is one that falsely dichotomises heredity 
and environment. If as is suggested by Wilson and Lumbsden 
(1981),'learning can be regarded as cognitive epigenesis 
within and beyond the womb' (p.303), then provided theory 
addresses the level at which epigenesis effects are occurring, 
temperament will not easily be seperable from contentful 
personality dispositions. Wilson and Lumbsden also suggest 
that human beings have primary and secondary epigenetic 
rules, and the latter are characterised by setting the 
evaluative and decision making functions by which culturgens 
(a culturally transmitted information package) are decided 
on. So, while the microprocess assembly model will have to 
allow learning theorists to account for the development of 
very specific behavioural consistencies, it is at a more 
general level of general affective orientation and its 
pervasive influence on decision making (e.g. Johnson & 
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Tversky, 1983; Schwarz and Clore, 1983), that epigenesis 
occurs. 
The influence of emotional states on the patterns of 
attachment behaviour emitted by very young children supports 
the proposition that the development of traits via environ-
mental experiences is insep~rable from temperament factors. 
Gaensbauer and Connell (1983) have recently demonstrated 
that the influence of current emotional state in children 
determines attachment behaviour in successive episodes. They 
also found a greater degree of temporal stability in 
emotional states between comparable episodes than for 
attachment behaviours between comparable episodes. The 
research indicates one mechanism whereby temperament factors 
can playa major influence in the determination of personal 
characteristics: characteristic emotional states determine 
whi~~ situations the infant emits attachment behaviours in, 
and thus has an influence on the early experience of person-
person are relationships. This means that it might be stated 
that temperament factors influence the early interpersonal 
experiences of the infant. It is these early experiences 
which are seen as critical by many developmental and person-
ality researchers. The research by Gaensbauer and Connell 
also shows that patterns of emotion are situation specific. 
This means that early affect-situation covariances are likely 
to set the kind of predominant interactions that will occur 
within a situation. 
Izard (1979) also discussed the manner in which the 
emotional expression of the infant can be an important 
determiner of the kinds of situations producable by the 
caregiver, whom the infant encounters. He also suggests 
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that " ••• the emergence of a particular emotion, along with 
correlative changes in other systems marks the beginning of 
a 'critical period' for certain types of experiences and 
for learning of certain types of responses that are important 
to development at that particular state of life." (p.169). 
Thus, temperament cannot be detached from the formation of 
the regularities of behaviour of personality. The variations 
of environment during such critical phases will no doubt be 
very important, but so will genetically determined variations 
of emotional lability, reactivity, extent and ontogenesis. 
In short, it is impossible to have a theory of personality 
or personality development that is at all detailed, unless 
personality characteristics are studied with reference to 
temperament - environment interactions. 
Other Theories of Personality and Emotion 
How does the assembly model, and its type of explanation 
fit with other theories that seek to integrate personality 
and emotion? Epstein's (1983) theory in which emotions are 
seen to be a consequence of the adequacy or inadequacy of 
a personal theory of reality has already been noted. Epstein's 
theory makes cognitions most important in defining behavioural 
regularities, and emotions develop as a consequence of the 
cognitive structure. Arnold (1960) sees emotions both as 
consequences of self-ideals, and impetuses towards acquisition 
of valid self-ideals. She posits that the early process of 
identification with parents sets the child's self-ideal, and 
this self-ideal is the ultimate value in a value heirarchy 
which is involved in the appraisal process contributing to 
emotions being felt. There is a considerable degree of 
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similarity between the theories of Epstein and Arnold in that 
for both there is a cognitive processing of the environment 
in terms of existing structures (world theory or value 
heirarchy) which occurs prior to the onset of emotion. In 
contrast to the microprocess assembly model, these theories 
see emotional reactions as results of personal constructs, 
not the determinant processes of personality manifestation. 
Two theorists that have theories more congruent with 
the model advocated in this thesis are Plutchik and Izard. 
Plutchik (1980, 1962) suggests ways in which the ordering 
of traits is reflective of the ordering of emotions, but 
does not provide explanation of the parallel. The parallel 
is expanded somewhat by Kellerman (1980), but still is 
fairly unspecified and speculative. In contrast, Izard (1977, 
1979) states in more detail the linkage between personality 
and affect. Izard argues that personality integration 
involves the development of effective interrelations and 
interactions between the processes of the set of primary 
emotions and particular types of processes employed by other 
systems. For example, interest, attention, and exploratory 
behaviour may be unconnected in the neonate, but via learning 
and adaptation, interest, attending and exploration will 
become part of a single personality complex. His formulation 
emphasises the importance of emotions in setting the 
conditions for the uptake and processing of information. 
This emphasis on explaining personality in terms of emotion 
related process characteristics is common to differential 
emotion theory and the microprocess assembly model. 
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Omnibus Personality Models are not Personality Models 
As the Figure 2-1 indicates, the microprocess 
assembly model of personality is not a complete account of 
individual functioning, but it represents a deliberate 
submodel of a more extensive model. One virtue of considering 
a submodel in preference to a full model, is that certain 
subsections of behaviour can be cut out of consideration as 
relevant to the model. Explicitly, those sections of 
behaviour that represent acquired units available to any 
person who encounters the precursor learning environment 
should be excluded from consideration. One qualification to 
this statement is that if the acquired behaviour is correlative 
with an acquired and stable cognitive structure that 
influences the development of other personal behaviours then 
it should be regarded as part of the data base of personality. 
Thus, it is proposed here that personality be restricted to 
variations in behaviour between individuals that is not 
consequential on the previous learning environments of the 
individuals. The influence of learning should only be 
considered when it results in psychological structures that 
produce individual differences that require an explanation 
in terms of unique temperame~t-environment interactional 
origins. By following such a restriction it becomes easy to 
distinguish between a level of behaviour that is more 
cultural and does not require linking to individual types, 
from a level of behaviour that manifests differences of 
which the individual is the locus. In short, personality 
theory has gone astray when it is applied to between culture 
differences; its proper domain is within culture variation. 
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The suggestion above is not new, but it bears repeating 
because it is not often observed. Possibly this is because 
of the seductiveness of a high correlation between a 
particular construct and ~ kind of situational behaviour. 
On the need to sep~rate the situation, Bern (1983) writes 
that " ••• if we hope to formulate a truely interactional model 
of persons in situations, then I believe that our person 
variables and our situation variables must be pure and 
explicitly distinct from one another. In particular, the 
person variables need to be formulated at a fairly genotypic 
level of personality functioning, at the level •.. of 
temperament or general personality traits. And among these, 
I believe the most promising are those that refer to an 
individual's stylistic ways of processing information and 
interacting with the internal and external environment." 
(Bern 1983, p.218). The microprocess assembly model fulfils 
Bern's suggestions in two ways. Firstly it takes as its 
building blocks of explanation the processes operating when 
affect is triggered and so is at a genotypic level of 
personality functioning. Secondly, it explains differences 
in behaviour in terms of the characteristic processes which 
an individual will bring to bear on an environment and the 
consequential outcome of the analysis. Thus, the model will 
explain behaviour in a situation by relating what the person 
does cognitively in a particular context, to the cognitive 
tendencies activated by their microprocess assembly 
characteristics. 
The solution to the situationist controversy (Michel, 
1968) of the microprocess assembly model is to drop out of 
the sphere of personality, those behaviours purely situation-
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ally predicted. While this may seem like defining away 
the problem it is in fact more than that. As pointed out 
by Mischel (1983a), the controversy arises because the 
discrepancy between the consistency in human behaviour that 
our intuitions suggest, contrast with the cross-situational 
inconsistency shown by empirical research. When the position 
is taken that personality should not be used to explain 
situationally determined behaviour, it is an admission that 
for some behaviour, the dynamics of individual cognitive 
and affective structures are not differentiating factors. 
Personality theory does not have to set itself the task of 
predicting all the behaviour all of the time. Rather than 
serving as an omnibus theory of behaviour, when relatively 
situationally determined behaviours are deleted, personality 
theory becomes a true theory of individuality. 
Interestingly the microprocess assembly model's 
approach to situations is substantially in agreement with 
Mischel in that it operates with psychological variables 
such as competencies, encoding strategies etc in preference 
to semantic categories such as 'friendliness' or 'punctuality'. 
It thus employs some of the same kind of processes that are 
used byMischel in his analysis of an individual within a 
specific situation. It diverges from the social learning 
approach of Mischel in that its focus is on the within 
individual influences on behaviour, whereas Mischel's 
primary focus is on within situation influences on behaviour. 
Both approaches have virtues and a convergent middle ground 
where limitation of the assumption set of one or other 
approach converts it to the other approach (e.g. restriction 
of the social learning theory approach to situationally 
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invariant attributes of the individual will make it 
substantially similar to the approach offered here). But 
the microprocess assembly model's meta-theoretical structure 
is specifically intended to keep its explanational locus 
within the bounds of a concrete 'personality system'. As a 
concrete system approach, it claims to be a better theory 
of personality (not behaviour) than other more inclusive 
and omnibus theories. 
The Level and Units of the Microprocess Assembly 
Model (M.P.A.) 
The MPA model is preferred to the full model of 
Figure 2-1(a) because it is intended to be better suited 
than a full model to the explication of personality as 
defined here. In contrast with the emotion characteristics 
(E.G.) submodel (Fig. 2-1(b)), the MPA model is non 
motivational and seeks to explain the behaviour within its 
range of convenience, not by the why of the actor, but by 
the how of the way in which environmental input is transformed 
into psychologically active information. It is not denied 
that individual differences in motivational characteristics 
do occur and are well described by emotional setpoints as 
Heisse (1979) has shown. There are however, several 
advantages of the MPA model when used to consider personality, 
that favour it over the more ecologically and linguistically 
valid approach of the EG model. These are now considered. 
1. The MPA model does not have to have situational 
transients defined in order to demonstrate its efficacy .. 
The demonstration of the EG model requires the relating of 
situational transients, behavioural strategies and the 
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characteristic setpoint of the individual. Thus a necessary 
adjunct to the EC model is a theory about the way in which 
situations map onto transients, or a direct measure of 
transients. In contrast empirical research in the MFA model 
can proceed by the demonstration of the microprocess assemblies 
operating in new situations producing a set of biases in 
situation representation. 
2. The MFA model is at a more fundamental level than the 
EC model, and thus some of the results in the latter can be 
subsumed by the former, but not vice versa. For example, it 
is possible that emotional experience emerges partially as 
an interactive result of various subprocesses in much the 
same way as Luria (1978) and Hebb (1968) have suggested for 
consciousness. Even if emotional experience is not wholly 
a consequence of the rearrangement of normally operating 
cognitive processes, the attempt to maintain emotional setpoints 
will to some extent be understandable in terms of maintaining 
certain levels in a configuration of cognitive processes. 
3. The MFA model does not use self report measures to 
establish its data base, and thus its data should be more 
readily interpretable. The EC model will employ the kinds 
of self report that are not always reliable or valid 
measures of affect (e.g. Deinstbier, 1979; Kelley & Michela, 
1980; Nisbett & Wilson 1977; Erickson and Simon, 1980). 
4. It can be argued that microprocesses underlying emotion 
are the most appropriate level to look for psychophenes 
(Fuller 1979). Fuller distinguishes between ostensible 
psychophenes which have direct physical measures and inferred 
psychophenes which are akin to the personality theorist's 
trait. Henderson (1979) has argued for the use of laboratory 
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independent factors in the study of behavioural genetics, 
and he points out that "In essence, then, the investigator 
who, through a logical analysis, breaks down performance in 
a certain test situation into component sub-characters, 
determines the relationship between subcharacters and then 
analyses genetically these groups of subcharacters, is 
likely to be doing much the same thing as the investigator 
who derives a number of factors from an extensive series of 
behavioural measures and genetically analyses them." (p.265). 
Thus, gi ven the intimate connection between personali ty and 
emotional organisation, in order to make the connection 
between personality and situational emotionality there are 
two approaches. One is working up from situational emotiona-
lity to higher order factors which are not situation 
specific. The other is to obtain the subcharacter 
(microprocess) structure of emotional responses, and to 
employ these to describe organism-environment relations. 
The MPA model takes the latter tack. The EC model chooses 
to remain at the level of ostensible psychophenes with the 
danger that cultural and situational factors are not 
separated out of the personality construct set. The aim of 
a concrete systems approach is best served by the MPA model. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter the aim was to consider one of the 
limitations of personality theory; its development in terms 
of an abstract system theory. It has noted that there is 
a call for a more evolutionarily relevant personality 
framework among current theorists, and it was suggested 
that sociobiology may provide essential concepts towards that 
end. The means of obtaining personality constructs of 
biological significance was discussed, and it was suggested 
that an essential part of personality research is demonstrat-
ing the biological or information processing processes that 
underlie personality traits. It was suggested that personality 
theory would benefit by uncovering the microprocesses that 
operate in person-situation encounters and that in accord 
with the realist philosophy of science, such microprocesses 
could be used to provide explanation for nonreplicable as 
well as replicable phenomena. 
In this chapter, the outline of a metatheory/model 
which would be a useful research heuristic was put forward. 
The microprocess assembly model of personality proposes that 
any cross-situational behavioural consistencies that are 
components of personality research are because of individually 
unique assemblies of microprocesses common to all persons. 
People are different in terms of the characteristic way in 
which resource is allocated to microprocess outputs. A 
program to discover a plausible set of microprocesses was 
advocated, and it was suggested that although to date 
undefined, the microprocess set underlying emotional 
experience would be most useful for the purpose of developing 
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a theory of personality. 
Noting that the MPA model is most akin to what 
personality theories term temperament, it was suggested that 
the temperament-personality distinction is artificial. 
Similarities and differences between the MPA model and other 
theories of personality and emotion are noted. It was 
suggested that the MPA model is a superior metatheory to 
other personality approaches as its range of convenience is 
not all embracing and thus it encourages a concrete systems 
approach to individual differences. 
Finally, several advantages of going to a more minute 
level than raw emotion for a theory of personality were 
noted. The EC model was contrasted with the MPA to draw 
these advantages out. 
This entire chapter has been an enquiry into the 
methodology of constructing a personality theory that does 
not stand alone, but is integratable with other levels of 
a theory of living systems. The enquiry was embarked upon 
because it is clear that personality theories, while they 
are often predictive of behaviour, do not usually connect 
with other fields of scientific research to the extent that 
they can be ranked in terms of being consistent with our 
overall knowledge of the human being. From the enquiry has 
come a research strategy that has been initiated in the 
studies reported in subsequent sections of this thesis. The 
action sequence advocated for the personality scientist, of 
the isolation of useful processes (for later explanation), 
their validation by biometric analysis, and relating of 
manifest personality to the operational configuration of such 
microprocesses, seems a bottom up strategy not yet attempted 
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by personality theorists. It promises to be more restraining 
on researchers in terms of linking personality and other 
levels of biological functioning, and thus may obtain this 
virtue lacked by current top-down theories of personality. 
The subsequent sections of this thesis begin the work 
of the isolation of an emotion microprocess set. The research 
will be useful in the understanding of emotion and cognition. 
It is the position taken in this chapter that research like 
this will also be useful in the development of personality 
theory. 
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Chapter three: Perceptual defense: Experiments investigating 
the effects of arousal on perceptual processes. 
The notion of perceptual defence has had a controversial 
history, since it was first demonstrated by McGinnies (1949). 
A thorough review of the studies that lend support to 
perceptual defence as a genuine phenomeno~ is to be found 
in Dixon (1981). Early studies suffer from a lack of a 
theoretical framework. Hence for some researchers, the 
results were more experimental anomalies to be explained away 
than part of the corpus of the science of psychology (e.g. 
Eriksen, 1960). The introduction of an information processing 
paradigm to the field of psychology provided a framework that 
could accommodate perceptual defence studies in its data base. 
A thorough analysis of how perceptual defence can be 
accommodated within an information processing framework is 
provided by Erdelyi (1974). The basic conclusion that Erdelyi 
comes to is that perceptual defence can operate at different 
levels within an information processing sequence. The concept 
of monitoring links between stages shows it is possible for 
the output of a later stage to influence the processing of an 
earlier stage. 
Accepting perceptual defence as a replicable phenomeno~ 
not antithetical to scientific psychology, demands that it 
be thoroughly investigated by emotion researchers. In 
particular, there is some evidence that there are individual 
differences in the extent to which defence is displayed (e.g. 
Dixon, 1966). The extent to which subject's emotional states 
give rise to these differences has not been examined. 
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Wagstaff (1974), in reviewing the literature on perceptual 
vigilance, suggests that whether defence or vigilance is 
displayed, may be a function of sex, stimulus emotionality, 
and certain personality characteristics such as subject 
repression. The last of these might well be related to subject 
emotionality, and raises the possibility of emotion-state 
influences on perceptual processes. 
There is some evidence that an emotion system might 
influence perception. Zajonc (1980) argues that the locus 
of emotionality lies within the limbic system, and that this 
system was capable of maintenance of the organism in the 
environment prior to the evolution of the neocortex. Dixon 
(1971, 1981) suggests that " ••• the cortex can regulate its 
own level of activation by centrifugal control of the 
ascending reticular activating system. 1I (1981, p.216). 
Dixon (1981) also suggests that emotional analysis might be 
important in determining such cortically controlled patterns 
of activation. 
In terms of current neurophysiological understanding 
the regulation of perception by emotional factors is quite 
plausible. It is well established that reticular activity 
(among other. brain mechanisms), may act to inhibit the 
initiation of impulses from peripheral sensory pathways 
(e.g. Ganong, 1977). Since limbic arousal (associated with 
emotion) has been suggested as mutually inhibitory with 
reticular arousal (Routtenberg 1968), there are known 
mechanisms which can account for an emotional influence on 
perception. 
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Experiment I 
The present experiments were designed, firstly, to 
produce an unambiguous demonstration of perceptual defence, 
and secondly to examine the influence that arousal has on 
this defence. It seems plausible in light of the discussion 
above, that arousal being a component of emotion (Schacter 
& Singer, 1962), might influence the processing of information. 
If the level of perceptual defence can be shown to covary 
with arousal, this would be evidence of a linkage between 
the emotion system, and the perceptual system. 
The first experiment was based upon an experiment of 
Marcel (1979), where he provided subjects with words, and 
primes in a lexical decision procedure. He found different 
prime consequences depending upon whether the prime was 
, 
subliminal or conscious and whether it was energy or pattern 
masked. In the present experiment, there could be no 
semantic relationship between prime and target, since the 
targets were 4-digit numbers which had to be reported. It 
was however expected that there would be a disruptive 
influence of the primes (which consisted of emotional and 
taboo words), in much the same manner as subliminal stimuli 
have been shown to affect the subjective intensity of a spot 
of light presented to the eye that does not receive the 
subliminal stimulus (Dixon, 1958). If perceptual defence 
could be demonstrated using such a paradigm, it would add 
to the studies that have controlled for the obvious problems 
of response biases and word frequency, (as for example Dixon, 
1958; Williams & Evans, 1980 employing a lexical decision 
procedure), and would provide evidence that perceptual 
defence is not localised to the processing of the defended 
stimulus, but that it has ongoing effects on the entire 
processing system. 
Method 
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Subjects: The subjects were 10 University of Canterbury 
students recruited from first year laboratory classes. The 
subjects received no payment for taking part in the experiment 
which took about 50 minutes to complete. 
Stimulus Materials and Design 
Ten emotional words were selected from a longer list 
which was put together on the basis of the degree of emotional 
connotation that they conveyed to the researcher. Of these 
words, two each were taken from the conceptual domains of 
sex, religion, bodily distress, excrement and threat. The 
Thorndike-Lorgee word frequency (Thorndike, 1932) was found 
for each of these words, and they were matched by control 
words of the same length and word frequency count. Another 
comparison condition was produced by scrambling the letters 
of the emotional words. 
The stimulus words for the emotional word condition were 
SEX, PENIS, SHIT, VOMIT, CHRIST,GOD;PAIN,BLOOD,KILL,HATE. 
The stimulus words for the neutral word condition were 
KIT, HUMID, HAZE, BLAND, CASINO, HAT, PAGE, VOICE, STEP, 
PACK. The words in the second list match the emotional words 
of the previous list in word frequency. 
Stimuli were drawn with black felt tip pens on white 
card with the aid of a stencil. The visual angle subtended 
by a stimulus word was approximately 4 degrees. All stimuli 
were presented in a Scientific Prototype MFG Corp Model GB 
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3-field tachistoscope. Timing was shared between the 
tachistoscope timing unit, and a Lafayette eight bank program 
timer model 52021. The timing sequence is detailed in 
Figure (3-1). 
The order of presentation, was arranged so that half 
the subjects received a neutral word first, and half the 
subjects received an emotional word first. Thereafter, the 
presentation followed the sequence; scrambled control, and 
then either the emotional word stimulus or the neutral word 
stimulus (if the first stimulus had been neutral or emotional 
respectively). The five emotional content areas were 
presented in a different order for each subject, so that 
each emotional stimulus and its controls were found an equal 
number of times in each place in the presentation order. 
Thus the design was balanced so that valid comparisons could 
be made between the thresholds of the three kinds of stimuli, 
as well as for the stimuli from two semantic domains. 
Procedure 
The subjects, were initially briefed that the experiment 
was concerned with t~chistoscopic recognition thresholds for 
numbers. They then had a series of twelve practice trials. 
The first two practice trials were to familiarise subjects 
with recognition tasks under conditions of tachistoscopic 
presentation. The next six trials were to establish an 
approximate word recognition threshold. The final four 
practice trials provided a preview of the digit report 
procedure of the present experiment. 
The word recognition threshold was established by 
starting with a full 300 msec pattern mask (see Figure (3-1)), 
FIGURE (3-1) TIMING SEQUENCE FOR EXPERIMENT I. 
CONTROL 
OR FOUR PATTERN PATTERN 
WORD DIGIT 
STINULUS NUMBER ~!ASK ~1ASK 
I ( t 
2000 msec 4 msec 300 msec 300 msec 
(Set for each subject) (Starts at a ratio of 10:290 .) 
135 
an~ ~rogressively decreasing the duration of the mask until 
the word was correctly reported. The threshold was set by 
the fastest onset of the mask that allowed correct reporting 
of one of the practice words. Subliminality was obtained by 
setting the time for the mask onset to 15 msec less than 
threshold. 
Once the duration of the subliminal words was established, 
subjects received four practice trials. These trials were 
precisely the same as the trials for the experiment proper 
(described below). At the end of practice, the experimenter 
indicated that the experiment proper was commencing. 
The digit threshold for each trial was established by 
starting with a ratio of digit duration to mask duration of 
zero, and progressively incrementing the digit duration by 
5 msecs until the subject correctly reported the digits 
presented on three consecutive occasions. The digit threshold 
was taken as the digit duration that resulted in the first 
correct report of the three consecutive reports. The subjects 
were given no feedback as to whether they were correct or 
incorrect in part or in full, until they had completed 
three consecutive correct reports. 
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked 
whether they could report seeing a word during the experiment. 
After this, they were then told about the true purpose of 
the experiment, and allowed to discuss their results with 
the experimenter. Subjects were asked not to reveal the 
purpose of-the experiment to future subjects. 
Results 
Medians were used for the analysis since an inspection 
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of the raw data revealed a pattern of positive skew which 
could have been a consequence of the reluctance of subjects 
to reformulate a near correct report about the digits. 
(Perhaps because of a strong influence of mental set). This 
reluctance to reformulate a partially correct hypothesis 
resulted in a disproportionate number of observations falling 
into the very high end of the distribution of digit thresholds, 
and this end should be regarded as contaminated. 
A repeated measures analysis of variance was conducted 
on the median digit threshold, where the repeated factor was 
the kind of subliminal stimulus (emotional word, neutral 
word, non word). The mean thresholds for each condition and 
the significant contrasts are given in Table (3-2). The value 
of the overall F test was F(2,S) = 3.69, (p< .OS), which 
approached significance. Ihe- C)v'\\~ S\~y\\~ic..o-"\ C.OA\. ... o-""\ .......,0..'5, 
be.-h.v«-e.C\ ~o\-\oV"\O\\ lA.)on:\"", I onc\ nOAl . ....,or<lS C t-L\,') == '5 ·2g7/ p.::. . OS). 
Discussion 
The results obtained were consistent with those expected 
for perceptual defence. While the overall F ratio only 
approached significance, the comparison of the nonword 
controls and the emotional words was statistically significant. 
The condition of word frequency matched neutral words produced 
a digit threshold intermediate between that of emotional 
words and the scrambled letters. This intermediate result 
is suggestive that the 'defence' produced in this experiment 
could be demonstrated for any meaningful word stimuli. The 
emotional words may have produced a larger effect because of 
their higher semantic salience, but the same processes might 
have operated on both sets of words. 
Two studies lend support to the possibility that it is 
FIGURE (3-2). DIGIT THRESHOLDS FOR SUBLIMINAL CONDITIONS 
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TABLE (3-1) MEAN DIGIT THRESHOLDS ~MSEC2 FOR EACH KIND 
OF SUBLIMINAL PRIME. (EXP 1.) 
EMOTION NEUTRAL NON 
WORD WORD vJORD 
48.6 45.8 43.1 
Condi tions not joined by a line are si gnifi can tly different 
(p<:'.05). 
TABLE (3-2) MEAN THRESHOLD DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WORD 
STIMULI AND THEIR NONvJORD CONTROLS. (EXPERIMENT II) 
Word Emotionality 
Noise 
Control Emotional Neutral 
Noise - 3.125 -4.875b 
Silent +5.00a -3.250b 
Conditions with different letters differ significantly from 
each other (p<.05). A positive difference indicated 
perceptual defence. 
TABLE (3-3) DIGIT THRESHOLDS (MSEC2 IN EXPERIMENT II. 
Emotionality 
Emotional 
Non Emotional 
Word 
Nonword 
Word 
Nonword 
Noise Condition 
Silent 
37.75 
32.75 
30.75 
35.62 
Noise 
33.25 
36.37 
32.62 
35.87 
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not just emotional material that disrupts the processing of 
other stimuli. Firstly, Philpott and Wilding (1979) showed 
that subliminal presentation to one eye at the same time as 
the other eye received a target stimulus, slowed the naming 
response to the target. They found that the increase in 
naming response time was apparent even when the target and 
the subliminal stimulus were unrelated. Secondly, an 
experiment by Humphreys (1981) showed that for a task 
involving categorical judgement, a preceding subliminal 
stimulus could prove facilitative or disruptive for the 
judgement. A preceding subliminal stimulus of the same 
category as the target stimulus improved target category 
report accuracy, while if the preceding subliminal stimulus 
was of the opposite category, target category report accuracy 
declined. (Both results are relative to a condition in which 
a blank field preceeded the target stimulus). 
The experiment clearly demonstrated that emotional 
words differ significantly from nonwords in their disruptive 
effects on the task of correctly reporting another stimulus. 
There are several possible explanations for this finding. 
A first possibility is that the alerting (Posner, 1978, 
1981) provided by the subliminal stimulus varies as an 
inverse function of its familiarity. This has been demonstrated 
for words presented as warning signals (Kraut, Smothergill 
& Mitchell, 1981). It could be argued that in the present 
experiment, because the scrambled letters were totally 
unfamiliar, the alerting produced by the nonwords was more 
than that produced by previously processed words. This 
greater alerting might result in superior performance at 
digit report for the nonwords. This explanation is not 
140 
favoured however since it is a naive version of stimulus 
novelty; it supposes that XXUN is more alerting than BOMB. 
In the absence of data to support this, the reverse view 
would seem more plausible. 
A better explanation of the results is in terms of 
network dynamics. If the subliminal stimulus is responsible 
for a pattern of network activation, then the extent of 
interference with a stable pattern of activation for the 
digits will be proportional to the subliminal activation. 
Such an explanation is compatible with several recent models 
of network dynamics (e.g. Wicklegren, 1979; Grossberg, 1980; 
McClelland & Rummelhart, 1981). 
The results of the first experiment can also be accounted 
for in terms of a modern account of perceptual defence. 
Dixon (1981) in distinguishing between six types of attention 
suggest that perceptual defence falls into the category of 
selective inattention (unconscious). He suggests that 
defence arises as a consequence of a dampening of the level 
of activation of the ascending reticular activating system. 
This dampening is supposed to be under cortical control. 
Such an explanation can account for the differences 
between taboo and neutral or nonwords. However, if a real 
defence effect is also found for neutral words, then another 
explanation might be preferred. (Why should there be defence 
against non-emotional words?) 
The next experiment looks as the viability of the 
defence explanation. In it the level of subject arousal is 
manipUlated. Such a Change in arousal might influence 
defence mechanisms. It was hoped that any changes towards 
defence or vigilance would provide clues to the cause of 
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perceptual defence. 
Experiment II 
Experiment I produced evidence that perceptual defence 
can be obtained using a procedure that does not require the 
reporting of the defended material. The second experiment 
looks at whether this defence is an epiphenomenon of normal 
information processing, or whether it has some adaptive 
significance. 
The experiment looks at whether there are adaptive 
processes which ensure that the information in the 
environment related to current concerns (Klinger, 1982) gains 
access to awareness. It seems reasonable to postulate such 
processes, since many behavioural and decision programmes 
operate on the material which the individual is aware of. 
The idea of the experiment is that by changing the emotion 
related parameters of the subject's situation, the availability 
to awareness of material from various semantic domains will 
be altered. Experiment II seeks to introduce two distinct 
environments within which the experimental measurement of 
digit thresholds can occur. 
The distinct environments are created by introducing 
white noise at places in the experiment. The white noise 
intervention was chosen because firstly it has been much 
employed previously in the study of the relationship between 
arousal and memory (see Eysenck ,1977 for a review of these 
studies). Secondly because white noise alters subject's 
arousal levels, it is affecting one of the accepted central 
components of emotion (e.g. Mandler, 1975; Schachter & Singer, 
1962). If changing the emotional salience of the situation 
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can be demonstrated to change the extent of the perceptual 
defence exhibited by subjects, then a new and adaptive theory 
of the phenomena is called for. 
The introduction of a manipulation which affects a 
component of emotion also allows assessment of whether the 
present task can furnish a measure of microprocesses that 
are involved in emotion. It will be remembered that the 
research strategy of Chapter two called for the isolation 
of such a microprocess set. 
Method 
Subjects: The subjects were 8 University of Canterbury 
students recruited from first year psychology classes. The 
subjects received no payment for taking part in the experiment 
which took about 50 minutes. 
Stimulus Materials and Design 
From the results of the previous experiment, four 
emotionally significant words that had produced a pattern 
of digit reaction times consistent with perceptual defence 
were chosen. The words were PENIS, VOMIT, CHRIST, KILL, and 
other stimuli were the neutral words of the same length and 
word frequency used as word controls in experiment I 
(HUMID, BLAND, CASINO, STEP), and also nonword controls 
obtained by scrambling the letters of the words. The words 
were displayed subliminally prior to the digit report and 
the setup, and display apparatus, were the same as that 
described for experiment I. During the course of the 
experiment, the emotional words, emotional controls, neutral 
words, neutral controls, were all presented twice; once with 
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a white noise background, and once without the white noise 
background. The white noise was produced by LAYFAYETTE 
MODEL 15012 WHITE NOISE GENERATOR and was presented 
simultaneously to each ear by STEREO HEADPHONE MODEL SM-220, 
The factors of the experiment were TYPE (word, nonword), 
EMOTION (emotionally significant, neutral), NOISE (white 
noise, silence). The digits used in the experiment were 
rotated so that they were associated with each of the word 
stimuli control stimuli pairs. As well, the word stimulus 
- control stimulus pairs were rotated to ensure that after 
all subjects had been run, each pair had appeared in every 
possible presentation position in the set of all pairs. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that given for Experiment 
I, with the exception that at some point of the experiment 
white noise was introduced. The level of the white noise 
was set at the beginning of the experiment by increasing 
the volume of the white noise until the subject indicated 
that they found the level of noise uncomfortable. The 
setting for the noise was made at a level just below the 
level of discomfort. Half the subjects had white noise for 
their initial 16 and last 16 trials, while the rest of the 
subjects experienced the white noise in the middle 32 trials. 
Apart from this introduction of white noise, the procedure 
was completely identical to that of Experiment I. 
Results 
As in Experiment I, median threshold times were calculated 
for each subject in each condition. These eight measures 
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were then reduced to four measures by subtracting the time 
for the control stimuli from the time for their corresponding 
word stimuli. The reasons for choosing the differenced times, 
(and four cell ANOVA), for analysis rather than the actual 
times are; firstly that the controls are specific to their 
words because they contain the letters of the words; secondly, 
the fact that words and corresponding controls are measured 
at the same point of time during the experiment also makes 
them very specific to each other. If as is suggested the 
controls and words are specific within each subject, there 
will be a greater reduction in error variance than if a 
full ANOVA with eight cells is used for analysis. One other 
reason for using difference scores is that they provide a 
ready made index of perceptual defense. A positive difference 
will indicate defence, and a negative difference will indicate 
vigilance. (For completeness, the undifferenced means of 
all conditions are reported in Table (3-3).) 
Table (3-2) details the mean threshold differences for 
each word and noise combination. An analysis of variance 
revealed that there was a significant effect for the EMOTION 
factor:F(1,7) = 9.49, p .02, but that there was no significant 
effect for the NOISE factor; F(1,7) = 2.06 p< .19, or the 
NOISE X EMOTION interaction; F(1,7) = 2.18 p<.18. These 
results are complicated somewhat by simple t-tests on the 
significance of the defence/vigilance under each condition. 
For both conditions with neutral word stimuli, there appeared 
to be evidence for vigilance. Without noise; t(7) = 2.12, 
p<.1 and with noise; t(7) = 3.375, p< .01. Neither of 
the noise conditions with the emotional word stimuli produced 
defence/vigilance effects. T-tests also showed differences 
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in the amount of defence produced by the emotion words in 
silence, and the two neutral word conditions; t(7) = 2.38, 
p...:: .05 for the compari son wi th the noi s e condition; t ( 7) 
= 2.39, P < .05 for the compari son wi th the silent condition. 
No other comparisons were significant so it was only for 
emotional words with noise that a shift towards perceptual 
vigilance was evident. 
Di scussion 
The second experiment failed to replicate the perceptual 
defence that was obtained in the first experiment. The 
procedure was exactly the same except that the second 
experiment introduced a noise manipulation in half the trials. 
Any explanation of the results must address what the 
consequence of the noise was on the information processing 
leading up to digit perception. 
Noise has been used in a number of experiments to alter 
the arousal levels of the subjects (see Eysenck (1977, 1982), 
for the review of some of these experiments). In the present 
experiment, it was used in one half of the trlQls performed 
by a subject. It was assumed (perhaps naively), that the 
noise would have an influence only on those trials on which 
it occurred. In fact the significant vigilance shown to 
neutral words in both parts of the experiment, indicates 
that the noise must have had an ongoing effect. It seems 
to have had a similar but less powerful influence on the 
emotional words; moving the condition which should have 
shown defence to being nonsignificantly different from the 
nonwords; moving the condition where it was coincidental 
with words to bordering upon exhibiting significant vigilance. 
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Why has the noise, and the arousal caused by the noise 
had the effect that it has had? There is little in the 
studies of the influence of noise on memory that seems 
relevant to the present experiment. The most relevant 
studies seem to be on the influence of noise on attention 
selectivity. The general finding there is that noise results 
in an increase in attention selectivity, and a decrease in 
attention capacity (Eysenck, 1982). Consequently, it might 
be expected that with an increase in noise, less attention 
will be devoted to the distracting subliminal stimuli. 
However, this only explains the attenuation of the defence 
of the first experiment by the introduction of noise in the 
second. It does not explain the reversal to a pattern of 
'vigilance' in the case of the neutral subliminal words in 
Experiment II. 
The results of the second experiment seem best explained 
in terms of two factors which were mentioned in Experiment I. 
The factors are the alerting consequences of words as 
warning signals, and the disruptive influence of recently 
presented information on material being presently processed. 
The latter of these two factors has already been 
discussed in Experiment I. It was suggested that the 
presence of a subliminal word stimulus produced sufficient 
network activation to interfere with the encoding of the 
target digits. The interference of an irrelevant stimulus 
presented simultaneously with a target has been reviewed 
by Eriksen and Schultz (1978). Recently Kahneman, Treisman 
and Burkell (1983) have provided evidence that there may be 
interference from distractor~, even when the distractors 
are removed at the time of presentation of the target 
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stimulus. It also seems from research by Kahneman and 
Chajczyk (1983) and Flowers, Polansky and Kerl (1981), that 
words produce considerably more interference with the 
encoding of target stimuli than do nonword letter stimuli. 
The other factor needed to explain the results of the 
current experiment is the alerting consequences of the 
subliminal words presented prior to the target digits. As 
explained by Posner (1978, 1981), the effect of alerting is 
to increase the general level of receptivity of the organism 
to information. Kraut, Smothergill and Farkas (1981) have 
shown that word stimuli as warning signals have alerting 
consequences that increase with stimulus novelty. Words 
not previously presented have greater alerting consequences 
than familiarised words. Thus, if the alerting and orienting 
consequences of the subliminal neutral words are assumed to 
be greater than those of the nonwords (in Experiment II), 
this could give rise to the 'vigilance'. 
The two factors that have been mentioned above produced 
a different set of results when presentation occurred without 
noise (Experiment I), than with noise (Experiment II). 
This needs to be explained. 
It is proposed that one effect of the noise is to reduce 
the influence of the subliminal word on the semantic network. 
The consequence of this would be to reduce the interference 
of the subliminal stimuli with the encoding of target digits, 
and thus increase the relative importance of the alerting 
consequences of the subliminal stimuli. Evidence for this 
effect of noise upon the semantic network is provided by 
Singer, Bronstein and Miles (1981). They showed that the 
effect of noise was to remove the priming advantage enjoyed 
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by related primes in a lexical decision task. 
The noise may also mean that the alerting and orienting 
consequences of stimuli may become more pronounced. The 
reasoning behind this is that any reduction in attentional 
capacity with arousal (Eysenck, 1982), will mean that the 
phasic readiness associated with alerting and orienting, 
will become more valuable to the processing of information. 
In Experiment I (without noise), it is suggested that 
difference in thresholds between emotional words, neutral 
words and nonwords reflects the interference factor. In 
Exp~riment II, the orienting and alerting consequences of 
the respective stimuli become more important. Although the 
difference between emotional words and neutral words reflected 
an interference effect, the difference in orienting. and 
alerting between words and nonwords, ensured perceptual 
vigilance for neutral words compared with nonwords. 
One criticism that might be levelled against the 
explanation above is that it seems at first glance to be 
experiment specific. It is not obvious that it can be applied 
to explain the results of other experiments on perceptual 
defence. This criticism has some validity, but the 
attractiveness of a single 'defence' explanation should not 
blind us to the obvious inability of 'perceptual defence' 
accounts to explain all the data. 
Take for example two 'classic' examples of perceptual 
defence often cited by its exponents as unambiguous 
demonstrations of defence. Dixon (1958), had subjects control 
the intensity of light spots while subliminal word stimuli 
were projected into one eye. Dixon (1971) reports that the 
results support the hypothesis n ••• that 'emotional' stimuli, 
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at subliminal intensities to one eye, would occasion changes 
to threshold for the other eye. II (p, 192). In fact, 
irrespective of the emotionality of the subliminal words, 
there was a sensitivity increase. In the case of the female 
subjects there was perceptual vigilance to both neutral and 
emotional words (although vigilance to neutral words was 
stronger). Such a result requires a fuller account tha~ 
just'defens·e'. 
Another example is the demonstration of a decline in 
sensitivity in a signal detection experiment when subliminal 
emotional words are presented concurrently with the target 
stimulus (Hardy and Legge, 1968). While such a result is 
congruent with an explanation in terms of non specific 
defence, it is also possible that the subliminal stimulus 
produced switches in attention to the unattended channel, 
with consequent performance deficits. Unless such alternative 
explanations are examined, perceptual defense has received 
less than a satisfactory analysis. 
The explanation of the present results receives support 
from recent experiments reported by Posner (1982). They 
note that when a subject's attention is drawn to a cued 
place in space, and then returned to fixation, processing 
at the cued position is inhibited with respect to other 
positions in the visual field. They conclude that for 
spatial attention there are the opponent effects of inhibition 
and covert orienting which determine sensitivity to events. 
In the explanation of the current chapter, we have preferred 
to label the facilitatory process alerting and orienting. 
It is suspected that in the present experiments modality 
orienting may have become more important with the introduction 
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of the white noise. The present explanation takes it that 
visual word stimuli are more likely to produce a readiness 
to uptake information from the visual modality, than will 
nonword stimuli. 
Taking the explanation a step further: the processes 
causing perceptual defence may be analogous at the semantic 
level to those discussed above for spacial attention. An 
early emotional encoding by a separate emotional memory 
system (c.f. Posner, 1975, strongman, 1982) may produce a 
tendency to orient towards the emotional stimulus. However, 
the experimental situation which is non threatening will 
demand a dampening of activation accumulating at the level 
of emotional features. Consequently it is supposed that the 
initial tendency to orient and alert is counteracted by later 
inhibitory processes which prevent an over reaction to the 
emotional word. The effect of a dampening of the activation 
associated with one level of analysis with the activity 
associated with other levels can be quite profound (e.g. 
McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1981). 
The explanation put forward here is not all that much 
different to that put forward by Dixon (1971, 1981). However, 
it is couched in the terminology of modern attention theory, 
and it is more compatible with the idea of perceptual 
vigilance. It predicts that certain experimental procedures 
that give rise to alerting and orienting could produce 
examples of perceptual vigilance. 
More importantly, it predicts that under~~ormal 
environmental conditions, the processes that give rise to 
perceptual defence will be facilitative in the processing 
of emotional material. Under stressful conditions, the 
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inhibition of processing at an emotional level will not 
occur. Under such conditions, there will be a tendency to 
orient and process emotional information in preference to 
non emotional information. 
Some indication of this tendency is demonstrated in an 
experiment by Nielsen and Sarason (1981). They showed in a 
shadowing task, that there are more intrusions from the 
unattended channel of taboo words, than of neutral words. 
Interestingly, it was only for subjects who could report 
the intrusions that there was a decline in shadowing 
performance caused by the taboo words. Such an effect is 
not predicted by perceptual defence accounts, since it is 
generally supposed that defence is nonspecific and occurs 
to all current input. 
The argument put forward here, is that so called 
perceptual defence might be a consequence of the way in 
which the emotional encoding given emotional words, produces 
effects on attention processes. Extrapolating from the 
present experiments, it is possible that at high levels of 
emotional arousal, the early emotional encoding might result 
in more benefits than costs in the processing of emotional 
material. At high arousal levels, there may be 'attention 
capture', alerting, and orienting caused by emotional 
stimuli. Thus it is plausible that the interaction between 
stimulus materials, the mechanisms of attention, and arousal 
levels, results in the tuning of information processing to 
the analysis of emotionally relevant material. Such a tuning 
would obviously be functional, and might have been selected 
for. 
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Conclusion 
Perceptual defense can be shown in many ways. However, 
there are many examples in the contemporary research into 
attention where nontarget information produces performance 
deficits. We do not label this interference defense, and 
perhaps we should not label changes in perceptual thresholds 
on presentation of emotional words as such either. 
The present experiments have shown how one 'defense' 
phenomena was affected by auditory noise. The joint effects 
of the alerting, and the interference caused by the presented 
words seems to provide a parsimonious explanation of the 
results of these experiments. 
It would seem that a more thorough analysis of 
perceptual defen~e experiments is required. It is not 
sufficient just to show a processing cost associated with 
emotional stimuli. Experiments must be planned to examine 
which microprocesses are responsible for these processing 
costs (defense). In this way, an understanding of the way 
in which microprocesses are coordinated to ensure optimal 
information processing in stressful environments can be 
achieved. 
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Chapter Four: An investigation of the consequence of 
emotion for spreading activation in the semantic network. 
Recent research by Bower, Gilligan and Monteiro, (1978, 
1981b), has provided data that has implicated emotion in 
retrieval processes, and also encoding processes. Bower 
et.al. (1978), demonstrated that hypnotically induced 
emotional states resulted in affect-state-dependent learning, 
but only under conditions where subjects had to learn two 
lists under differing emotional states. Bower (1981) 
explained the results obtained in terms of an associative 
network with emotion nodes that are active during emotional 
episodes, and whose activation can spread to event nodes 
which are connected to the emotional node. This account 
predicts that under particular emotional states, the material 
congruent with the ongoing emotion, will receive more attention 
and processing than information incongruent with the ongoing 
emotion. The prediction was confirmed in a series of 
experiments by Bower et.al. (1981), in which it was 
demonstrated that emotional states influenced which material 
was learned in narratives, but seemed to have little effect 
on recall of what had been learnt when the mood was neutral. 
While these results are well explained in semantic network 
terms, to date there has been no more direct attempt to 
demonstrate the influence of emotion on the semantic 
network. The experiments of this chapter were formulated 
to provide a direct demonstration of the effect of emotional 
states on activation within the semantic network. 
Activation within the semantic network, has generally 
been investigated using semantic priming methods. For 
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example, Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971) found that the 
lexical decision time for "Nurse" is less when it is preceded 
by "Doctor" than if it is preceded by "Butter". Such 
methods have been used to investigate the time course of 
the spread of activation in lexical memory (e.g. Warren ,1977), 
the activation produced by sentences (e.g. Foss,1982), the 
effects of syntactic contex (e.g. Seidenberg, Tannenhaus, 
Leiman & Bienkowski, 1982 ), the semantic activation 
consequences of pictures (e.g. Carr, McCauley & Sperber, 
1982 ), among other phenomena. Such priming studies have 
proved very useful to date in developing an understanding 
of the operating principles of the semantic network. However, 
priming methods might not be those of first choice for 
investigating the influence of emotion on the semantic 
network. 
A problem with using priming methods, is that recent 
evidence has suggested that priming methods may produce 
patterns of inhibition as well as patterns of facilitation 
in lexical decision tasks. For example Becker (1980) found 
that for lists with highly predictable prime-target 
associations facilitation occurred, whereas for lists with 
.little predictability between prime and target, inhibition 
occurred. Posner (1982) in discussing this inhibition, 
suggests that it might have arisen as a consequence of the 
subject's active prediction of the target stimulus. Because 
the predictions will usually be wrong, the costs of a 
mismatched expectancy when consciously attending will be 
obtained (Posner, 1978). 
In the light of the Becker's results, it seems desirable 
to investigate the effect of emotion on the semantic 
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network by a method which will minimize conscious attention 
artifacts. In other words, since Bower's theory of emotional 
nodes is a theory of the automatic spread of activation, 
it behoves us to confine our investigation to that level 
and exclude conscious attentional processes from our 
experimentation as much as is possible. We want to employ 
a method which will minimize the impact of the experimental 
context; avoiding artifacts of the emotion induction 
procedures (and the kinds of hypotheses that will be 
generated in subjects by such procedures). 
A task which promises to be less influenced by conscious 
attention strategies, and still is a measure of activation 
in the semantic network, is the Warren task, (Warren 1972, 
1974). This task is a modified Stroop task, (Stroop 1938) 
where the interference with colour naming is obtained via 
the activation of semantic networks and response schemas 
by stimulus material other than colour words. It has been 
found that the immediately prior presentation of an associate 
to the coloured word to which subjects respond, results in 
a significant amount of interference with the colour naming 
response. This increase in colour naming time has been 
taken to be an indicator of the strength of association 
between the priming word, and the word to which a response 
is required. The Warren task has been used to investigate 
processes affecting stimulus encoding (Warren 1972, 1974), 
lexical ambiguity and sentence processing (Conrad 1974), and 
developmental changes in the encoding of simple sentences 
(Kareev 1980). Since these tasks involve the naming of 
colours and the word that the colour forms is irrelevant 
to a subject's response, this kind of task should sample 
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the effects of automatic pathway activation more than that 
of conscious attention activation. Evidence supporting this 
assumption can be found in a study by Logan (1980), where 
a particular kind of paradigm closely analogous to the 
Stroop paradigm was demonstrated to have automatic and 
non-automatic components which would be made larger or 
smaller dependent on stimulus predictability (that is 
response relevance). 
The following series of experiments involved emotion 
induction procedures followed by experimental periods during 
which subjects saw a range of stimulus words, and had to 
name the colour of a target word. Experiment I replicated 
the general experimental procedure of Warren (1972), while 
experiments II and III used the same Stroop type task with 
multiple words appearing, in an attempt to investigate some 
of the attentional properties of emotion. 
Experiment I 
The rationale behind the first experiment was that if 
subject emotionality produces a higher level of activation 
of emotion relevant conceptual nodes in the semantic network, 
this should result in a larger amount of interference in 
colour words semantically related or associatively related 
to the emotion, than to words which are unrelated to the 
emotion. Specifically, any such effects should show up 
most strongly on target colour words which are closely 
related to the emotion of interest, and should be absent 
from colour words which have no emotional content. 
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Method 
Subjects: Subjects were 24 undergraduate students at 
the University of Canterbury. The subjects were recruited 
from laboratory cl~sses'on the basis that they were prepared 
to experience emotions of Fear and Joy, and they understood 
that the procedure would require some active role-play! 
fantasy on their parts. Subjects were paid a rate of $5 per 
hour for the series of experiments which generally took 
about 2 hours. 
Stimulus Materials and Design 
Stimulus material was obtained with the following 
considerations in mind: 
1) That there should if possible be a set of control 
words with no emotional connotations. 
2) That subject strategies be minimized as much as 
possible by the almost complete crossing of list materials 
thereby making distractor-target pairings unpredictable. 
(If, emotion words preceded the emotional colour words in 
general, and neutral words preceded the neutral colour words 
in general, then it is likely that the subjects would engage 
in some predictive strategies. Since the hypothesised 
influence of emotion within semantic networks is taken to 
be found in the consequent patterns of spreading activation 
occurring automatically, the experiment was designed to 
minimize confounding influences). 
3) That all materials should be matched as closely as 
possible in terms of word frequency, concreteness, and 
associative strengths. 
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The stimuli were obtained with a view to finding an 
equivalent in (emotional terms) to the categories of Battig 
and Montague (1969). To this end, the norms of Word 
association provided by Palermo and Jenkins (1964), were 
consulted in an attempt to obtain "category headers" from 
the terms that had been normed. As far as possible, it was 
hoped to obtain terms which corresponded to the semantic 
domains of four of the fundamental emotions posited by 
Izard (1977); Enjoyment-Joy, Anger-Rage, Fear-Terror, 
Distress-Anguish. The word association norms provided 
associations for the words joy, anger, afraid, and trouble 
and cry; the first three seemed to correspond reasonably 
closely to the fundamental emotions being investigated, 
while the judicious use of the last two word norms was hoped 
to provide material that corresponds to the Distress-Anguish 
emotion. A final selection of emotional terms for each 
category was made weighing each of the following factors 
up 
1) The word frequency count. (Thorndike 1932) 
2) The frequency that a word was found to be an associate 
of another emotional category. (As much as possible it was 
desired to have words with a strong association with just 
one category). 
3) The paucity of abstract emotionally same toned words 
meant that included within each category were not just state 
descriptive terms but also terms which were likely to be 
the object of emotion. For example, Joy included Friend 
as an associate. 
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The final words used are included in Appendix 1 with 
their word frequency counts. Also in Appendix 1, are 
examples of the stimuli for a 32 trial block including the 
words for each trial, with a classification of each prime-
target pair in terms of the emotionality, category , and 
validity of pair members. 
Stimulus Conditions (within subjects design). 
Primes were of four possible types. 
1) A row of four XIS. (K condition). e.g. XXXX-Joy 
2) Unrelated to the target stimulus in either category 
or emotionality. (li condition) e.g. JOY-APPLE or 
APPLE-MAD 
3) From a different category to the target stimulus, 
but with the same level of emotional relevance. 
(SE condition) e.g. JOY-MAD or HOUR-APPLE 
4) From the same category as the target stimulus (which 
means the same level of emotional relevance as well). 
(y condition) e.g. ANGRY-MAD or APPLE-PLUM 
The total 128 stimuli for each subject, contained four 
presentations of each validity condition for each target 
category. Table 4-1b illustrates this crossing of 
validity conditions with target category. Table 4-1a 
expresses the crossings of prime types and target categories 
that were used in the experiment. 
These tables illustrate that each subject had sixteen 
trials in which the emotional target words had primes from 
the same category, and sixteen trials in which the neutral 
target words had primes from their same category. There 
were also sixteen trials in which the prime and target 
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words had emotionality in common, and sixteen trials with 
prime and target having neutrality in common. Both 
emotional and neutral targets had sixteen trials with 
crosses as primes, and sixteen trials where they se~ved 
as primes for each other. 
The stimuli were presented in 32 trial blocks. Each 
trial block contained one stimulus from each of the four 
validity conditions for everyone of the eight target 
categories. The prime stimuli never matched the target 
stimuli since the prime stimuli were taken from a second 
set of word stimuli. Half the subjects received one set 
of target stimuli, and half the subjects received the other 
set of target stimuli. 
In terms of the stimulus factors that could be analysed 
in this experiment, the following stimulus factors were 
present 
1 ) 
2) 
3) 
5) 
VALIDITY 
EMOTION 
CATEGORY TARGET 
CATEGORY PRIME 
-- --
ABSTRACTNESS 
(x, N, SE, V) • 
(E = Emotional words, 
(E 1 , E2, E3, E4, N1 , 
Categories 1 to 4 by 
(E1 , E2, E3, E4, N1 , 
Categories 1 to 4 by 
(A= Abstract words, C 
N = Neutral 
N2, N3, N4) 
EMOTION 
N2, N3, N4) 
EMOTION 
= Concrete 
There was not a perfect crossing of each of these 
factors, so the experiment cannot be analysed as a full 
words). 
words). 
factorial design. As well, the number of trials performed 
by each subject made it necessary to restrict analysis to 
no more than two factors at once. Consequently in the 
analysis of the stimulus conditions the possibility exists 
that some complex interactions may have been missed. 
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Between Subjects Design 
The emotion node model of Bower required that subjects 
be in different emotional states in order to be tested •. 
The affect induction procedure described elsewhere was 
employed in order to obtain a range of emotional states in 
the subjects. Because affect induction is not always 
effective, and because subjects bring a range of emotional 
states into an experiment it was decided to use a correlation-
al analysis rather than an ANOVA to test the predictions of 
Bower's semantic network theory. The correlational analysis 
is justified by the fact that it can provide tests of the 
experimental hypotheses in the absence of a strong induction 
effect. As is pointed out in Cronbach and Snow (1977), the 
use of regression is always preferable to the use of median 
split methods to test the influence of an aptitude on a 
dependent measure. (In the two group case, the ANOVA is 
equivalent to a simple regression with the predictor 
variable having only two values). 
The assumption is that if the results of the test of 
the emotion induction do not indicate the efficacy of the 
induction, at the very least they indicate a wide range of 
emotion within groups (contributing to the error variance). 
The effect of this emotion on the naming of the colour of 
an emotional coloured-word is ascertained from the 
significance of the correlation between the emotion and the 
difference in reaction time between the emotional word 
condition and its corresponding control condition. 
The correlational analysis uses difference times, in 
preference to seperate regressions because the use of such 
times prevents the correlation reflecting intersubject 
differences in reaction time. Besides, as pointed out in 
Cook and Campbell (1979), difference scores result in a 
lowering of error variance if the sep~rate scores are 
highly correlated (as is the case for the sep~rate reaction 
times in this experiment). The use of differences between 
reaction times is considered in more depth in Chapter five. 
By subtracting the reaction time of a neutral category, 
from that of an emotional category one is left with the 
processing time associated. with the emotional nature of the 
stimuli. Specifically-
RT control = G + e. 
RT emotional word = G + E + e. 
Subtracting we obtain 
Reaction time difference = E +e 
Accordingly, because it conveys the meaning of the 
measure, throughout the rest of this chapter we refer to 
the reaction time difference calculated above as emotion 
time. 
In practice, the differences obtained are proportional 
the the mean reaction times for each subject. Working with 
raw reaction times would have meant that reaction time 
differences were not as significant for subjects with low 
mean reaction times as for subjects with high mean reaction 
times. Accordingly throughout the correlations the emotion 
time is calculated by -
Emotion time = Log (RT emotional word/RT control) 
= Log (RT emotional word) - Log (RT control) 
Figure 4-1 contains a set of example stimuli for the anger 
target category. All validity conditions have been 
FIGURE (4-1) EXAMPLE PRIME AND TARGET STIMULI FOR 
EXPERIMENTS I, II AND III. 
Expt 1 
Expt 2 
Expt 3 
Prime 
Stimulus 
PEACH 
XXXX 
JOY 
ANGER 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX 
Target 
Stimulus 
HATE C1 
HATE C1 
HATE C1 
HATE C1 
PEACH C1 
HATE C1 
PEACH C3 
XXXX C2 
HATE C1 
XXXX C3 
JOY C2 
HATE C1 
JOY C3 
ANGER C2 
HATE C1 
ANGER C3 
ANGER C1 
XXXX C1 
PEACH C2 
ANGER C2 
XXXX C1 
PEACH C1 
VALIDITY 
CONDITION 
Not Valid 
XIS 
Same Emotion 
Valid 
Not Valid 
x IS 
Same Emotion 
Valid 
Same Colour 
Different Colour 
C1 = Colour 1, C2 = Colour 2, C3 = Colour 3. 
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TABLE (4-1a) PRIME AND TARGET CATEGORY PAIRINGS FOR EXPERIMENT 1. 
Va lidi t:t Distractor Target Categor:t Distractor Target Categor:t 
Co ndition Stimulus E1 E2 E3 El. Stimulus N1 N2 N3 Nl. 
X X 4 4 4 4 X 4 4 4 4 
N1 2 1 1 E1 2 1 1 
N2 2 1 1 E2 2 1 1 
N N3 1 1 2 E3 1 1 2 
N4 1 1 2 E4 1 1 2 
E1 2 1 1 N1 2 1 1 
SE E2 2 1 1 N2 2 1 1 
E3 1 1 2 N3 1 1 2 
E4 1 1 2 N4 1 1 2 
V E1 4 N1 4 
E2 4 N2 4 
E3 4 N3 4 
E4 4 N4 4 
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TABLE (4-1 b) STIMULUS CONDITIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 • 
Target Category 
Validity 
Condition E1 E2 E3 E4 N1 N2 N3 N4 
XX's 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
VALID 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
SAME EMOTION 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
NOT VALID 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Category Codes: E1 = Fear, E2 = Anger, E3 = Happiness, 
E4 = Distress, N1 = Weather, N2 = Fruit, N3 = Time, 
N4 = Literature. 
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exemplified. Stimulus examples for experiments II and III 
are also included. 
Several specific tests of the locus of emotional 
activation in the semantic network should be possible with 
the categories of stimulus material given in Table (4-1). 
I) The emotional activation hypothesis without any 
refinements, predicts that the correlation between the 
emotion-time of a particular emotional category with the 
level of a particular induced affect, will be highest when 
the emotional category and the affect correspond. Such a 
prediction should hold across all types of prime-stimulus 
conditions. 
II) If the effect above is present, then it should arise 
most strongly for nonpredictive primes if the emotional 
influence is predominantly on patterns of automatic 
activation. If on the other hand the effects mentioned 
above arise because of an amplification of material relevant 
to the induced affect by conscious attention strategies, 
then the correlation between emotion-time and affective 
state should be higher in trials with predictive primes. 
III) If the activity of a particular node in memory is 
related to working memory processes (e.g. Wicklegren 1979), 
and if as has been suggested by Bower (1981), particular 
active emotion nodes inhibit nodes of antagonistic emotions, 
then there should be a negative correlation between affective 
states and emotion-times in trials where target words 
represent emotions that are antagonistic to the emotional 
states induced in the subjects. For example, when the priming 
stimulus is XXXX, then a target stimulus of ANGER, should 
show less interference in colour naming given that joy has 
been induced in the subjects, than a target stimulus of 
APPLE. The reason for this, is that the anger concept 
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node is being somewhat inhibited by the induced emotion, and 
therefore has a lower resting activity and is less lik€ly 
to provide significant interference in the response selection/ 
decision processes involved in colour naming. 
The colour words were presented in bold upper case 
letters coloured either orange, green or blue and subt€nded 
a visual angle of between 3 and 4 degrees. The words were 
displayed on a Karga (model KS14P) colour monitor, and the 
experiment was controlled by an Apple II + microcomputer. 
The program to control the experiment was written by the 
author, and is listed in Appendix 3. Subject responses were 
timed via a voice activated relay consisting of a MTL F-96 
microphone and a Realistic CTR~40 tape recorder which fed 
into the computer cassette input. The time taken for the 
subject to respond was calculated from an assembly language 
program written by the author, and modified from a program 
described by Price (1979). The rapid presentation of the 
word stimuli involved writing the word on a non displayed 
screen, and then displaying the screen using the Apple 
software switches for graphics in a manner detailed by 
Cavanagh and Anstis (1980). The timing accuracy was to 
the nearest millisecond. 
Materials for Emotion Induction 
Subjects in the emotion induction conditions chose 
six TAT pictures, to which they would tell stories having 
an emotional content congruent with the affect being induced. 
The Thematic Apperception Test (Murray, 1943) stimuli were 
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used because responses to these stimuli are usually 
characterised by a range of emotions. Consequently it was 
hoped that emotions could be induced by having subjects tell 
stories to these stimuli. Story telling has been used 
succesfully as a means of affect induction (Masters, Barden 
& Ford, 1979). 
Procedure 
Subjects were assigned randomly into one of three 
experimental groups on their arrival. They were told that 
the purpose of the experiment was to study the influence 
of emotion on information processing, and that emotion 
induction techniques would be used in order to "bias their 
emotions". At this point, the subjects were asked to go 
through the full set of TAT stimuli, and pick out cards 
they could tell happy/fearful/non emotional stories to. 
Which kind of story depended on the mood induction condition 
assigned to the subjects. The subjects were then given 
20 practice colour naming trials in which they had to name 
the colour of a set of neutral words not used in the 
experiment. 
The experiment proper now commenced. Subjects were 
asked to tell a story to the first of the TAT cards that 
they had chosen. The instructions read 
"This is a test of how well you can become emotionally 
involved through the use of your imagination. For the five 
stimuli that you have chosen, at various times in the 
experiment you will be asked to tell emotional stories 
that should take about two to four minutes. I will show 
you the pictures and you should make up as I a story 
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as you can for each. Tell what has led up to the event 
shown in the picture, describe what is happening at the 
moment, (and try to become the person that this is happening 
to and feel the same ______ ness that they are experiencing). 
Describe (what you must be feeling and thinking) as vividly 
as you can, and if you want to, describe the outcome. Speak 
your thoughts as they corne to mind. Do you understand? 
(To do well, you should forget that you are (Persods Name) 
and really become involved in the experiences of the person 
in the picture.)" 
(The dashes contain the word appropriate to the 
stimulus condition that the subject was in; either happy, 
fearful, or neutral. The bracketed portions were deleted 
in the instructions for the neutral condition.) 
Every second block of trials involved the telling of 
a story (experiments were run one after another). In 
between story telling trial blocks were blocks where subjects 
had to recall (to themselves) emotional memories. It was 
hoped, that using two emotion induction techniques, would 
prove to be more powerful than one. The instructions for 
emotional memory recall for the two emotion conditions were: 
"Recall an event in your life that provoked feelings 
of ' Can you think of such an event?" (Wait for 
subject to affirm). 
"Now for the next two or three minutes I would ask you 
to recall, visualise or imagine (to yourself), all the 
details of this event as vividly as possible. In particular 
try to recapture what you were thinking and feeling when 
this event occurred. It may help to shut your eyes. I will 
tell you when to stop." 
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(The dash was either happiness or fear depending on 
the condition.) 
The instructions for the neutral group at this point 
in the experiment were: 
"For the next two or three minutes, take a break, turn 
off your mind and relax. You may shut your eyes if you 
like". 
The sequence of events that occurred in a typical trial 
are now described. There was a 1 second appearance of 
either four Xs, or a priming word 2 seconds after the subject 
pressed a key to commence a trial. This stimulus, the 
subject was required to recall after naming the colour of 
a word stimulus which appeared on the screen 4 seconds after 
the initial presentation. Subjects had been told to name 
the colour of the coloured word as rapidly as they could 
without making a mistake. At the end of this sequence of 
events (priming stimulus, target stimulus, colour naming, 
recall of the priming stimulus) the subjects could commence 
another trial by pressing a key. Any mistakes in colour 
naming were pointed out to the subject prior to the 
commencement of a new trial, while errors in recall were not 
corrected, but were generally obvious to subjects. At three 
points during the experiments, subjects completed a modified 
version of the Differential Emotion Scale (DES) (Izard 1972). 
The first form was completed at the end of experiment I and 
prior to experiment II; the second form was completed at 
the finish of the second experiment; the final form was 
completed at the end of the third experiment. The first 
two scales measured emotional states, the last scale 
measured emotional traits (see Appendix 2). 
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Results 
Correlations between emotion-time for word stimuli 
from each emotional category with the ratings on the emotion 
scales which corresponded to each category were computed. 
The correlations which should have been largest were those 
between corresponding emotion-times and emotion scales. 
Consequently these correlations are examined first, and 
are reported in Table (4-3). There is only one significant 
correlation out of the 15 reported, and this lack of relation-
ship between emotion-times and emotion rating scale scores 
was also evidenced when the two correlated measures came 
from different categories. (Note also that the correlations 
were still without appreciable numbers of significant 
correlations when sep~rate correlations between emotion-times 
and emotion rating scores were performed for each validity 
condition between prime and cue stimuli.) 
The effectiveness of the emotion induction procedure 
was evaluated by a between groups ANOVA on each of the two 
emotion rating scales corresponding to the induction emotions. 
The ANOVA summaries are provided in Tables (4-4a) and (4-4b). 
The results indicate that there was no significant effect 
for induction group although the Group factor bordered on 
significance for the joy measures. Table (4-5) contains 
the mean scores on each emotion rating scale for the four 
emotions represented within the experimental stimuli. 
Table (4-6) contains the mean reaction time for each 
of the thirty two conditions obtained by crossing Validity 
with category The data for this table was screened by 
employing cutoffs of 500 msec (low) and 2000 msec (high). 
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TABLE (4-3) CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EMOTION TIMES (MSEC) AND 
CORRESPONDING RATING SCALES SCORES (EXP. I). 
Scales administered Fear 
after -
Exp I . 36~~ 
Exp II -.02 
Exp III .31 
Emotion-Times 
Anger Joy Distress 
- .10 -.06 .01 
- • 14 - • 11 -.02 
-.22 .06 .09 
* p<. .05 (One-tailed test) 
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TABLE (4-4a) Al:ALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR RATINGS OF FEAR 
Effect SS df MS F 
Time 65.3 1 65.33 10.23· 
Group 45.5 2 22.75 1.63 
Time X Group 7.166 2 3.58 .56 
Error between 292.75 21 13.94 
Error within 134.5 21 6.38 
TABLE (4-4b) ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR RATINGS OF JOY 
Effect SS df MS F 
Time 58.52 1 58.52 13.09* 
Group 133.04 2 66.51 2.91 
Time X Group 9.04 2 4.52 1. 01 
Error between 479.42 21 22.82 
Error within 93.92 21 4.47 
TABLE (4-5) MEANS LEVELS OF EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS ON 
EMOTIONAL RATING SCALES 
INDUCTION EXP. I SCALES EXP. II SCALES 
GROUP Fe An Jo Di Fe An Jo Di 
Fear 5.0 2.0 7.3 2.6 2.0 1 .9 4.6 2.4 
Joy 2.9 .6 10 .9 . 1 0 9 1 .3 
Con trol 4.2 .6 7.5 3.4 3.0 1 .0 4.5 5.8 
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TABLE (4-6) MEAN REACTION THIES (MSEC) FOR MAIN STIMULUS 
CONDITIONS EXP. I. 
Emotion Category Validity X S 
Emotional Fear XXXX 842.7 256.2 
VAL 867.8 204.7 
SE 917.7 261 .0 
N 884.6 211 . 1 
Anger XXXX 878.3 218.8 
VAL 867.0 237.7 
SE 871 .8 199.9 
N 880.2 227.4 
Joy XXXX 815.3 187.9 
VAL 909.9 279.4 
SE 857.1 221 .5 
N 909.5 282.2 
Distress XXXX 844.5 279.3 
VAL 837.2 219.5 
SE 843.0 220.8 
N 867.5 246.2 
Table 4-6 continued on next page 
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Table 4-6 Continued 
Emotion Category Validity X S 
Neutral Weather XXXX 844.0 201 .3 
VAL 834.8 219.5 
SE 841 .1 180.8 
N 853.6 214.5 
Fruit XXXX 859.7 211 .3 
VAL 850.9 198.6 
SE 881 .2 201 .2 
N 900.1 261 .8 
Time XXXX 841 .4 199.6 
VAL 877.1 220.4 
SE 839.0 214.0 
N 861 .3 206.6 
Writing XXXX 837.7 230.3 
VAL 876.7 198.6 
SE 865.3 244.5 
N 854.0 211 .7 
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For the statistical analys:_s (with fewer conditions) there 
was suffi ent data per subject per condition to use 25% 
trimmed means to reduce ou~lier contamination. (Barnett & 
Lewis, 1978). Thus, there might be small discrepancies 
between means calculated f~om this table and the means 
reported elsewhere. 
The analysis was done using the SPSS MANOVA program 
(Hull & Nie, 1981) and a multivariate approach to the 
repea teel measures desi gn. Sepa rate ANOVAs were performed 
for the following stimulus factor pairings (crossed with 
the between subject factors of Induction group and List 
group): (Emotion, Validi t;r), (Emotion, Category), (Emotion, 
Abstractness), (Prime Emotion, Prime Category). All of 
these AKOVAs with two within-subject factors and two grouping 
factors had significant or near significant effects. The 
results are reported in Table (4-7), with the Induction and 
st group factors absent, as they showed no statistically 
significant main effects. Also omitted from the tables, are 
the nonsignificant interactions; for the Induction group and 
list group factors, with the stimulus factors (for the 
purpose of reporting, the significance levels are taken at 
F<.1, E.lthough more rigorous (p< .05) significance levels 
are taken for rejecting the null hypothesis). The degrees 
of W, ll<..e'l> I....", ...... bd" 
of freedom for the approxirJate F testsl\have been omi tted, 
but were calculated from Rao's formula (Rao, 1973), by the 
SPSS MAKOVA program (Hull & Nie.1981). 
The means which gave rise to the gnificant Validity 
effect are listed in Table (4-8), and graphed in Figure (4-2). 
The lower value of the cross condition was expected, but 
the large value when the cue and target differed in emotional 
FIGURE (4-2). NAMING LATENCIES FOR VALIDITY CONDITIONS (EXP1) 
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TABLE (4-7) SIGNIFICA~T AND NEAR SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS OF 
WORD STIMULI (EXPERIMENT I) 
(Within Subject Factors: Emotion, Validity) 
EFFECT F Ratio P 
List X Emotion 3.20 .091 
Validity 4.46 .04 
Induction X Emotion X Validity 2.12 .08 
(Within Subject Factors: Emotion, Category) 
EFFECT F Ratio P 
Emotion X Category 2.5 .07 
(Within Subject Factors: Emotion, Abstractness) 
EFFECT F Ratio P 
Emotion X Abstractness 4.62 .05 
(Within Subject Factors: Prime Emotion, Prime Category) 
EFFECT F Ratio P 
Prime Em X Prime Cat 8. 1 .002 
TABLE (4-8) COLOUR NAMING LATENCY (MSEC) AND CUE-TARGET 
VALIDITY CONDITION 
XXXX 
845.4 
VALID 
865.2 
SEM 
864.2 
DIFF 
876.3 
TABLE (4-9) COLOUR NAMING LATENCY (MSEC) AND STIMULUS CATEGORY 
Fear Anger Joy Distress Weather Fruit 
881 868 875 861 866 888 
TABLE (4-10) COLOUR NAMING LATENCY (MSEC) AND PRIME CATEGORY 
Fear Anger Joy Distress Weather Fruit 
868 878 910 863 863 888 
Time 
863 
Time 
877 
Literature 
870 
Literature 
890 
-" 
OJ 
o 
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tone, was unexpected. The mean reaction time for each word 
category is in Table (4-9). The most significant Emotion x 
Abstractness effect is because words from the category of fruit 
had considerably longer times than those from other categories. 
The interaction Emotion x Abstractness arises because the 
mean reaction time for emotional more abstract words (M = 880) 
and non-emotional concrete words (M = 875) was considerably 
more than for emotional and concrete words (M = 861) or for 
neutral abstract words (M = 867). The Emotion x Prime 
Category arises because of the difference between the levels 
of individual mean reaction times for different prime 
category conditions, and it is not predicted by prime 
emotionality. The mean reaction times are set out in Table 
(4-10), and they indicate a large increase in reaction time 
when words from the category "joy" were the cuing to-be-
remembered words. 
Discussion 
A) Differences between Subjects 
Experiment I sought to test Bower's hypothesis that 
there are emotion nodes which interact with the semantic 
network and that these have consequences for the activation 
pattern throughout the network. The experiment failed to 
give any support to the notion of emotion nodes. The one 
significant correlation of Table (4-3) was almost certainly 
the consequence of Type I error for if it reflected a real 
correlation between emotion time for fear category stimuli 
and fear state levels, it would be expected that a parallel 
correlation. would be evidenced in a similar condition in 
the next experiment, and this was not the case. 
Such a set of null differences could have arisen 
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because emotional states do not have influences on the 
patterns of activation in the semantic network, or they 
could have arisen as a consequence of experimental 
limitations. The possible experimental limitations that 
could lead to null results will now be considered. 
An obvious candidate for an explanation of the lack of 
consequences of emotional states on the information processing 
of emotion relevant material, is the possible lack of an 
emotional state. If the difference in emotion rating 
between the median split groups on the scales which correspond 
to the induction procedures, seems to be psychologically 
insignificant, then it is probable that the lack of 
apparent influence of emotion on the activity of the 
semantic network, reflects the fact that subjects are 
indistinguishable in terms of their emotional states. A 
median split revealed that the two groups differed by two 
scale units in the case of fear, (M1 = .33, M2 = 2.33), and 
also by two scale units in the case of joy (M1 = 1.72, 
M2 = 3.77). In terms of the verbal labels included with 
the rating scales (see appendix 2), two scale units could 
encompass the distance between a rating of 'not at all', to 
bordering on a 'moderately' rating of the emotional quality 
concerned (this applies to the fear scales). In the case 
of the joy scales the difference between the means of the 
highest and lowest groups, encompasses the distance from 
just below 'moderately', to the high end of 'moderately'. 
It thus seems, that serious doubts can be raised as to 
whether there was a sufficient range of intensities of 
emotional states to allow marked processing differences 
between the subjects at different ends of the intensity 
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continuum. 
This n£rrow range of emotional intensities is obviously 
partly the consequence of a less than successful induction 
of emotional states in subjects. The range of emotional 
intensity might possibly have been improved had a more 
antagonistic pair of emotions (such as joy and distress), 
been chosen for the emotions to be induced. However, the 
use of imagery and recall as mood altering processes seemed 
well justified in the light of evidence that imagery is a 
very effective way of altering affective states (Lang 1979, 
Izard 1972, Masters, Barden, Ford 1979). It is also possible 
that the experimental task of naming the colour of coloured 
words, acted to dampen the extent of any affect change. A 
second factor which might act against the eviden~ing of 
semantic network activation by affect, is the induction 
procedure itself. The worst possible induction procedure 
would involve subjects seeing those words which they would 
be required to name later during the experiment. The 
reason that such a procedure would be undesirob\e !, is that 
it is likely to result in some residual activation for the 
parts of the semantic network that correspond to the early 
induction words. (The procedures that employ word lists 
in order to induce mood states are those based on the work 
of Velten, 1968). That an elevation in activation is 
likely, and could be quite enduring is evidenced by studies 
such as those of Warren (1977), Durso and Johnson (1979), 
in which the activation from a previous stimulus presentation 
has consequences for the processing of a later stimulus, 
as much as 50 trials later (in the Durso and Johnson 
example). Thus, the presentation of words of a particular 
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emotional tone in order to induce a congruent mood state, 
could produce an artifactual relationship between mood state 
and semantic network activity as measured by a Warren task. 
It was for that reason that an imagery based induction 
procedure was preferred to the Velten technique. The lack 
of a significant Group x Category interaction shows that 
the reaction times in colour naming are not influenced by 
group-stimulus congruence. This suggests that the possible 
artifact discussed above did not arise in spite of the 
subjects often using emotional category terms in their 
responding to the TAT stimuli. 
There is however, another possible influence of the 
story telling induction procedure. It might act to inhibit 
the processing of emotion words that have been used in the 
story telling. Evidence for this possibility comes from 
the Durso and Johnson (1979) Study, where at zero lag 
between picture prime and to-be-spoken word, there was 
actually a reaction time increase of 37 msec compared with 
the condition where there was no picture prime to the word. 
A study b~ Kraut, Smothergill and Mitchell (1981), has 
shown that reaction time to word stimuli is a joint function 
of level of alertness (raised by novel, stimuli), and of the 
encoding facilitation enabled by familiarity with the word. 
Thus, a novel word as a warning signal produces a faster 
reaction time to a speeded choice task, than a familiar 
word. 
In the case of this experiment, the recent use of 
words in the story telling phase would most likely mean 
that there was a decrement in the alerting produced by the 
same words appearing during the Warren task phase. At the 
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same time, there is evidence that encoding facilitation as 
a consequence of stimulus familiarity does not accrue across 
modalities (Winnick & Daniel, 1970; Warren & Morton, 1982). 
It is therefore possible, that where the emotion induction 
procedure was succesful in inducing different levels of an 
emotion between groups, that the decrease in processing 
efficiency associated with the alerting decrement caused by 
familiarity with the lexical and semantic domain of the 
emotion concerned, (brought about by the induction procedure), 
counteracts any changes brought about by the activation 
emotion nodes. Such a criticism applies in the case of the 
present experiment, only when the induction procedure 
resulted in appreciable changes between groups, but it is 
a criticism that could be leveled at experiments such as 
those by Durso and Johnson (1979), and Warren and Morton 
(1982), without reservation. It calls into question the 
accounts of such experiments which tend to concentrate on 
pathway activation processes only. 
Another possibility, raised by the discussion in the 
previous paragraph, is that the repetition of words, and 
conceptual domains during the course of the experiment, 
produces a substantial increase in the level of activation 
for all subjects. If this occurred the activation of the 
semantic network via emotion would be relatively very minor, 
and the influence of a subject's emotional state on 
information processing might be swamped. 
There is some reas.on to suspect that this might have 
occurred in the present experiment, in that unlike the 
original series of experiments by Warren (1972, 1974), the 
present experiment utilises only eight categories as primes 
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but has four repetitions of each target word during the 
course of the experiment. The effect of a number of 
presentations, is to increase the activation of the portion 
of the semantic network associated with the conceptual 
domain of the words presented, and make the amount of 
alerting to a stimulus from that domain less. Thus, under 
such circumstances, a sizeable component of the reaction 
times would be contributed by alerting, and only a miniscule 
amount by the encoding facilitation of the preceding prime. 
Such an interpretation is consistent with the 
significant effect for Validity, and the surprising finding 
that the mean reaction times were larger when there was an 
invalid relation between cue and target, (with the two 
words having no common 'emotional', or 'nonemotional' 
designation). The momentary alerting enjoyed by the colour 
word which differs from the priming to-be-remembered word 
maximally, will result in a greater allocation of processing 
resources to the target word, and consequently will result 
in a larger amount of interference with the colour naming. 
The three possible explanations of the lack of a 
significant influence of subject emotionality on the 
processing of information of an emotional nature, could all 
hold to some extent, and they are not advanced as competing 
explanations. The experiment has shed no light on how 
subject emotional states interact with different emotional 
information, but it is still possible to address questions 
of a more general nature-on how stimulus materials are 
processed when they are of the type used in the experiment 
(basically emotional and nonemotional materials). 
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B) Differences Between Stimulus Conditions 
One very interesting result, was the slower reaction 
time when abstract emotional words were targets, than when 
concrete emotional words were targets. The explanation for 
this is to be found in the types of priming stimulus that 
the subject had to remember (in comparison to the type of 
priming stimulus in the case of nonemotional words). The 
priming stimuli of the emotional kind were labels of the 
four categories of emotional words, while those priming 
stimuli that were non emotional, were exemplars from the 
four categories of neutral words. The abstractness or 
concreteness of the neutral words was constant within 
categories (that is, there were concrete categories - e.g. 
fruit, and abstract categories - e.g. time). Within each 
emotional category, there were four target words possible, 
two of which were abstract, and two of which were more 
concrete (prototypically emotion producing). Thus, the 
greater level of activation which might have accrued to 
those words representing conceptual levels similar to the 
priming words will result in a more significant interference, 
when it comes to colour naming. The result indicating a 
reaction time cost to abstract emotional words, suggests the 
possibility that the semantic network, as well as being 
associative in the sense that likely associates are 
activated, is specific in the sense that it is more likely 
to produce activation at a particular level of the network. 
This result is compatible with experiments by-Jorg and 
Horman (1978) which show that the verbal label accompanying 
a picture apparently affects the level at which subjects 
process that picture. Secondly, it is compatible with a 
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study of a picture-word analogue of the Stroop task by 
Lupker and Katz (1981), who showed that most of the 
interference in such a task, occurs when the interfering 
stimulus is at the same level (category level rather than 
exemplar level in their experiment 2), as the level at which 
the decision of which is the correct response must be made. 
Thirdly, the much cited result of Potter and Faulconer (1975), 
that pictures require more time to name, and less time to 
categorise than words suggests that there are certain classes 
of stimuli where activation may accrue most rapidly at a 
conceptually high level of the semantic network. 
The most perplexing result perhaps was the highly 
significant interaction between the emotion of the priming 
words, and their content. Basically this has to be 
interpreted as a consequence of the widely divergent reaction 
time to trials which involved the to-be-remembered word 
coming from the only positive emotion category; that of 
joy. It is not obvious why prime words taken from this 
positive emotion category should prove especially disruptive, 
but it is likely that the reason is not to be found in 
patterns of network activity caused by the joy prime. If 
network activity was the cause, then the semantic category 
'joy', being least predictive of the emotion categories, (in 
that it is the only category of positive affect), should 
interfere less with colour naming of target emotional words 
than words taken from the other negative emotional categories. 
An explanation in terms of the alerting consequence being 
greater in the case of emotion precues (greater alerting 
in going from positive primes to negative targets than vice 
versa) might be advanced, but in the absence of other 
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evidence that might confirm or deny such a suggestion, the 
result will not be considered further here. 
Overall then, the results of experiment I do not 
provide support for an interpretation of emotion as acting 
on the semantic network. Indeed, the results seem best 
interpreted within a framework that has it that the most 
significant form of activation caused by a precue is a 
nonspecific activation associated with the alerting value 
of the target stimulus, rather than a specific pattern of 
activation in the semantic network. 
This might explain why the present experiment failed 
to obtain a pattern of results similar to Warren's (1972). 
The only aspect of Warren's results that was replicated by 
the current experiment was the faster reaction times when 
XIS were precues. Other details of the present procedure 
might also have contributed to the replication failure; 
the present procedure used only one to be remembered word 
(Warren used three); the use of abstract category names as 
primes (Warren used category names as targets). The use of 
category names as cues could be critical, because Warren 
(1974) shows the colour naming interference does not occur 
amongst backward associates. 
The kind of experiment used here, while being desirable 
in terms of avoiding production biasing effects, is not a 
simple measure of semantic network activation: . response 
time will be affected by the alerting quality of the 
stimulus word, and residual activation from both the induction 
procedure and the previous words presented during the course 
of the experiment. An experiment by Warren (1977) has 
demonstrated that there are different consequences for the 
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naming latency of a target word, whcn the priming stimulus 
is an antonym or involves a sex shift. This result shows 
that there is not necessarily a simple relationship between 
prime-target relatedness, and processing/production benefits, 
(although most studies which employ lexical decision tasks 
can be explained in terms of automatic activation benefits 
when prime-target predictability is not too high (c.f. 
Posner, 1982)). 
There is also data from Elmes, Dye and Herdelin (1983) 
which show a very interesting relationship between word 
emotionality and word repetition interval: neutral words 
are rated more pleasant if their presentation and representa-
tion is widely spaced, whereas the same relationship is not 
discernable with emotional words. The result, in terms of 
recall is that massed repetition does not produce as large 
recall benefits as spaced repetition in the case of neutral 
words, but the recall of emotional words shows .the same 
repetition benefits for zero spaced words, as for words with 
a space of eight other words between repetitions. This 
example provides converging evidence that results for 
emotionally significant and emotionally nonsignificant words 
under repetition, (and presumably associative conditions), 
are not the same and a one factor explanation of experiments 
in which the emotionality of stimulus material is varied 
(along with other experimental variations), is not tenable. 
The classic colour naming interference method as 
formulated by Warren has not proved useful in demonstrating 
prime caused activation of the semantic network. The 
discussion of the correlational and ANOVA analyses has 
pointed out that the priming stimulus may produce complicated 
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effects. In the next experiment, the priming stimulus was 
not used, and so some of the problems of the current 
procedure were overcome. 
Experiment II 
The second experiment deviated from the classic Warren 
paradigm, in that the subject had no word to remember, prior 
to colour naming. It was thus hoped that a less contaminated 
measure of the consequence of emotion on information 
processing might be obtained. Any activation of the semantic 
network via emotion will be the only source of reaction 
time differences between neutral and emotional colour word 
targets, whereas in experiment I, prime-target relationships 
were also a source of activation, and these might have proved 
intense enough to swamp any effect arising from an 
interaction between the subject's emotional state and the 
stimulus material. The second experiment is a more direct 
test for activation produced by emotion within the semantic 
network. 
The second experiment also included other stimuli that 
had a validity relationship with the target stimulus. This 
time the relations were between the target colour word, and 
a distracting flanker stimulus which appeared simultaneously 
with the target colour word, flanking it above and below 
written in colours different to that of the target. This 
experiment is a stroop version of an experiment by Shaffer 
and La Berge (1979), which showed that the semantic 
information of flanking distractor words, is processed 
automatically and seems to interfere with the processing 
of same response targets. By including flanker words, 
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the second experiment looks for evidence of the effect of 
emotion on information processing outside of the attentional 
focus. Thus, the second experiment tests for the influence 
of emotion on the semantic network by measuring the 
interference that arises from unattended, as well as 
attended information channels. 
Method Experiment 2 
Subjects: The same group of 24 undergraduate students 
that took part in experiment 1, also took part in experiment 
2, which was run as part of one continuous session which 
encompassed three experiments. 
Stimulus Materials and Design 
The lists for the second experiment, were similar to 
those for experiment I. They were composed of a word 
designated as the target word, and another word designated 
as the distractor word. Again, the experiment was computer 
controlled, with the same timing and presentation methods 
as were outlined in experiment I. 
The major difference in experiment II, was that the 
target word was flanked on both sides by distractor words 
(both distractor words were identical except in colour). 
Thus, the subject saw three words and had to name the colour 
of the middle word. Experiment I's prime words were now 
the distractor words. 
As before, TAT stimuli were used as stimuli for emotion 
laden stories. 
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Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that outlined for 
experiment I, except that the 'priming' stimulus was always 
a row of XXXX's, and this would be followed by a display 
comprising three words each in a different colour, with the 
subject required to name the colour of the middle word. 
At the end of experiment II, subjects filled in the second 
of the emotion rating scales discussed in the procedure 
section of experiment I. 
Results 
Correlations were computed between the emotion-times 
for each word category with the scores for the four DES 
scales. As in the previous experiment, loi times are used 
to calculate emotion-times. It was predicted that the 
greatest amount of interference would accrue to the 
correlations between corresponding emotion-times and emotion 
scale scores, and so these correlations were examined first. 
The correlations are reported in Table (4-11). 
Only one of the 12 correlations between corresponding 
emotion-times, and e~otion rating scale scores was significant. 
In case the lack of relationship found, was a result of 
some distractors swamping the effect of the target, sepurate 
correlations between the emotion rating scores and the 
emotion times for each validity condition were performed. 
These correlations were not significant, not even for the 
condition where X's were the distracting stimuli. 
A series of repeated measures ANOVA's with the design 
factors shown in Table (4-1) was conducted, to test the 
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effects of the emotionality of the materials used, the 
influence of distractors, and what categories were most 
distracting. As previously the analysis was performed using 
the multivariate approach to repeated measures using the 
SPSS MANOVA package (Hull and Nie,1981). 
Estimation of subject reaction times was achieved in 
two ways. Firstly, for the purposes of reporting data, 
mean reaction times for each of the 32 conditions were used 
(cutoffs at which data were rejected as being probably 
error contaminated were below 500 msec and above 2000 msec). 
The second estimate of subject reaction time was for the 
purposes of statistical analysis and was by taking 25% 
trimmed means for the sets of conditions defined by two 
factors. For instance, crossing the Emotion factor with 
the Validity factor, yields 2 x 4 conditions each of which 
will have sixteen data points. These data points were used 
to provide robust estimates of the subject reaction times 
for each ANOVA cell. With a considerably larger data base 
for providing the trimmed mean, the presence of an outlier 
was unlikely to produce contamination in the overall 
estimate of a subject's reaction time for a condition, and 
so cutoffs were not applied. Implicitly in doing separate 
analyses with two factor combinations, it was assumed that 
third and higher order interactions of stimulus factors 
were unlikely or uninterpretable, and that the cost of 
ignoring such factors was negligible in terms of error 
variance. 
Mean reaction times for all groups, and all levels of 
the stimulus factors Emotion Validity, and Category 
are provided in Table (4-13). Separate ANOVAs were performed 
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TABLE (4-11) CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EMOTION-TIMES (MSEC) AND 
CORRESPONDING RATING SCALE SCORES (EXP. II). 
Emotion Times 
Scales administered Fear 
after -
Anger Joy Distress 
Exp I .05 .03 ".16 .07 
Exp II .03 -.00 -.08 -.24 
Exp III -.35* -.10 -.07 -.0 
* p<.05 (One-tailed test) 
TABLE (4-12) SIGNIFICANT AND NEAR SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS OF THE 
WORD STIMULI IN EXPERIMENT II. 
(Within Subject Factors: Emotion, Validity) 
EFFECT 
Emotion 
List Group X Emotion 
List Group X Validity 
F RATIO 
5.19 
5.74 
3.64 
P 
.035 
.028 
.036 
(Within Subject Factors: Emotion, Validity) 
EFFECT 
Category 
List Group X Emotion X Category 
F RATIO 
3.95 
6.10 
p 
.028 
.004 
(Within Subject Factors: Emotion, Abstractness) 
EFFECT F RATIO P 
List Group X Emotion X Abstractness 3.84 .066 
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TABLE (4-13) MEAN REACTION TIMES (MSEC) FOR MAIN STIMULUS 
CONDITIONS EXP. II. 
Emoti6.n Category Validity X S 
Emotional Fear XXXX 800.6 178.2 
VAL 792.6 167.4 
SE 806.6 176.0 
N 813.0 161 .5 
Anger XXXX 814.6 158.7 
VAL 877.5 209.9 
SE 842.5 183.8 
N 862.0 217.4 
Joy XXXX 800.3 175.7 
VAL 797.6 166.8 
SE 804.2 195.2 
N 835.6 175.1 
Distress XXXX 792.7 188.4 
VAL 840.0 191 .9 
SE 825.1 201 .1 
N 797.5 167.1 
Table 4-13 continued on next page 
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Table 4-13 Continued 
Emotion Category Validity X S 
Nonemotional Weather XXXX 837.4 221 .3 
VAL 832.4 195.2 
SE 784.4 163.0 
N 832.0 168.6 
Fruit XXXX 803.6 148.7 
VAL 804.4 173.8 
SE 824.7 181 .3 
N 790.6 149.6 
Time XXXX 781 .3 175.0 
VAL 804.6 173.4 
SE 793.7 167.8 
N 799.2 174.8 
Wri ting XXX X 793.4 176.7 
VAL 798.4 161 .7 
SE 821 .4 188.1 
N 843.6 181 .7 
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for the following factor combination pairs, crossed with 
the Induction Group and List Group between subject factors: 
(Emotion, Validity), (Emotion, Category), (Emotion, Abstract-
ness), (Distractor Emotion, Distractor Category). Only the 
first two analysis combinations produced significant effects 
(apart from the effect for the emotionality of the material). 
The results of the first two ANOVAs are detailed in Table 
(4-12). The significant effect for Emotion arises because 
of an 11 msec difference between the mean reaction time to 
emotional colour words (M = 805.5) and the neutral colour 
words (M = 794.5). The means for the reaction times that 
led to the significant interaction between List Group-and 
Validity factors are presented in Figure (4-3) and Table 
(4-15). It can be seen that only for the second list group 
did the XIS as distractors produce different results from 
words as distractors. In this group, the X distractor 
condition was 25 msec faster than the average for the other 
three (word) distractor conditions. 
The significant effect for Category is nonsensical 
since Category is a dummy variable that in conjunction with 
the Emotion factor distinguished the category of the 
stimulus word. It must be supposed that the significant 
Category effect arises because of the interaction between 
Category, Emotion and other experiment factors. 
There was a significant effect for the interaction 
between the factors of Emotion, Category and List Group. 
Tables of the means for each of the two stimulus lists are 
provided in Table (4-17). Figure (4-4) graphs these means. 
It can be seen that for stimulus set II, there was a large 
difference between the times for the anger category, and 
TABLE (4-15) REACTION TIMES FOR EMOTION AND VALIDITY 
CONDITIONS FOR STIMULUS SETS I & II. 
Stimulus set I Stimulus set II 
XXXX VAL SEM N XXXX VAL SEM 
E 811 800 812 810 808 E 786 817 803 
N 811 800 823 793 809 N 760 798 781 
X 811 800 818 802 773 808 792 
TABLE (4-16) REACTION TIMES FOR ALL CATEGORIES IN 
EXPERIMENT II. 
N 
805 
782 
794 
199 
803 
780 
Fear Anger Joy Distress Weather Fruit Time Literature 
798 823 799 802 797 803 782 798 
TABLE (4-17) REACTION TIMES (MSEC) 
LIST I 
Category 
Emotion C1 C2 C3 
E 798 808 812 
N 805 834 786 
802 821 799 
FOR EMOTION AND CATEGORY 
C4 Emotion 
811 807 E 
813 809 N 
812 
CONDITIONS FOR LISTS 
LIST II 
Category 
C1 C2 C3 
797 838 782 
790 773 778 
794 806 780 
I & II. 
C4 
793 
783 
788 
803 
781 
N 
o 
o 
FIGURE (4-3). NAMING LATENCIES FOR VALIDITY CONDITIONS (EXP2) 
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the other word categories. A series of repeated measure 
t-tests showed that the time taken for the anger category 
words was significantly more (p< .05) than for words of 
other categories for five out of seven possible contrasts. 
None of the other possible contrasts within the two lists 
was significant. 
The appearance of a significant three way interaction 
that involves the List Group factor could have several 
explanations; it could arise because the two lists are not 
well matched at one or more emotion-category combinations; 
it could be a genuine statistical aberation that has 
arisen purely because of a fortuitous distribution of reaction 
times with respect to conditions; or, it could arise because 
the subjects in the blocks were not equivalent. 
There is evidence pointing towards the third of these 
possibilities in the comparison of the data from Experiment I 
with that of the present experiment. Experiment II used as 
a stimulus set the word list not used in Experiment I. Thus 
there was a crossing of lists between Experiments I and II. 
If the cause of the interaction was that the lists were not 
matched, then a similar pattern of results to those of 
Experiment II would be expected for each list in Experiment I. 
That is, in Experiment I the first List Group should show 
the elevation of reaction times for emotional words which 
the second List Group has in the present case. In fact 
the almost significant List Group x Emotion interaction in 
the first experiment has the List group 2 again showing 
elevated reaction times for emotional target words. The 
first List Group actually shows faster reaction times for 
emotional words. Thus, we can rule out the possibility 
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that the interactions involving List Group are because of 
the stimulus sets. Instead, the significant interactions 
involving List Group must be attributed to differences in 
informati0n processing between the two subject groups. The 
results from the two experiments, dividing the subjects by 
which List group they were in, appears in Table (4-18). 
To see whether the two groups receiving different 
stimulus material could be differentiated in terms of self 
report measures, a series of Mann-Whitney U tests between 
the list groups was done on the emotion rating scale scores 
for fear, anger, joy, distress and the scale total for the 
scales completed at the end of Experiment I, at the end of 
Experiment II, and also for the characteristic emotions 
scale at the end of Experiment III. Only the scale total 
measure of the characteristic emotions scale differentiated 
the groups to a statistically significant level (U = 37.5 
p< .05), while state joy scale after Experiment I approached 
significanc~ (U = 40.5 p< .07). An assessment of whether 
these score differences could explain the differences that 
appeared between the groups receiving the different stimulus 
lists was achieved by reexamining the correlations between 
the emotion-times with the emotion scale scores. These 
correlations are presented in Table (4-19), and show that 
there is a large highly significant negative correlation 
between the anger emotion-times and how happy subjects 
rated themselves. This negative correlation also occurred 
between the anger emotion-time and the overall level of 
emotionality typical of subjects, although it was not quite 
significant (p< .06). It should be noted that the correlations 
between the anger category emotion-time and the joy ratings 
AF:D NEUTRAL COLOVFi \WRDS n~ EIPERIJ':EN TS 
Emotion EXT:. 
List Group I E 878 
N 889 
List Group II E 862 
N 851 
I & 
I 
II. 
Ext. 
807 
809 
803 
781 
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II 
TABLE (4-19) CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EMOTION-TIMES WITH 
(SELECTED) EMOTION RATING SCALES. 
EMOTION SCALE 
Joy State 
(Exp. I) 
Total Emotions 
Fear 
.1459 
-.042 
EMOTION TIME 
Anger Joy Distress 
* 
-.7338* .1565 -.2794 
-.3259 .0132 -.2587 
p <::: .01 
TABLE (4-20) CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FEAR AND JOY SCALES AND 
MEAN REACTION TIME. 
TIME EXP. I 
Fear Joy 
EXF I .25 -.258 
EXP II .061 -.264 
(-)f = p< .05, c -" p..:::.01) 
(EXPERIMENTS I AND II) 
EXF. II 
Fear Joy 
.004 -.322 
. 01 0 -.419~f 
EXP. III 
(Trait-scale) 
Fear Joy 
.49E;t 
-.185 
.41 0-)( 
-.373" 
one-tailed tests. 
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after Experiment II, and typical joy state rating (Experiment 
III) were also significant (r = -.35 p< .05, r = -.46 
p< .05 respectively), but that these correlations can be 
accounted for by the correlations between the joy state scale 
after Experiment I and these two scales (r12 = .71, r13 = .51). 
As a further check that emotion state scores are not 
spuriously correlating with the emotion-time for anger, a 
comparison was made of the correlation of the two emotion 
scales that are being considered, with the nearest 
equivalent condition of experiment I - which had the XXXX's 
to be remembered followed by a display consisting of a single 
anger category colour word. The correlation with the joy 
state rating was r = -.37 (p < .05), while that with the 
overall typical emotionality measure was r = .11. Thus, 
there is some evidence that for at least the joy state 
after Experiment I, there is an influence on the processing 
of anger related information. (In fact, the anger category 
emotion time also correlated with the typical level of 
overall emotionality (r = -.36, p <:. .05) ) . 
In a quest for an information processing minitypology 
(Kareev, 1982), a further analysis of the data of experiments 
1 and 2 was conducted using cluster analysis. These analyses 
are considered in a separate section, at the end of this 
chapter. 
One other table included among the results of this 
chapter is the table of correlations between the Fear and 
Joy scale, and the subject's mean reaction times. In view 
of previous experimentation that has demonstrated a relation-
ship between mood and decision time (e.g. Velten 1968), if 
the scales were a valid and reliable measure of emotion 
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intensity, some significant correlations should occur 
between scale scores and reaction time. The correlations 
appear in Table (4-20), and are for both experiments I and 
II. There are several significant correlations, and these 
will be discussed in the final section. 
Discussion 
Experiment II constituted a more direct test of whether 
the semanti~ network is affected by the emotional state of 
the subject, than did Experiment I. There were no priming 
to-be-remembered words, so that subjects could gain no 
advantage from expectancies of what the next stimulus might 
be. This should have reduced the extent that the semantic 
network was activated by sources apart from the stimulus 
that was being processed in the present trial, and the 
emotional state activation of the semantic network. The 
fact that only fear scale scores correlated significantly 
with the emotion-times for the corresponding fear category 
in the experiment was an initially disappointing result. 
This correlation in fact goes against what would be predicted 
by semantic network activation by the emotion of fear, 
because being negative, it indicates that there is less 
interference in colour naming a fear word when a subject is 
characterised by chronic fear. Such a result might be 
predicted by the perceptual defense literature (reviewed in 
Dixon,1981), but it is more likely to have arisen by chance 
given that it was the only significant correlation in twelve 
correlations. Thus, at first sight the second experiment 
provides no support for Bower's (1981) theory put forward 
to explain the effects of emotion on memory. 
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The fortuitous emergence of a significant interaction 
between groups that received different word lists in 
Experiment II, was shown to have arisen as a consequence 
of differences between subject groups rather than as a 
consequence of the different word lists. This was demonstrated 
by showing that the group that received stimulus List 1 in 
Experiment II, and previously had received stimulus List 2 
in Experiment I had the same tendency towards a slower 
response time to emotional than non emotional colour words, 
in both experiments despite the change in lists. The 
differences that the groups exhibited in terms of emotional 
states was in the amount of positive affect that they were 
feeling at the time of the experiment, and in the characteristic 
overall level of emotion. Both emotional scales on which 
the groups differed had significant or near significant 
correlations with the emotion-times for at least the 
corresponding anger category, and inspection of Table (4-17) 
reveals that this category is the one with the most pronounced 
difference (relative to all control categories) in the group 
receiving List 2. 
An hypothesis which describes the effect of the 
emotional states of people on their tendency to automatically 
process information and admit it to awareness is -
"The more relaxed and happy people are, the less likely 
they are to admit into the limited capacity system the 
automatic outputs of emotion system information processing 
of information relating to threat.". Such a hypothesis 
makes obvious sense from an evolutionary point of view. It 
is going to be an advantage to an organism that ranges 
across many and varied environments to be able to adopt 
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information processing strategies specific to the optimisation 
of behaviour within particular environments, and have the 
ability to shift processing strategy when the environmental 
boundary is crossed. However, while the results from 
experiment 2 suggest this as a viable hypothesis, it requires 
confirmation from the results of other experiments. The 
re-examination of the results from Experiment I provided a 
valuable piece of corrobative evidence in finding the same 
significant correlations for the anger emotion-time in the 
nearest equivalent condition to the kind of conditions in 
Experiment II. However, the results of Experiment III will 
allow final assessment of whether there is good evidence 
for such an effect of emotion on information processing. 
Overall, the anger category colour words were responded 
to more slowly than words taken from the other seven 
categories. One explanation is anger words were more 
self-relevant than those of other categories, and were 
admitted to the limited capacity system (Duncan 1980) more 
than words from other categories. As a consequence of 
admittance to the limited capacity system, (which would 
appear to be connected to response processes-Duncan, 1980; 
La Berge, 1981), interference with the colour naming 
response occurs. 
The explanation of colour naming interference in terms 
of word self-relevance is consistent with results from 
experiments conducted by Geller and Shaver (1976). They 
showed that self-relevant words such as 'disliked, proud, 
error, failure, capable, impotent' produced more interference 
with colour naming than neutral words equated for frequency 
symbols and part of speach. In Geller and Shaver's framework 
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the emotional words in the present experiment should be 
self-relevant. The significantly longer reaction time to 
colour name these words compared to neutral words, confirms 
the result they obtained in experiment I. 
The results of Geller and Shaver also indicated that 
interference that subjects experience because of self-
relevant information, can be altered by a simple manipulation 
(the presence of a mirror and camera in their experiments). 
That subject states can affect the extent that information 
is admitted into conscious awareness, is totally compatible 
with the correlational results discussed in this chapter. 
An alternative explanation to that put forward by Geller 
and Shaver is that the introduction of the mirror and 
camera, had an influence on situationally induced emotion, 
which produced the larger amount of interference. Shearer 
and Carver (1982) provide evidence that self awareness 
manipulations can alter the level of felt affect. 
One puzzling effect that the present experiment 
revealed, was that only for List Group 2 was there evidence 
that flanking XIS were less interfering than flanking words. 
Kahneman and Chajczyk (1983) in another stroop type 
experiment employed flanking words, found that XIS produce 
significantly less colour naming interference than do 
neutral word flankers. Thus, the results for group 2 are 
what are expected by the Kahneman and Chajczyk study. 
Perhaps the lack of such a difference in group 2 can be 
ascribed to a type II error. There is no obvious alternative 
explanation. 
Overall the finding that happiness is negatively 
correlated with interference from anger words is suggestive 
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of an influence of emotion on the semantic network. The 
result is what would be expected if there is an inhibitory 
connection between happiness and anger nodes in the network 
as suggested by Bower (1981). But if the result is of 
significance, the reservations of the previous experiment 
with regard to the range of emotion being insufficient, 
need re-examining. The correlations between the emotion 
scales of relevance in this experiment and overall reaction 
times indicate that the previous reservations might have 
been too cautious. The correlations between characteristic 
affect states and reaction times suggest that the emotional 
states that the subjects bring into the experiment vary 
sufficiently to have an influence on some response processes. 
Accordingly, the earlier reservation might be open to 
question. 
The results reported here are suggestive, not conclusive. 
The relationship between anger emotion-time and the joy state 
measured early in the experiment was not expected, and it 
might well be spurious. Final assessment of what the 
findings from Experiment II indicate will be left until 
after discussing Experiment III. Then, the consistency 
of results among the experiments will be examined, and the 
extent of the overall evidence assessed. 
Experiment III 
If for the moment, the possibility of a correlation 
between emotion-time and a person's emotional state is 
admitted (at least for the anger category stimuli), then 
there are two obvious explanations for such results. 
Firstly, such correlations could arise because emotional 
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states produce different resting levels of activation within 
the semantic network. The different resting levels of 
activation will enhance and inhibit the processing of 
emotional words. This explanation is the one advanced by 
Bower (1981) for his demonstrations of emotion state-dependent 
learning. 
An alternative explanation of emotion-time, emotion 
state correlations is in terms of attention allocation policy. 
This suggests that the greater reaction times to emotional 
colour words in Experiment II, comes about because a greater 
amount of attentional resource (c.f. Kahneman, 1973; Navon 
& Gopher, 1979) is allocated to the emotional colour word. 
The greater allocation of attentional resource means that 
there is a higher probability of the emotion colour word 
being analysed to a phQnemic level where it will interfere 
with the production of the colour name. It is assumed that 
attention allocation policy will be more biased towards 
emotional inputs the more intense the emotional state. 
This last assumption provides the explanation for the emotion-
time, emotion state correlations. 
The present experiment provides a test of the attention 
allocation explanation of the earlier results. In the 
experiment, subjects received a central row of XIS flanked 
by a neutral, and an emotional word. In one stimulus 
condition the neutral word is in a colour different to the 
central XIS, and in another stimulus condition the emotional 
word differs in colour from the XIS. If subject's emotional 
states produce differences in attention allocation, then 
very angry subjects (for example), will allocate more 
attention to the emotional words from the anger category, 
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than to neutral words. The greater attention allocation 
to the emotion word in the visual field, should have a 
different influence on reaction time depending upon whether 
it is the same or a different colour from the central XIS. 
The present experiment looks for an attention allocation 
bias towards emotional words. This bias is likely to become 
more pronounced with any increase in the intensity of an 
emotional state. 
The logic of the experiment is as follows. The 
attentional bias towards emotion relevant information will 
mean an increas~level of activation accruing to all features 
composing an emotional stimulus. Thus, if the colour of 
the emotional word is in conflict with that of the target 
XIS, the additional conflict between colour codes will 
result in an increase in colour-naming time. If on the 
other hand, the colour of the emotional word is the s~me 
as that of the target XIS, then a colour ~aming time decrease 
should be the consequence of the agreement between the 
colour codes. 
Thus, attention allocation produced by emotional words 
can be measured by differencing the times between the 
condition when the emotion word's colour matches the target 
colou~ and the condition where it does not. If attention 
allocation is a consequence of emotion, there should be a 
correlation between this difference and the intensity of 
the corresponding emotional state. 
Method 
Subjects: The same group of 24 undergraduate students 
who took part in experiments I and II, served in Experiment 
III. The experiment started immediately after subjects 
had completed the emotion scale at the conclusion of 
Experiment II. 
Stimulus Materials and Design 
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In Experiment III, the target for colour naming was a 
line of five XIS, with distractor words positioned above 
and below. One of the distractor words was written in the 
same colour as the XIS, and the other distractor word was 
written in a different colour to the XIS. In the 64 trials 
in Experiment III, emotional and neutral words appeared an 
equal number of times above and below the target, and an 
equal number of times in the same, and a different colour 
to the target. Appendix 1 contains stimuli, and demonstrates 
the balancing of the target stimuli. The same list was 
used for subjects in List Groups 1 and 2. Words that were 
the same colour as the target XIS for one group were a 
different colour (at the same list position) for the second 
stimulus group. Of course, words of a different colour 
to ·target XIS in one list were of the same colour as the 
XIS in the second list. The stimulus factors in the present 
experiment were: Colour (whether the emotional word was 
the same, or a different colour to the target stimulus), 
Category (the category of the emotional word). 
The same group factors of Induction Group and List 
Group were used for this experiment. 
In the results that follow, the difference between 
the condition with target and emotion word the same colour, 
and the condition where they were different is once again 
referred to as emotion-time. It is acknowledged that the 
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processes which cause the emotion-times of the present 
experiment might be quite different from those of Experiments 
I and II. However, since the term carries an implication 
that it is the general processing cost associated with the 
processing of emotional stimuli, it is retained here. 
Results 
The emotion-time measure was obtained by taking the 
natural log of the ratio of the reaction time in the 
condition with the emotional word a different colour to 
target XIS, to the condition with the emotional word the 
same colour as the target. 
i.e. Emotion-time = Log (RT1/RT2) 
Where RT1 = X colour # Emotional word colour 
and RT2 = X colour = Emotional word colour. 
Table (4-24) reports the correlations between emotion-
times and their corresponding emotion scale scores. The 
one significant correlation out of twelve testing for the 
influence of emotion on attention allocation is best 
regarded as Type I error. 
The two stimulus factors Category and Colour were 
analysed along with the grouping factors of Induction Group 
and List Group by analysis of variance. The two significant 
effects are listed in Table (4-25). As well as these two 
significant effects the interaction List Group X Colour X 
Category also approached significance, and was significant 
by an alternative statistic to the multivariate F (Averaged 
F = 3.0172, p< .04). 
Table (4-26) lists the mean reaction times for the 
subject groups that gave rise to the significant Induction 
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TABLE (A-24) EMOTION-TIMES (COLOUR DIFFERENT - COLOUR SAME) 
CORRELATED WITH THE CORRESPONDING EMOTION SCALE MEASURE 
(EXP. I II) 
EMOTION TIMES 
Scales administered 
after - Fear Anger Joy Distress 
Exp. I - .15 .05 -.23 .24 
Exp. II - .15 -.21 -.29 .22 
Exp. III -.30 -.26 -.27 .41* 
* p< .05 (one-tailed test) 
TABLE (4-25) SIGNIFICANT AND NEAR SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS IN 
EXPERIMENT III. 
Effect F Ratio P 
Induction X List 3.67 .046 
Induction X List X Colour X Category 2.467 .045 
TABLE (4-26) MEAN REACTION TIMES (MSEC) FOR EACH GROUP. 
(EXP. III) 
INDUCTION GROUP 
Fear Joy Neutral 
List Group 1 780 618 780 726 
List Group 2 633 849 807 763 
707 734 793 
TABLE (4-27) MEAN REACTION TIMES FOR EACH LIST GROUP IN EXPERIMENT III. 
List Group 1 List Group 2 
CATEGORY CATEGORY 
Colour Fear Anger Joy Distress Colour Fear Anger Joy Distress 
Diff 720 725 733 720 724 Diff 799 731 771 745 762 
Same 732 719 735 721 727 Same 759 787 765 753 766 
726 722 734 720 770 759 768 749 
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TABLE ( 4-28) ANOVA TABLE FOR A SEPERATE ANALYSIS OF THE 
ANGER CATEGORY REACTION TIMES. (EXP. III) • 
Effect F df P 
List Group .38 22 .54 
Colour 5.00 22 .035 
List X Colour 8.12 22 .009 
TABLE (4-29) CORRELATIONS OF THE DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION FOR 
DISTINGUISHING LIST GROUPS 1 AND 2 WITH THE EMOTION-TIMES FOR 
EACH CATEGORY. (EXPERIMENTS I , II & III). 
Emotion-Time 
Fear Anger Joy Distress 
Exp. I .09 -.30 .09 .17 
Exp. II .07 -.42* -.33 - . 001 
Exp. III -.10 -.12 -.30 .17 
* pc::::..05 (two-tailed test) 
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Group X List Group interaction. It is evident from this 
table that there is a wide range of reaction times across 
the groups. There is no obvious manner in which the factor 
of Induction Group affects colour naming time. 
The consistent lack of any effect involving the 
Induction Groups, and failure to find any effect for the 
mood inductions renders interpretation of interactions 
involving Induction Group problematic. Consequently, instead 
of interpreting the Induction X List X Category X Colour 
interaction, the marginally insignificant List Group X Colour 
X Category interaction was looked at. This interaction 
corresponds to the interaction involving the List Group 
factor in the last experiment. Table (4-27) contains the 
results for each of the stimulus groups. Again, as in 
earlier experiments, the conditions containing the anger 
category words produced marked differences between the groups. 
The second List Group obtained a 56 msec advantage for when 
the emotion word was written in a different colour to the 
target XIS. The first List Group showed no evidence of such 
a pattern. The reaction times for anger category words 
were subjected to a seperate ANOVA. Table (4-28) reports 
the results of this ANOVA. 
Discussion 
The third experiment sought to demonstrate an influence 
of emotion on spatial attention allocation. Unfortunately 
there was not a significant main effect for Colour. The 
hypothesis that emotional words produce a biasing in the 
allocation of attentional resource is not supported. Also, 
the failure to find a number of significant correlations 
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between emotion times and emotion scale scores means that 
there is no evidence for a relationship between emotional 
states and attention allocation. 
The only evidence that emotion might be important in 
attention allocation was the significant interaction 
involving List Group X Colour X Category. The examination 
of the reaction times for the anger category revealed that 
the condition in which the emotional word was a different 
colour to the target XIS, was significantly slower than 
when it was the same colour as the target XIS. It was only 
the second List Group that showed this pattern of results. 
In terms of the predicted consequences of emotion on 
attention allocation, these results were in the opposite 
direction to what was expected. If the logic outlined in 
the introduction is followed, it has to be concluded that 
subjects in the second stimulus group allocated less 
attention to emotional words than to neutral words. 
There is an alternative way of explaining the slower 
reaction times when the colour of the anger category word 
is the same colour as the target XIS. If it is assumed 
that the visual field is rapidly segregated into relevant 
colour feature regions, then only when the emotion word is 
the same colour as the target XIS, will it receive any 
processing. Consequently if emotion words are more interfering 
with colour naming than neutral words, there will be slower 
reaction times to the condition with their colour the same 
as the target XIS. If this explanation holds, the experiment 
provides some evidence to support studies such as those of 
Treisman (1982), Carter (1982) which demonstrate the early 
segregation of the visual field on the basis of colour 
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features. 
The fact that the List groups were involved in the 
interactions once again, suggests that there were differences 
in the way in which the two groups of subjects processed 
emotional information. However, the lack of significant 
correlations between anger emotion-time and the emotion 
scales that distinguished the two groups, means that there 
is no evidence for emotional differences between the groups 
being the cause of these results. The next section of the 
chapter uses multivariate methods in an attempt to discover 
the causes of the differences between subjects. 
It should also be noted that the results of Experiment 
III might be a consequence of the joint action of both of 
the processes proposed. That is, both emotion caused 
attention allocation and colour caused attention allocation 
might be occurring. As these will produce opposite effects 
on reaction time, and the relative extent that they operate 
might vary between word categories, the interpretation of 
the results of this experiment becomes problematic. 
Further Analysis 
In order to determine what the difference between 
List groups was, the following multivariate analyses were 
performed. 
1) A stepwise discriminant analysis on the emotion scale 
scores (for state and trait) was performed. The relation-
ship of the discriminant function score to the emotion-times 
was then examined. 
2) Cluster analyses were performed on the reaction time 
data of each experiment. This was a search for subject 
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minitypologies (Kareev, 1982). 
3) The age and sex profiles of the two List groups were 
examined to see whether these factors were contributors to 
the differences between the groups. 
Discriminant Analysis 
The emotion scale scores were used to derive a 
discriminant function that would distinguish List group 1 
from List group 2. The set of twelve scales measuring 
individual emotions was reduced to eight by obtaining the 
mean score for each subject for each emotion scale from the 
ratings taken after the first experiment, and taken after 
the second experiment. The subject's mean scores on each 
emotion scale are regarded as measurements of the subject's 
emotional states during the experiment. The other'four 
scales in the discriminant analysis were those from the 
final rating period. These scores are regarded as measurements 
of the subject's emotional traits. 
The discriminant analysis was stepwise, and employed 
the selection rule of minimizing Wilk's Lambda. After three 
steps, no unentered variables had F ratios greater than 1. 
The discriminant function obtained was: 
D = -.199 (Fear State) + .240 (Joy State) + .390 
(Fear Trait) 
The significance of this function using a Chi square 
test of Wilks Lambda (Overall & Klett 1972), is p = .046 
for three discriminating variables. However, since eight 
variables were used to develop the function, it is not 
significant overall. 
To ascertain whether this function can account for 
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the differences between the two groups in emotion-times, 
correlations between the discriminant function and emotion-
times were performed for 'each of the three experiments. 
The correlations appear in Table (4-29). They show only 
one significant correlation; that between the discriminant 
function and the anger emotion-time in Experiment II. The 
correlation suggests that happy subjects with low fear 
states have large emotion-time components for anger category 
words. The sign of the corresponding correlations for 
Experiments I and II were the same. 
If we consider that we obtained one significant 
correlation out of sixteen correlations, then the discriminant 
function cannot be said to explain the emotion-time data. 
However, in the category where the two groups most deviated 
from each other there is a ratio of one significant correla-
tion to three. Accordingly the results can be taken as 
equivocal. While providing no strong evidence that the 
emotional states that distinguished the groups affected 
processing time, they do not completely rule out the 
possibility either. 
Cluster Analysis 
In accord with the suggestion of Kareev (1982) that 
we employ methods to distinguish the different ways that 
people respond in experiments, a cluster analysis was 
performed. It was hoped that the cluster analysis would 
reveal at least two 'minitypes l , and that these minitypes 
could be distinguished in terms of their emotional states 
and traits. 
The cluster analysis utilised the single linkage option 
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of the BMDP2M program. The program's procedure can be 
visualised as the incrementing of disks on each element 
until another, element is touched. These touching elements 
are then made part of a cluster. The procedure continues 
until all elements have been joined in the one cluster. 
The method corresponds to the minimum method proposed by 
Johnson (1967). 
A seperate cluster analysis was performed for each of 
the three experiments. The analyses were performed using 
the within subject z-scores. In Experiments I and II, there 
are 32 within subject conditions (see Table (4-13). Of 
these, only the sixteen associated with emotional categories 
were used (although all conditions were employed in 
calculating the within subject z-scores). Z-scores were 
employed to ensure that clustering was based upon the 
pattern of reaction times between conditions, and not just 
their absolute levels. The neutral word conditions were 
eliminated to prevent the formation of subject clusters 
based upon differences in reactions to neutral stimulus 
categories. 
The output vertical tree diagrams for each experiment 
are found in Tables (4-30) to (4-32). 
For the purposes of testing between clusters, it was 
decided that tests would only be performed if the smallest 
(of two) clusters contained at least 4 elements. Cluster 
membership was determined at the step immediately prior to 
the amalgamation of the two largest sets of elements. 
Using these criteria, only experiments II and III gave 
evidence of clusters. 
The average emotional state scores, and average 
225 
TABLE (4-30) CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT I. 
S U BJ E C T 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
NUMBER 1 5 3 1 3 0 7 4 4 3 2 0 3 5 7 6 9 6 9 8 2 3 1 4 
AMALG. 
DISTANCE 
0.664 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I -+- I I I I I I I I 
1.483 I I I I I I I I I I I I -+-
1.566 I I I I I I I I I I I --+-
1.572 I I I I I -+- I I I I I 
1.622 I I I I I -+-- I I I I 
1.699 I I I I I I -+- I I 
1.926 I I I I I I I ---+-
2.129 I I I I I I ----+--
I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I 
2.230 I I I I I 
2.344 I I I I I 
2.395 I I I I I 
2.558 I I I I I 
2.374 I I I I I 
2.744 I -+- I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
--+------ I I I I I I I I 
2.803 I 
3.023 I 
3.071 I 
3. 169 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I I I I I I 
-+- I I I I I 
--+--------- I I I I I 
I I -+- I I 
I I I I I 
-+----------- I I I 
--+------------
--------------+---
I -----------------+-
3.231 I I ------------------+-
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
3.298 I ------------------+-- I I 
3.498 ----------------------- I I 
3.669 -+---------------------- I 
3.821 -+-----------------------
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TABLE (4-31) CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT II. 
1 2 1 1 1 1 2212111 2 1 SUBJECT 
NUMBER 176184658233423045218907 
AMALG. 
DISTANCE 
o 0.384 I I I -+- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
0.958 I I I I I I I -+- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1 .293 I I I I I -+- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1 .620 I I I I I --+-- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1 .820 I -+- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1.861 I I I ----+-
1.935 I I I I 
2.051 I --+--
2.104 I 
2.107 I 
2.193 I 
I 
I 
2.245 ---------+-
I 
I 
I 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I -+- I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I -+-- I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
-+- I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I ---+-
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 2.271 
2.414 
2.464 
2.468 
2.513 
2.591 
2.640 
2.943 
2.993 
3.298 
3.584 
--+---------- I I I I I I I I I 
I I ----+- I I I I I I 
-+------------ I I I I I I I 
-----+------------- I I I I I 
-+------------------ I I I I I 
-+------------------- I I I I 
-+-------------------- I I I 
-+--------------------- I I 
-+---------------------- I 
-+-----------------------
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TABLE (4-32) CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT III. 
SUBJECT 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 
NUMBER 1 2 7 3 0 4 4 6 0 6 4 5 7 8 1 2 1 3 9 8 5 3 2 9 
AMALG. 
DISTANCE 
o 0.990 I I I I I I I -+- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1.115 I I I I I I I I -+- I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1.126 -+- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1.243 -+-- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1.380 I I I I I --+-- I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1.395 I I I I I -+---- I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1 .423 
1 .445 
1 .567 
1 .572 
1 .574 
1 .583 
1 .630 
1.654 
1 .697 
1 .699 
1.762 
1 .805 
1 .836 
1.847 
1 .853 
2.147 
2.346 
I I I I I 
-+--- I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
-+---- I I 
-+----- I 
I I 
-+------
I 
I 
I 
I 
-+----- I I I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I I I I 
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TABLE (4-33) MEANS OF CLUSTER 
Fear State 
Anger State 
Joy State 
Distress State 
Fear Typical 
Anger Typical 
Joy Typical 
Distress Typical 
GROUPS IN 
GP1 
1.5 
.5 
4.8 
1. 91 
3.8 
4.5 
8.3 
5.5 
EXPERIMENT 
GP2 
3.45 
1 .82 
8.22 
4.13 
2.72 
2.27 
10.81 
5.72 
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3. 
TABLE (4-34) MEANS OF CLUSTER GROUPS ON EMOTION SCALES IN 
EXPERIMENT 2. 
Fear State 
Anger State 
Joy State 
Distress State 
Fear Typical 
Anger Typical 
Joy Typical 
Distress Typical 
GP1 
3.1 
.5 
8 
3 
3.7 
4.0 
10.6 
6.3 
GP2 
3.8 
3.3 
4.1 
4 
2.2 
2.6 
8.0 
4.2 
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emotional trait scores for each group are shown in Table 
(4-33) for Experiment II, and (4-34) for Experiment III. 
There was no significant difference between the groups on 
any emotional scale. However, for both Experiment II and 
Experiment III, the difference between the groups on the 
state happiness scores approached significance. In Experiment 
II; F(1,15) = 3.963, p< .07, and in Experiment III ; 
F(1,15) = 3.716, p< .08. 
The lack of significant differences between the emotion 
scores of the cluster groups suggests that any mini types 
revealed, are unrelated to differences in the subject's 
emotional characteristics. As well, since there is almost 
no overlap between the membership of the cluster groups 
between experiments II and III, this suggests that any 
minitypes are experiment specific. Thus, the cluster 
analysis failed to provide any evidence of an effect of 
emotion on the semantic network. 
Age and Sex Profiles 
It is possible that some characteristic of the subjects 
apart from their emotional characteristics produced the 
interactions involving the List Group factor. The sex, and 
ages of the two List groups were examined to see if they 
could account for the group differences. 
The ages of the two groups did not differ significantly 
(M1 = 20.66 years, M2 = 19.33 years). 
The proportion of males to females was 8 to 4 in group 
1, and 5 to 7 in group 2. It is conceivable that the 
different ratio of males to females might account for the 
group differences, so an ANOVA was performed for each 
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experiment, with SEX as the grouping factor. No significant 
interaction involving SEX emerged, except for a CATEGORY X 
. 
SEX interaction in Experiment II (F(7,16) = 3.32, p< .03). 
The CATEGORY variable in this analysis contained all eight 
categories of words, and an inspection of the category means 
revealed that males took longer for fruit category words 
than did females. 
The lack of any SEX X EMOTION interactions means that 
sex can be eliminated as the cause of the processing 
differences between the List groups. 
General Discussion 
Taken together, the three experiments failed to provide 
any substantial support for Bower's (1981) theory of emotion. 
The predicted correlations between emotional states and 
their corresponding emotion-times (extra time taken to name 
a coloured word because of the extra interference from an 
emotional word), failed to eventuate. 
The only evidence suggesting an effect of emotion on 
the semantic network is the interactions involving the List 
groups, and the anger category emotion-time. The List 
groups received different lists from each other, and the 
List Group factor was included in the design to check that 
the lists were adequately matched. However, as was argued 
in the discussion of Experiment II, the List Group interaction 
with the stimulus factors of Emotion and Category, could 
not be because of the lists, but must be because of the 
subjects. Experiment III confirmed this because in spite 
of the fact that all subjects received the same list of 
stimuli, there was still an interaction involving the List 
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Group factor for anger words. 
The attempt to find an explanation for the difference 
between the List groups by using methods such as discriminant 
analysis did not produce useful answers. The groups were 
different on some emotion scales, but the correlations 
between emotion scale scores and emotion-times for anger, 
did not hold across experiments. 
The failure of the significant correlations to generalise 
across experiments could have two causes. It could arise 
because the experiments involve fundamentally different 
processes, or it could arise because the correlations are 
spurious. There is good reason to argue for different 
processes between Experiments II and III. Experiment III 
was formulated as a means of measuring spatial allocation 
of attention, while Experiment II concentrated on measuring 
the activation of semantic memory. There was a significant 
correlation in Experiment I between anger emotion-time, and 
the joy state scale for the Validity condition most akin to 
the unprimed conditions in Experiment II. However in the 
light of no other replications of correlations, and no 
significant correlation between overall anger emotion-time 
and joy state in Experiment I, the probability is that this 
'replication' is spurious. 
The failure of the analysis of the correlations between 
emotion-times and emotion state scores to explain the List 
Group interactions with the stimulus factors, leaves a 
puzzle. However, the generality of these interactions 
across all experiments does have an important implication. 
It means that the Warren task can demonstrate consistent 
differences in processing style. The fact that these 
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differences were obtained most strongly in the case of 
anger category words does suggest an emotional influence 
on information processing styles. But that is all that can 
be said on the basis of the research reported here. 
Does the failure to find a relationship between 
emotional state and semantic network activation count 
against Bower's theory? It would, if we were satisfied that 
the subjects displayed a sufficient range of emotions, and 
emotional intensities, and that the task was a reliable 
measure of semantic memory activation. We have already 
queried the first of these requirements. As for the second 
requirement, the recent work of Kraut et.al. (1981) on 
alerting, and Kahneman and Chajczyk (1983) on the stroop 
task, cast doubt on whether this task is a very pure measure 
of activity in semantic memory. Consequently the null 
results obtained do not count against Bower's theory. 
In fact, the doubtful significance between anger 
emotion-time and joy states are what might be predicted by 
Bower's model. Since anger is antagonistic to happiness, 
a high level of happiness should inhibit the anger node, 
and anger related nodes in the semantic network. 
Conclusion 
The three experiments reported here provide some 
evidence of individual differences in the processing of 
emotional words. The experiments do not provide any clear 
indication of why these differences arise. In short, the 
experiments have provided no answers, but they have raised 
some questions. One of the questions, the influence of 
emotion on attention allocation, is looked at in the 
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subsequent experiments reported in the next chapter. 
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Chapter five: An investigation of the consequence of 
emotion on early attention allocation. 
An issue which is to date unresearched, is the effect 
that emotional states have upon the allocation of attention. 
Some theorists (e.g. Klinger, 1982; Hamilton, 1980), have 
implicated attention in their theories of emotion and 
information processing, but none have produced empirical 
evidence linking attention and emotion. The studies that 
bear most upon this linkage, are those which show the effect 
of material with emotional content upon attention. For 
example Nielsen & Sarason (1981), showed that sexual content 
words produced more intrusion errors in a dichotic listening 
task. Bargh (1982) found self relevant information produced 
an attentional cost. 
The experiments reported in this chapter, looked at 
attention and emotion from the point of view of the feature-
integration theory of attention put forward by Treisman and 
Gelade (1980). This theory conceptualises attention as the 
'glue' that binds together the outputs of various feature 
detectors. The analysis of elementary features is assumed 
to be automatic and occur in parallel. The integration of 
the feature outputs into a representation of the stimulus 
element requires a form of serial, limited capacity processing. 
Thus, by this analysis, attention is required for the 
perception of complex objects. 
Treisman and her colleagues have obtained converging 
evidence for her theory, using at least three different 
experimental procedures. In one of these experiments, subjects 
were required to search for a target letter in a field of 
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distractor letters. Treisman and Gelade (1980), showed that 
in such a task, visual search for targets that could be 
defined in terms of a disjunctive feature (different in one 
particular feature from the rest of the display) occurs in 
parallel. In contrast a target that is defined by a 
conjunction of the features common to other members in the 
display had serial search times. (An example of a conjunctive 
target would be a 'red X', in a display composed of 'red U's', 
and 'green X's.) The result in favour of the feature 
integration theory of attention, was that search times only 
increased with display size for conjunctive targets. 
In one of the other experiments, it was shown that when 
attention was overloaded, illusory conjunctions of features 
occurred (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982). A last series of 
experiments (Treisman, 1982), demonstrated that where subjects 
had to search for the target stimulus, in a set of uniform 
stimulus groups in the display, search across groups was 
serial, but search within groups occurred in parallel. 
The present experiments asked whether in a task involving 
visual search, the feature integration process commences with 
the regions of the stimulus field containing features of 
emotional significance. It was predicted that for experiments 
such as the search task reported above, emotion should bias 
attention allocation so that reaction times to targets in 
emotionally relevant regions of a stimulus field, should be 
faster than for other regions. 
The present experiments were formulated bearing in mind 
the reservations (expressed in the last chapter) about the 
success of artificial emotion induction procedures. An 
attempt was made to utilise in the laboratory, an environment 
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which has been shown to have affective consequences in 
everyday life. The subjects in these experiments were 
engaged in a gambling game where the stimulus array that 
was searched, contained information pertaining to the outcome 
of the current gamble. This environment allowed the 
manipulation of mood states to be effected by the stimulus 
set of the experiment. Thus, there was no contrived mood 
induction phase in these experiments; mood induction was 
continued throughout the experiment. 
Experiment I 
The first experiment employed groups of letters, one of 
which contained an odd letter which the subject had to name. 
Treisman (1982) had found that under such circumstances, 
serial search results. The question of interest was whether 
the target stimulus would be more rapidly detected when 
located in letters that signify a win, or when located 
amongst letters associated with a loss. It was predicted 
that for subjects who were happy, the target would be more 
rapidly detected amongst letters associated with wins, than 
amongst letters associated with losses. The reverse of this 
should hold when the subjects were unhappy. 
Figure (5-1) Stimulus for Experiment I 
TT 
TT 
xx 
XX 
TT 
TT 
XX 
XX 
xx 
xx 
TT 
TT 
XX 
XX 
TT 
TT 
XX 
XX 
TT 
TK 
TT 
TT 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
TT 
TT 
XX 
XX 
TT 
TT 
An example stimulus array with target group T, 
distractor group X, and letter K as the target. 
Method 
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Subjects: Subjects were thirty undergraduate students 
attending the University of Canterbury. The subjects were 
recruited to take part in "research on gambling" for which 
they were told that they would be staked $4, and get to keep 
their winnings/losings. 
Stimulus Materials and Design 
Subjects had to perform a visual search task that 
involved finding an odd letter out in one of a group of 
letters. There were sixteen letter groups altogether, with 
only one being nonhomogeneous. The nonhomogeneous group 
contained a single different letter, and subjects were 
required to name this different letter as rapidly as they 
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could. All sixteen groups in the visual array were composed 
of four letters. 
The visual array subtended a visual angle of 10 0 x 10 0 • 
Letter groups subtended a visual range of 2 0 x 2 0 , and 
individual letters subtended a visual angle of 1 0 
~pproximately). The visual array was displayed in white 
bold face capitals on a Kaga (Model KS14P) colour monitor 
connected in an Apple II plus computer. 
A visual array was always composed of two kinds of 
letter groups. Each of the two kinds of letters making up 
the letter groups were the elements in eight out of the 
sixteen letter groups in an array. The kinds of letter 
groups were (T, X, U, A). Figure (5-1) provides an example 
stimulus array. 
The target letter which the subject had to name was one 
of the letters (D, F, G, J, K, L, N, P, S). The target letter 
could appear in any of the letter groups in a stimulus array. 
It could occupy anyone of the four letter positions within 
the group that it was located in. The target letter was 
the means whereby gamble outcome was signalled; it changed 
to a colour after the subject made a response and if this 
matched the colour which the subject had chosen to stake on, 
the subject won. The subject always had a 'choice' between 
the colour green and the colour purple on each trial. There 
was a fifty percent chance of choosing the correct colour. 
At this point, we describe the nature of the gambling 
environment since this is necessary for defining the 
stimulus conditions. 
TABLE (5-1) TABLE OF AMOUNTS WON/LOST WHEN TARGET LETTER LOCATED IN VARIOUS GROUPS 
Significant Stimulus Groups Non Significant Stimulus Group 
Target located Subjects's colour choice Subjects colour choice 
in letter group Correct Wrong Correct Incorrect 
T (Fri end) +S 0 +S -S 
X (Enemy) 0 -S +S -S 
U (Neutral) +2 -2 +S -S 
A (Neutral) +2 -2 +S -S 
(S is the stake chosen by the subj ect for the current gamble. The minimum level on a 
trial ranged from 4 cents to 30 cents. ) 
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The Nature of the Gambling Environment' 
Subjects gambled in a game which involved choosing one 
colour out of two alternatives which were offered on any 
one trial. Prior to their choosing, subjects were offered 
a choice between two stakes which differed in value by 4cents. 
After these decisions were made, a trial commenced ending 
in the target stimulus turning a shade that was one of the 
colour alternatives offered earlier. There were several 
possible outcome alternatives contingent on; (i) whether 
the subject had indeed chosen the display colour; (ii) the 
letter group in the display that the target letter appeared 
in. Assuming that the subject chose stake S, and colour C, 
then the outcomes in the Table (5-1) were possible depending 
on what letter group the target was located in. 
It is clear from the table that target letter groups 
could be designated as friendly (T groups since it is not 
possible to lose) , enemy groups (X groups since it is not 
possible to win) , and neutral groups (A, U groups since 
the amounts involved are not of much consequence, and winning 
and losing are possible). Subjects were encouraged to think 
of letter groups as friends, enemies and neutrals. This 
designation was pointed out to them before they commenced 
practice. A check was made after practice that subjects 
had correctly remembered group designation, and were in fact 
aware of the outcome consequences of the letter group that 
the target was found in. 
After each trial, the outcome was displayed on a screen 
in the form of the message "You have won/lost'S' cents". 
Prior to choosing the next stake, the screen displayed the 
current level of the subject's monetary resources. Subject 
",n\5 c\e...5c..,~be.e, t-he.. e..>r.V\r-oV'v-r.e-ry\: \'0"'- S"\.\ojeL\s "' ........ +he (S\:",;""\\\-\CC\"'\ 
s},-, ...... "'\v..::, '2)"sv..\,~ p lhca-sQ... s"'\o21e..c--\--s we.re- c=\;.\'2>C e\\-'ne.r +c..;.;~ o-r 
r-ev->o..rc\e.& ~=..r\,c>d'C-Cl\.\\.j CS~ \=,0-.2:l"'- A 4,1) , 
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TABLE (5-2) TABLE OF STIMULUS ARRAY CONDITIONS FOR 
EXPERIMENT I SHOWING AFFECT LEVELS 
Distractor Group 
Target Group T X U A 
T ( Friend) (+-) (+0) ( + 0) 
X (Enemy) (-+) (- 0) (-0) 
U (Neutral) (0+) (0-) (00) 
A (Neutral) (0+) (0-) ( 00) 
(+ = affecti vely po si ti ve letter, - = affecti vely nega ti ve 
letter, 0 = affectively neutral letter. The first symbol 
inside the brackets refers to the target letter, and the 
second symbol refers to the distractor letter). 
242 
resources started with a 'stake' of $4.00 thereafter it 
was dependent on how well the outcomes had been of earlier 
trials. Subjects were told that they had an initial amount 
of $4.00 and could walk away from the session with that amount 
plus whatever they won, or minus whatever they lost. The 
level of stake choices varied between 4 cents and 30 cents 
(for the lower of the two stake choices offered - the higher 
stake choice was worth 4 cents more). The effect of offering 
only limited choice in terms of how much a subject might 
stake, was to ensure that the initial sum of $4.00 would be 
sufficient to cover the total of 120 trials that a subject 
would play. 
Array Conditions 
The four kinds of letter groups available as distractors, 
crossed with the four kinds of letter groups available as 
carriers of the target letter meant that sixteen display 
conditions were possible. Of these, four were not of interest 
as the target and distractor groups were identical, and no 
attention allocation bias could be measured by these array 
conditions. The twelve remaining display conditions are 
shown in Table (5-2). It can be seen from the table that the 
conditions can be classified by whether the target group 
and distractor group letters are neutral, friendly, or 
enemy. The reason the letter groups have obtained their 
classifications is because the payoff and costs of successful 
and unsuccessful gambles is contingent upon which letter 
group the target letter is located in. This has already 
been discussed in the previous section, and Table (5-1) 
contains the contingencies. 
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A total of 120 stimulus arrays were presented, with 
there being two presentations of every array condition 
within each 24 trial block. Every trial had an associated 
stake choice, and the stake choices were shuffled so that 
the total amount that could be staked in any 24 trial block 
was always the same. Within each 24 trial block the 
stimulus array conditions were shuffled so as not to be 
predictable. Over the total of 120 trials, the amount that 
could be staked was the same for all stimulus array conditions. 
The same 120 stimulus arrays, in the same order were 
presented fon every subject thus ensuring that differences 
in search times between subjects could be attributed to 
subject differences, and subject state differences. However, 
the outcome of the gamble associated with anyone trial, 
and thereby with anyone stimulus array, was not fixed. The 
gamble was genuine. This was achieved by having one of the 
two colour options offered to the subject to bet on, chosen 
by the computer randomly prior to the subject's choice. 
The twelve conditions of stimulus array lend themselves 
to the creation of a set of three composite difference 
scores. These difference scores were decided on prior to 
the experiment and were independent of each other. (As 
pointed out in Cook & Campbell (1979), the error variance 
in <301(\ Sc..ore. ANOVA \!;) '3;ven b~-
Var(error) = Var(X1) + Var(X2) - 2 Cov(X1,X2) 
Thus, in the case of the present reaction time experiment, 
assuming that Var(X1) = Var(X2) then 
Var(error) = 2Var(X1) - 2 Corr(X1,X2) Var(X1) 
and unless Corr(X1,X2):> .5, power is lost in a gain score 
design. Since the present reaction time data shows a level 
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of correlation between stimulus conditions of greater than 
.5, there is no loss of sensitivity in employing such 
difference scores.) 
The difference measures were 
W = TA + TU 
L = XA + XU 
A = TX + TX 
UT 
UX 
UA 
AT 
AX 
UA 
Where TA refers to the stimulus array composed of groups 
of T's and groups of A's, with the target located in a 
group of T's. In contrast, if the target is located in a 
neutral stimulus group, then the neutral stimulus will occupy 
the first position of the letter pairing that designates the 
array condition. (e.g. UX has the target letter appearing 
in the U letter groups of the array.) 
The first two equations that the composite difference 
scores are calculated from are composed by subtracting from 
the time taken to locate a target in emotionally relevant 
letter groups, the time taken to locate the target when it 
appears in the neutral stimulus groups of similarly composed 
arrays. 
If there is an early allocation of attention resources 
to emotionally relevant parts of the perceptual field then 
we expect that the greater the level of emotionality the 
subject is operating under, the greater the difference times 
W (Win time), and L (Loss time). The other index A (Alerting 
time) is designed to be a measure of the extent that target 
detection is expedited by the emotional vs non emotional 
content of the display. If there is a general alerting 
(cf Posner, 1978) which is produced by emotionally relevant 
arrays, and this alerting hastens processing, then one 
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expects lower scores (more negative scores if the scores 
are below zero) on this index. 
The target letter set contained 9 letters, and in 
generating the set of 120 arrays common to all subjects, 
the target letters (D, F, G, J, K, L, N, P, S) were assigned 
at random to each array, and were the same targets for every 
subject. After the subject made a response to a trial, the 
target letter in the array which was initially white in 
common with all letters in the array became the colour that 
the computer had chosen for that trial. The subjects then 
could tell whether they had predicted correctly, and from 
the group that the target letter was located in, the subjects 
could calculate the financial consequences of their decision. 
The stimulus arrays were displayed on a Kaga (model 
KS14P colour monitor, and the experiment was controlled 
by an Apple II + microcomputer via the program listed in 
Appendix 4. Subject responses were timed via a voice 
activated relay consisting of a MTL F-96 Microphone and a 
Realistic CTR-40 tape recorder which fed into the computer 
cassette input slot. The time taken for the subject to 
respond was calculated from an assembly program written 
by the author, and modified from a program described by 
Price (1979). The timing accuracy was to the nearest 
millisecond. 
Procedure 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions; significant stimului-affective induction 
positive; significant stimuli-affective induction negative; 
insignificant stimuli. Significant stimuli conditions had 
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their payoffs contingent both on whether the right colour 
was chosen, and the letter group that the target stimulus 
was located in. (See Table (5-1)). Insignificant stimuli 
conditions had payoffs determined only by whether the target 
letter became the colour that the subject had chosen. The 
affect induction was attempted by the payment of non-contingent 
bonuses, or the extraction of non-contingent taxes during 
the course of the experimen~. The assignment was done 
overtly at the beginning of the experiment by the toss of a 
coin to determine which group the subject would be in. 
Having determined which group the subjects would be 
in, they were briefed on the nature of the game (see section 
on the gambling environment), and the kind of response that 
they were required to make. Subjects were told to name the 
target letter as fast as they could without making a mistake. 
To ensure that subjects understood the game and experimental 
task, and to reduce practioe effects, a practice set of 24 
stimulus arrays was presented. Subjects were informed that 
the gambles of the practice counted and the wins/losses of 
~he practice would be counted. 
A typical trial began with the subject being asked to 
type into the computer their choice of the two staking 
alternatives displayed on the screen. They then had to enter 
a number to indicate which of two colours they predicted 
would come up. At this point the subject could commence 
the part of the trial involving visual search by pressing 
the "Enter" button. All manual responses were performed 
using a hand held numeric keypad. 
The initiation of a visual search trial was followed 
by a presentation of a colour patch on the screen for a 
'80<'\'-'\5/'10..")< P"'-jff\€-"'-'\-s rC""'5e..4 'b",_\-,-","-eV\ \Oce.~" C\f\"-. <;;;zo'-Q_A.~( 
u..li>t-", O<l€..- c\t\O\.V"\c€- ,v, .(\ve_ o.(? oG::_" .. A.rri,,') 0", C>\(\~ Ol'"le. -\--r'<\.\' 
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duration of 500 msecs. The colour displayed was that chosen 
by the subject for this trial, and the presentation was 
intended to act as a reminder of what the subject had bet 
on, and as a warning stimulus so that the subjects could 
prepare for their responses. Following the colour patch 
the screen went blank for a period of 5000 msec. (This 
time interval was required for drawing the stimulus on the 
non displayed screen.) The Treisman type stimulus array 
then appeared on the screen until the subject made a verbal 
response by naming the target letter; the letter which was 
not consistent with the group in which it appeared. The 
stimulus array was thereafter modified by the replacement 
of the target stimulus by the letter stimulus appropriate 
for that group, but in the colour chosen by the computer. 
The target stimulus was displayed on the border of the 
stimulus array at this stage in the colour that the subject 
had chosen. If the two coloured letters were of the same 
colour then the subject had chosen correctly. The modified 
stimulus array remained on the screen for 500 msecs, 
thereafter a message of how much the subject had won/lost 
was displayed until such time as the subject pressed any 
key to commence a new trial sequence. 
A pilot series had shown that subject error rates were 
very low, so during the experiment they were asked to report 
their own errors (if any). These errors were'not correlated 
with a particular condition, and are so not analysed. 
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to 
rate scales (E1 = HAPPINESS, E2 = DISTRESS, EJ = ANGER, 
E4 = ANXIETY, E5 = FEAR). The scale points ranged from 1 
to indicate that the emotions described were not at all 
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present, to 7 which indicated that the emotions described 
were very much present at that point of time. At the end 
of the experiment which lasted approximately 50 minutes, 
subjects received their payment. Payments ranged from $0.00 
to $7.90 depending on the subject's winnings. 
Results 
Initial analysis was performed to examine whether the 
groups differed in their mean levels of reported emotions. 
In recognition of the ordinal nature of the emotion scales 
(although it can be argued that there will be little deviation 
from an equal interval measure), nonparametric tests were 
performed on each of the scales. Kruskal-Wallis 1-way 
ANOVA's revealed that the three groups did not differ 
significantly on any of the five scales. As a consequence, 
all subsequent analyses were performed without reference to 
the original treatment groups. Given that there was no 
effect of gambling condition on the dependent emotion scales, 
it was assumed that the distribution of emotion scores in 
our subject sample approximated a normal distribution, and 
the joint emotion score and reaction time measure scores 
therefore can be represented as bivariate normal. Accordingly, 
correlations are reported, in preference to ANOVAs on groups 
obtained on the basis of a median split. 
One tailed tests with p< .05 were used to assess the 
statistical significance of the results. All correlations 
opposite in sign to that predicted are therefore treated as 
statistically unreliable. 
While the subjects completed five emotion scales the 
~as 
primary interestAin the effect of the first two emotions 
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TABLE (5-3) 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EMOTION SCALES AND ATTENTION 
ALLOCATION AS MEASURED BY REACTION TIME DIFFERENCE MEASURES 
Attention Measure 
W 
L 
A 
Attention Measure 
W 
L 
A 
Bonus and Tax Groups (n=20) 
EM1 EM2 EM3 EM4 EM5 
-.07 .51"a .41"< .31 .31 
-.26 .14 .16 .14 .06 
-.23 -.03 -.09 -.22 .23 
EM1 
.03 
.32 
.44 
Neutral Group (n=10) 
EM2 EM3 EM4 
-.12 -.01 -.04 
-.25 -.14 -.47 
.18 .47 .48 
EM5 
.27 
.16 
.28 
* p< .05, ** p<= .01 (One-tailed test) 
EM1 = Happiness, EM2 = Distress, EM3 = Anger, EM4 = Anxiety, 
EM5 = Fear. 
TABLE (5-4) CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MONETARY OUTCOME INDEXES AND EMOTION SCALES 
EM1 EM2 EM3 EM4 EM5 
Bonus/Tax Final Amount .20 - . 45~~ -.18 -.42* -.06 
Groups Bon/Tax -.02 -.36 -.31 -. 48"~ - . 11 
Neutral Final Amount .29 -.55 -.36 -.30 -.09 
Group 
>, p < .05 (One-tailed test) " 
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TABLE (5-5) 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MONETARY OUTCOME INDEXES AND 
Bonus and Tax Grou12 s Neutral GrouI2 
Attentj on Final Amount Bonus/Tax Final Amount 
~easllr:e 
VJ -.15 -.23 .52 
L -.31 -.28 .33 
A .23 .58~f-~~ .04 
~~* p ~ .01 (Two- tailed te st) 
252 
(happiness and distress) on the attention allocation measures. 
The correlations between the five emotion scales and the three 
measures of attention are reported in Table (5-3). The 
correlations between the W measure and the emotions of 
distress and anger were significant at the .01 and .05 levels 
respectively. No other correlations were significant. 
Table (5-4) details the correlations between the 
monetary outcomes and the emotion scales. As would be expected, 
there are positive aorrelations between monetary outcome and 
positive emotion, while there are negative correlations 
between monetary outcome and negative emotions. 
Table (5-5) shows the correlations between the monetary 
outcomes and the attention measures (W, L and A). There 
were no significant correlations for the measures of attention 
biasing (Wand L). The correlation between the A measure, 
and the amount of noncontingent bonuses/taxes was significant. 
Finally, there was a significant positive correlation 
between overall reaction time and the amount paid/taken 
in noncontingent bonuses/taxes. (r = .5186, p< .01; two 
tailed test). The correlation between the total amount that 
the subject ended with and overall reaction time was also 
significant (r = .5284, p<..01). 
Discussion 
The experiment was designed to test whether emotional 
states affect the early allocation of attention about the 
visual field. The pattern of correlations for the subjects 
who had 'friendly' and 'enemy' letters, was for the friendly 
letters, what would be expected if emotion biases attention 
towards mood congruent material. Specifically, the more 
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distressed and angry the subject, the slower they are to 
process those parts of the visual field that contain 'friendly' 
information. While the converse pattern was not seen for 
'enemy' letters, this might have been because the game was 
enjoyable in itself so that no subjects really entered 
negative affect states which would have been attention biasing. 
Overall, the results of the correlation between emotional 
states, and the reaction time difference measures, are 
suggestive that emotion may be attention biasing, without 
providing a conclusive demonstration of this. 
The correlations between a subject's monetary takings 
and the mood state on the emotion scales, were all in the 
predicted direction. It seems that the gambling environment 
is the ideal way to incorporate an emotion manipulation within 
an information processing experiment. Garnes have also been 
used by Isen et.al. (1978), and Frankenhauser (1976) as a 
means of inducing states of emotion. However, Isen and 
Frankenhauser did not employ emotion scales as independent 
checks of the success of their mood manipulations. 
One set of correlations which were unexpected, were 
those between the bonuses and the A time, as well as the 
mean reaction time. The A time increased with the amount 
that was given (not taken away) from the subject. This 
indicates that the effect of winning (and presumably positive 
affect), was to reduce the advantage of affectively 
significant displays over neutral displays in terms of 
processing time. Such a result is the opposite of what would 
be expected from a simple account of emotion facilitating 
the processing of mood congruent material. The non significant 
correlation between the happiness scale and A also is in a 
254 
direction which indicated that there is a decline in the 
alerting by emotional stimuli with an increase in happiness. 
The best explanation of the result might be that bonuses 
act to reduce tension and negative affect rather than 
enhancing positive affect, and consequently reduce the alerting 
by emotional stimuli. In contrast, high taxes are associated 
with considerable negative affect and so, we expect an 
emotion alerting facilitation for taxed subjects, and no 
facilitation for subjects who receive bonuses. Inspection 
of the mean scores on the A index for each of the subject 
condition groups confirms this. For subjects receiving 
bonuses, the mean A time was (-23 msec), for those receiving 
neither bonuses nor taxes, it was (-37 msec). For subjects 
in the taxation group, the difference was (-204 msec); 
subjects processed stimulus arrays composed of 'friends' and 
'enemies' considerably faster than entirely neutral arrays. 
This indicated that relatively intense emotion might result 
in more processing resource availability to any stimulus with 
emotionally relevant elements. 
Another surprising result was the positive correlation 
between monetary outcomes and overall reaction times. The 
time taken to perform information processing tasks is often 
used as a validator of affect induction procedures (e.g. 
Velten, 1968). Typically it is found that with increased 
levels of negative affect, processing time increases. The 
reverse finding in the case of the present experiment might 
reflect the fact that the affect induced in the present 
gambling experiment is not akin to that associated with 
ongoing mood states. Instead, the patterns of affect 
induced in gambling experiments are likely to be momentary. 
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Thus, rather than because of emotion, the reaction time 
increase with gambling success might be because the 
accumulated arousal associated with unsuccessful gambling 
produces an improvement in information transfer in losing 
subjects (cf Humpheys & Revelle, 1~84). 
The results of this experiment .indicate to some extent 
the plausibility of the suggestion of Klinger (1982) that 
one of the influences of emotion is in the sequencing and 
allocation of resources to current concerns. Klinger suggests 
that " ••• attentional mechanisms are themselves steered in 
part by emotional response, which in turn is anchored in 
goal striving." (p.139-140). The present experiment seems 
to indicate that the attentional mechanisms are flexible 
enough to operate on stimuli that have very little intrinsic 
evaluative significance (viz. the letters in the current 
experiment). 
The two reservations to claiming a certain demonstration 
of emotion on information processing are firstly the 
possibility of a Type I error, and secondly that it may 
reflect strategies unrelated to emotion. The former 
possibility cannot be ruled out considering the large number 
of correlations reported in Table (5-3). However, there 
were only 4 specifically predicted correlations and the 
largest significant correlation was amongst these. The second 
possible reservation, of a conscious strategy difference 
between happy and unhappy subjects seems unlikely, since the 
information in a stimulus array was insufficient to provide 
complete outcome information prior to the subject's response. 
The next experiment eliminates all possible strategy 
advantage by employing affectively significant stimuli that 
256 
have no connection with gamble outcome. 
Experiment II 
The second experiment was designed to be a more 
straightforward demonstration of the influence of affect on 
attention. As well, it broadened the range of affect states 
that were examined to include the affect associated with the 
outcome of a single trial. 
The experiment used schematic faces as the affectively 
relevant stimuli, but the faces themselves were irrelevant 
to the gamble outcome, and the task required of the subject. 
The subject had to name the odd-hat-out of the hats which 
were on the heads of the schematic faces. The hats also 
gave no indication of the outcome of the gamble, so the 
display which related to the task, contained no information 
of relevance to the gamble. 
The prediction for the second experiment was that when 
the target hat was on the head of a mood congruent face, it 
would be detected more rapidly than when it was on a mood 
incongruent, or neutral face. This result would be 
unambiguous evidence for the consequence of emotion on 
attention, as there were no incentives for gamble related 
strategies in the information processing task. 
The second task differed from the first also in the time 
at which subjects were informed of the outcome of a gamble. 
In the second task, the winning colour appeared at the same 
time as the hat-wearing schematic faces. Thus, subjects 
had immediate knowledge of success or failure (unlike the 
first experiment when the outcome was signalled after the 
subject's task response). It was hoped that this procedure 
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would mean that there were two conditions of instantaneous 
affect; one associated with winning trials; one associated 
with losing tri s. In this way, the second experiment 
introduced a within subject factor of momentary affect state. 
The experiment could then tie analysed to show changes in 
attention allocation within subjects dependent upon momentary 
affect states. Such a demonstration would an important 
demonstration of the influence of a ect on attention. 
Throughout the second experiment, it was assumed that 
the conjunction of two setE of I atures l (hats and faces), 
meant that there was only seri processing of individual 
elements of the display. Eowever, as the expe ments of 
Tr sman and G ade (1980) indicate, segrega on of the 
perceptu field occurs in parallel. The present expe ment 
looks at whether parallel segregation by affectively 
significant features to regions of interest, car. reduce 
the se ~l search time. 
Method 
------
~jects: Subjects were eighteen students of the 
University of Canterbury, recruited at the same time, and 
under the same conditions as ttose subjects in expe ment I. 
Stimulus Materials and Design 
The experimental stimulus con sted of a display 
composed of eight head shapes circling a central square 
colour patch, (see Figure (5-2)). The visual angle subtended 
by the to array was 8 0 h~rizont ly o and 8 vertically, 
and the }18ad shapes each subtended a visual angle of 2 0 
o hcrizontally and 2 vertically. Each head shape wore a hat, 
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and often contained internal lines which in some cases 
created schematic faces. The kinds of hat which would appear 
on the faces were clown hats, bowler hats, top hats, and 
crowns. The hats were colour filled, and there was an 
even chance that the hat colour would match that of the 
central colour patch. The four kinds of facial configurations 
that could appear were a blank face, a face with two dots on 
the diagonal sepQrated by a diagonal line, a happy face, an 
unhappy or distressed face. 
All stimuli (which were combinations of facial 
configurations and their headwear), were made by combining 
shape tables for faces with shape tables for hats. The 
tables were created using the Versa Writer package (see 
Note 2 for details). 
There were a total of twelve kinds of stimulus conditions , 
of interest. Any display would contain two groups of four 
identical facial elements. As well, all faces bar one in 
the display would wear an identical hat. A display had 
seven heads with identical hats. One stimulus would have 
a different hat, and that stimulus would be the target 
stimulus for the experiment. The twelve different stimulus 
conditions are illustrated in Table (5-6). 
As in the first experiment there were a total of 120 
stimulus displays during the course of the experiment, and 
there were two presentations of each display type shuffled 
within each sequence of 24 trials. All subjects had the 
same set of face stimuli and hat stimuli presented during 
the experiment, but it was not predetermined whether the 
colour of the hats would match that of the central colour 
patch. (The colour of the central colour patch indicated 
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TABLE (5-6) 
TABLE OF STIMULUS ARRAY CONDITIONS FOR EXPERIMENT II 
SHOWING AFFECT LEVELS 
Target Faces 
B (Blank) 
N (Nonsense) 
H (Happy) 
S (Sad) 
B 
( 00) 
( + 0) 
(-0) 
Distractor Faces 
N 
( 00) 
(+0) 
(-0) 
H 
(0+) 
(0+) 
(-+) 
S 
(0-) 
(0-) 
( + - ) 
(+ = affectively positive face; - - affectively negative 
face; 0 = affectively neutral face. The first symbol inside 
the brackets refers to the face type that wears the target 
hat, and the second symbol refers to the distractor face 
type) 
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what colour the subject chose, the colour of the hats 
circling the colour patch was the colour that the computer 
chose). 
Reaction time difference measures of attention allocation 
were calculated from the following formulae. 
H = HN + HB NH BH (Happy bias) 
S = SN + SB NS BS (Sad bias) 
A = HS + SH NB BN (Alerting) 
Where the first letter in a letter pair refers to the 
letter that designates the type of face that the target hat 
is on, and the second letter refers to the other kind of 
face in the display concerned. The rationale behind these 
difference measures is parallel to the rationale given in 
the earlier experiment. If, in some way emotion induces an 
attention bias towards information consistent with emotional 
states, that should show up as a correlation between emotional 
intensity and the reaction time difference measures. 
The target stimulus was located randomly in positions 
one to eight in the display. The orientation of the split 
between the four face configuration 1 and the four face 
configuration 2 stimuli was also at random. 
All displays were presented on a Kaga Model KS14P 
colour monitor, and the experiment was controlled by an 
Apple II + microcomputer via a program listed in Appendix 4. 
Again, the reaction time was recorded using the assembly 
language routine used in experiment I. 
Procedure 
Subjects were assigned to one of two conditions; bonuses 
or taxes. The taxes and bonuses which the subject received 
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during the experiment, were not contingent upon subject 
behaviour. The taxes and bonuses were set to range from 
10 cents to 30 cents, with one chance in five of occurring 
in anyone trial. 
The subjects were initially briefed on the nature of 
the game, and the task responses that they were required to 
make. Subjects were told to name the type of hat that 
drffered from the hat worn by all other head stimuli. They 
were asked to do this as quickly as possible without making 
a mistake. A practice set of 24 trials was then completed. 
The decisions about stakes and the colour to bet on 
were made in the same way as was described in experiment I. 
After these decisions had been made, the subject could 
initiate the visual search trial. A colour patch in the 
colour that the subject had chosen was then displayed for 
500 msec, followed by a period of 2000 msec during which the 
screen was blank. After this a display composed of 8 head 
stimuli and a colour patch appeared. The colour patch was 
the central element in the 3 x 3 array. (See Fig (5-2).) 
If its colour matched the colour of the hats appearing on 
the heads, the subject won, if it did not, the subject lost. 
The subject named the hat that was the odd one out, and 
thereby set off the voice activated relay and a reaction 
time was obtained. After naming, the stimulus was replaced 
by a message of how much the subject had won or lost which 
remained on the screen until the subject pressed a key to 
commence a new trial. Again, as in the previous experiment 
subjects were required to report their own errors. Such 
errors were extremely rare. 
At the end of the experiment, the subjects completed 
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the five emotion rating Bcales which were outlined for 
experiment I. The subjects then received their payments. 
Final payments ranged from $0 to $11, with the average 
payment being $5.02. 
Figure (5-2) Stimulus for EX12eriment II 
@ 63 6J 
tSJ ~ g 
@ Q 6) 
An example stimulus array with a happy target face, nonsense 
distractor face and the target hat is a clown hat. 
Results 
Initial analysis of the emotion scales revealed that 
there were no significant differences between the bonus and 
tax groups on any of the emotion scales. The mean levels 
of the groups from experiments I & II are reported in Table 
(5-7). As in experiment I, correlations were performed 
between the five emotion scales and the three difference 
time measures. These correlations are reported in Table 
(5-8). There were no significant correlations. 
The absence of significant correlations between the 
subjects enduring mood state and the processing of emotionally 
significant stimuli as measured by the three reaction time 
difference measures, means that an analysis of the second 
experiment has not revealed the same pattern of effects 
that were obtained with the more artificial letter stimuli 
TABLE (5-7) 
MEAN EMOTION 
Group 
Bonus 
Tax 
Neutral 
Group 
Bonus 
Tax 
SCALE 
EM1 
3.6 
3.7 
4.0 
EM1 
3.6 
2.8 
SCORES FOR EXPERIMENTS 
EM2 
1.6 
3.1 
2.8 
EM2 
2.1 
2.1 
Experiment I 
EM3 
1.9 
2.1 
2.1 
Experiment II 
EM3 
1.6 
2.1 
EM4 
1 .8 
3.0 
3.1 
EM4 
2.6 
2.4 
I & II 
EM5 
1 .2 
1.9 
1 .7 
EM5 
1 .2 
1.0 
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(EM1 = Happy, EM2 = Distress, EM3 = Anger, EM4 = Anxiety, 
EM5 = Fear) 
TABLE (5-8) 
INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN EMOTION SCALES AND ATTENTION 
ALLOCATION MEASURES PROVIDED BY REACTION TIME DIFFERENCE 
SCALES. ( EXP 2.) 
Attention 
Measures 
H 
S 
A 
EM1 
-.327 
.099 
-.021 
EM2 
.089 
- . 071 
.215 
EM3 
-.086 
.102 
.221 
EM4 
-.326 
.0153 
.113 
EM5 
-.249 
.062 
.089 
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of the first experiment. However, one very important way 
in which the second experiment differs from the first 
experiment, is that the stimulus display contains unambiguous 
outcome information which appears simultaneously with the 
task relevant information. Thus, the display contains what 
is likely to be a powerful momentary affect modulator. The 
data were analysed to contrast attention allocation when a 
momentary positive affect was generated, with attention 
allocation when momentary negative affect was generated. 
(Winning and losing generates momentary positive affect and 
momentary negative affect respectively). 
The reaction times for the two momentary affects ar~ 
detailed in Table (5-9), and (5-10). Table (5-11) details 
the differences in reaction times for each of the stimulus 
conditions. Analysis of variance of the reaction time data 
in a repeated measures design encompassing all eighteen 
subjects, with factors of outcome (0), target stimulus type 
(T) distractor stimulus type (D) was done using the BMDP4V 
program. The design had four missing cells for the 
combinations of stimulus targets and distractors that were 
identical. Table (5-12) details the significant effects, 
and their interactions. The listing of sep~rate-interactions 
OT!(OD) and OD!(OT) reflects the fact that this design is not 
, 
completely crossed, and effects T, 0, OT, OD, are estimates 
based on weighted combinations of cell means, and are thus 
not orthogonal. Aseries of repeated measures t-tests were 
performed to investigate which stimulus types differed 
significantly between winning and losing trials. The 
significant t-tests for 17 degrees of freedom are detailed 
in Table (5-11). 
265 
TABLE (5-9) 
RAW REACTION TIMES (IN MSEC) FOR TARGET AND DISTRACTOR 
COMBINATIONS, ON WINNING TRIALS * 
Distractor Stimuli 
0 (0 Q g 
0 1495 1486 1425 1487 
Target (0 1560 1450 1550 1520 
Stimuli Q 1559 1546 1480 1528 
Q 1491 1451 1474 1472 
1536 1697 1470 1485 1497 
TA BL E (5 - 1 0) 
RAW REACTION TIMES (IN MSECl FOR TARGET AND DISTRACTOR 
COMBINATIONS, ON LOSING TRIALS * 
Distractor Stimuli 
0 6) Q 0 
0 1628 1632 1548 1602 
Target (0 1722 1560 1544 1609 
Stimuli Q 1665 1538 1515 1573 
Q 1693 1499 1561 1584 
1693 1555 1584 1536 1592 
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TABLE (5-11) 
DIFFERENCES IN REACTION TIME (IN MSEC) FOR TARGET AND 
DISTRACTOR COMBINATIONS BETWEEN WINNING AND LOSING TRIALS ~ 
Distractor Stimuli 
0 6) Q Q 
0 -133 -146+ -123 
Target 6) -162+ -110 +6 
Stimuli Q -106 +8 
-35 
Q -202+ -47 -87 
* In Tables 7, 8 and 9, where data is missing, it has been 
replaced by the value froID the other half table for the 
purposes of calculating the mean. 
(+ p <. .05 two-tailed test) 
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TABLE (5-12) 
TABLE OF TESTS OF MAIN EFFECTS AND INTERACTIONS 
EFFECT SS DF MS F P 
0 (Outcome) .3677 1 .3677 10.9 .01 
T (Target) .0424 3 .0141 1 .03 .39 
D (Distractor) .2430 3 .0810 5.53 .00 
0 x T .0683 3 .0228 1. 70 .18 
0 x D • 1118 3 .0373 2.33 .09 
T D .0709 3 .0236 2.06 .12 
D T .2715 3 .0905 7.32 .00 
0 x T 0 x D~~ .0982 3 .0327 2.50 .07 
0 x D 0 x T .1418 3 .0473 3.01 .04 
( ! = removing effects following the symbol) 
* Note, by an alternative statistic (TSQ), this effect is 
si gni fi can t (TSQ = 15.8, F = 4.52, P .025) 
(ISq·=: \-\ote..\\\~~ \- s<tu.o.rec:\ .stOl-\-i~\;c...J 
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There is a more comprehensive way of looking at Table 
(5-11). If we consider winning trials, then 
W (S(w, .... w)) ~ W(S(-w,w)) 
Where the capital W outside the bracket indicates the 
outcome. The S(X1,X2) indicates the target-distractor 
combination: X1 is the target stimulus type (in this case 
win compatible), and X2 is the distractor stimulus type 
(in this case not win compatible). 
In losing trials we expect 
L (S ( ..... w, w)) <: L ( S ( w , ..... w) (ii) 
were L indicates a losing outcome. 
Unfortunately, we cannot use the comparisons suggested 
by 00 and aD because the conditions were not balanced for 
target position. However, a reasonably valid comparison 
can be made through the fact that 
W ( S ( w ,"" w)) - L ( S ( w ,...-Iw)) <: W ( S (,... w , w )) - L ( S ( .... w , w ) ) 
(iii) 
The left hand side of the above inequality represents an 
entry from Table (5-11~ that has a happy stimulus in the 
target position, while the right hand side represents the 
same target-distractor pair, only with the winning stimulus 
as distractor. 
By similar reasoning to that above, it can be 
established that 
W ( S (~l , 1)) - L ( S (""'1, 1)) <. W ( S ( 1, ....... 1)) - L ( S ( 1, ...... 1) ) 
(iv) 
In the case of both (iii) and (iv), position effects (at 
least simple position effects), have been effectively 
eliminated as they are subtracted out on both sides of the 
inequality. 
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TABLE (5-13) 
INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN MONETARY OUTCOME INDEXES 
AND EMOTION SCALES IN EXP. 2. 
Groups 1 & 2 n=18 
Finishing 
Amount 
Bon/Taxes 
TABLE (5-14) 
Eti 1 
.249 
.272 
-.279 
-.008 
El<3 
-.077 
-.247 
-.056 
.043 
EV,5 
.241 
.355 
INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN MONETARY OUTCOME INDEXES 
AND MEAN REACTION TIME 
~1ean 
Finishing Amount 
-.028 
Bon/Taxes 
-.068 
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The inequalities (iii) and (iv) give rise to five 
predictions for Table (5-11). Designating table entries by 
A(i,j) where i is the row index and j the column index, the 
following inequalities are predicted: 
A(1,4)C:= A(4,1) (d = -79) 
A(2,4) c:. A(4,2) (d = -53) 
A ( 3 , 4) <:. A(4,3) ( d = -47) 
A(1,3) '> A(3,1) (d = 40) 
A(2,3) '> A(3,2) (d = 118) 
The bracketed figures to the right of the inequalities are 
the differences between the two table entries. As can be 
seen, they are all in the predicted direction. 
In the absence of estimates of the three way interactions 
between outcome, target and distractor, (because of missing 
cells in the ANOVA), the prediction set above provides a 
test of the attention allocation hypothesis. The probability 
of all five predicted inequalities being in the right direction 
is (.5)5 = .031. 
Finally, Tables (5-13) and (5-14) detail the results 
of correlating the monetary outcomes with the emotion scales, 
and the mean reaction time. Although they do not bear 
critically on the analysis (especially not that for momentary 
affect states), they are included for completeness. 
(Comparisons between the data of the first experiment and 
that of the present experiment can be made with this data.) 
Discussion 
The most important finding to come out of this experiment, 
was the clear evidence for the effect of momentary affect 
states on the allocation of attention in the visual field. 
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The experiment contained stimulus conditions that were 
equivalent except for the reversal of target and distractor 
stimuli. The particular prediction set which was derived 
from the principle that 'affect state congruent information 
is processed first', was totally upheld. It is this principle 
which may underlie the significant interaction between 
outcome and target which because of the confounding between 
target and distractor is not readily interpretable. The 
prediction set derived as it is from the apriori princ~ple 
of attention allocation policy stated above is a very specific 
test of the effect of emotion on attention allocation. As 
well, the result highlights a phenomen not considered in 
many of the experiments in the field of emotion; that 
emotional states are often fleeting stimulus elicited events 
that show considerable fluctuations between the times that 
subjects fill in emotion rating scales. 
Wilson,1977). 
(cf. Nisbett & 
In some ways, the only parallel to these results is to 
be found in the perceptual defense - perceptual vigilance 
literature discussed in chapter three. The demonstrations 
of such experiments (discussed in Dixon, 1981), of some form 
of early non conscious processing of stimuli, leading to 
defence or vigilance, is much akin to what has occurred 
in this experiment. 
The results are quite remarkable in the light of what 
the subjects revealed at debriefing. At this point, the 
experimenter carefully explained the rationale of the 
experiment, including the role of the various face stimuli. 
Almost all subjects commented on this information to the 
effect that during the experiment they had been oblivious 
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to all aspects of the heads. They claimed that all they 
were aware of was the hats, and the faces never were noticed. 
Several subjects expressed disbelief that there had been 
any faces beneath the hats at all. 
If these subject reports are taken as reliable (and 
subjects hqd no motives to lie about not noticing the faces), 
then it provides phenomenological evidence that the effects 
obtained are because of preconscious processing of the 
affective aspects of the stimulus display. That of course 
is what has been hypothesised all along, but it is remarkable 
that the effects obtained here have arisen without the 
attention biasing aspect of the display even being noted by 
the subjects. Thus, the results are compatible with the 
suggestion of Zajonc (1980) that an emotional analysis 
precedes cognition. However, they go further in that they 
demonstrate that the early emotional analysis is utilised 
in emotion biased attention allocation policies. 
In terms of which conditions showed the largest 
differences in reaction time between winning and losing 
trials, there were three that were found statistically 
significant. There was considerable advantage to the 
stimulus array with smiling targets and blank distractors 
in the winning outcome condition. There was also a 
considerable advantage to the stimulus array with blank 
head and unhappy distractor stimuli for winning conditions. 
The third significant difference was for a 'nonsense face' 
target with a blank distractor head. The first two differences 
are predicted by the emotion congruent attention allocation 
policy hypothesis. 
Perhaps the best indicator of the attention biasing is 
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to be found in the conditions that did not have slower 
reaction times in losing trials than in winning trials. This 
was the case firstly for the unhappy face target with nonsense 
face distractor, and secondly for the nonsense face target 
and a happy distractor. In the former case, the target was 
compatible with negative affect, and in the latter case, the 
distractor was incompatible with negative affect. The 
results are both explained by the negative affect biasing 
attention towards affect compatible regions in the visual 
field, and away from affect incompatible regions of thB 
visual field. Thus, in the two cases discussed, when the 
subjects lost, the negative affect produced, would have 
resulted in serial processing beginning with the type of 
face that had the odd hat out above it. 
The second experiment did not confirm the findings of 
the earlier experiment of correlations between emotional 
states and the reaction time difference measures. This 
might be attributable to the momentary affect state being 
the overriding determiner of reaction time variation in 
the current experiment. Certainly, the significant results 
for momentary affect and the fact that immediate feedback 
occurred after the visual scanning task in the first experiment 
are compatible with this interpretation. 
The experiment also failed to replicate the correlations 
between finishing amounts and emotion scale scores found 
in the earlier experiment. The results were in the same 
direction as found earlier with higher winnings associated 
with more happiness and less negative affect but they were 
not significant. There does not seem good cause to doubt 
the usefulness of the gambling environment because of these 
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results. 
One other finding from experiment I which was not 
replicated in the present experiment was the correlation 
between the monetary outcome measures, and the mean reaction 
time. The earlier result was surprising since it indicated 
slower times for happier subjects. In the light of the low 
correlations found in the present experiment, the earlier 
correlations may be attributed to Type I errors, or strategy 
effects. The latter of these possibilities suggests a 
slower search for outcome relevant information in subjects 
who were winning. The same strategy would not be possible 
in experiment II, because the immediately available outcome 
information was contained in the array colour which might 
be assumed to be an immediately available feature code. 
One significant result that deserves further investigation, 
is that of the longer time required to find the target on 
losing trials. Such a result could arise because of a 
longer time spent checking the gamble outcome in the case 
of losing trials; it could be an artifact of a difference 
in colour between the central colour patch and the surrounding 
stimuli; or it could be the effect of a momentary negative 
affect on information processing. Further experiments are 
required to determine the cause of the phenomena. 
Conclusion 
The two experiments reported in this chapter have 
provided evidence that emotion has an influence upon attention 
allocation in the visual field. Experiment I provided 
evidence that the subjects enduring emotional states induced 
by their overall success in gambling has consequences for 
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attention allocation. Experiment II produced strong evidence 
that momentary emotional states that coincide with success 
or failure on individual gambles biases attention towards 
affect congruent regions. 
The results from both experiments can be interpreted 
as demonstrating that there is an early analysis of information 
into its emotional relevance, and that subsequent processing 
priority is determined by this emotional analysis. This 
suggestion is quite congruent with the position of Zajonc 
(1980) that affect may precede cognition. The emotional 
analYSis may occur in parallel and on more data-limited input 
than a cognitive analysis. After the emotional analysis, 
the serial cognitive analysis can procede with well defined 
'regions of interest'. These regions of interest are most 
likely to be encoded into working memory earliest, and thus 
their information will be first available to action schemata 
and response processes. 
The interpretation above fits in well with the argument 
of Klinger (1982) that the emotion subsystem must at some 
stage of its ontogenesis, have assumed some functions related 
to directing the substance (information) processing goals 
of the organism. It can also explain why there seems to be 
no necessary linkage between eye position and focus of 
attention (Posner, Davidson & Snyder, 1980; Posner, 1982). 
If attention allocation is contingent upon an early analysis 
by an emotional processing system, then it is not expected 
to be foveally located. What is expected is that once a 
data-limited analysis has been completed, and attention 
allocation is determined, occular focus will also shift to 
the region of interest. Posner (1982) reports that covert 
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attention precedes eye movement by 150 msec. 
The evidence connecting affect state and attention 
allocation obtained here is an important confirmation of the 
linkage suggested in functional theories such as Klinger's. 
There do not seem to be any previous attempts to provide 
information processing measurements of the linkage. Thus, 
these experiments have provided important confirmation of 
evolutionarily derived theory, and a means of demonstrating 
and measuring an important microprocess of emotion. 
Chapter six: 
An account of the emotion system: a final look at the 
relationship between emotion and cognition. 
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This chapter will attempt to provide a model for some 
of the phenomena associated with emotion. It will not 
narrowly focus on the results of the previous three experiments, 
but it will consider some of the way: in which emotion appears 
to operate in everyday life. The data base taken both from 
the laboratory and the world is construed within a framework 
that attempts to relate the functioning of the emotion 
system to the operation of the cognitive system. The need 
to consider a particular system in the context of its 
interactions with other systems is advocated by Royce and 
Diamond (1980). It is also reflective of the fact that as 
well as considering the designed function of systems, it is 
also necessary to consider the way in which systems are 
utilised by agents. 
A Speculation on an Evolutionary Pathway 
Patry (1983) has suggested that evolutionary theory is 
often unjustifiably used by psychologists. He suggests that 
the use of evolutionary theory in psychology should be 
restricted to several fairly narrow scientific contexts, 
including amongst them the context of discovery. That is, 
evolutionary theory can be used to help find new ideas on 
how human beings could function. These ideas however require 
testing and justification before they can acquire a status 
beyond that of 'just ideas'. In accord with this use of 
evolutionary theory, a speculative sequence for the 
development of emotion system functioning is put forward, and 
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its consequences for patterns of information processing and 
action within the species homo sapiens, is considered. 
It is proposed that any organism has the task of finding 
substances and incorporating substances required in organism 
functioning. Thus, common to all motile species are 
stimulus-response tendencies that have selective advantage 
for the species. In as much as it is the goal of the 
organism to follow an optimal (ingestive) strategy, it is 
necessary for the organism to detect, and evaluate objects. 
Further, where an object cannot be readily evaluated, or 
where it must be operated on by the organism, orientation 
towards that object is a necessity. Thus, it is going to 
be advantageous for organisms to be able to prime behavioural 
sequences appropriate to perceptual categories. Accordingly 
there is a fundamental linkage between perception and action 
in organisms that is developed early in the evolutionary 
time-scale (cf Klinger y 1982). 
The early linkage of a perception-action package then 
provides the elements for the creation of a signalling system 
whereby members of a species can be alerted to significant 
aspects of the environment by the ~ignalling of one of 
their members most proximate to the region or object of 
significance. The evolutionary pathway postulated here 
suggests that there is a selective advantage for individual 
organisms that develop clear signalling patterns, and an 
early acquisition of encoding skills that allow the rapid 
reaction to these signals. Once a species has acquired a 
visually based signal system, it will bias selection fitness 
in a way that makes those individuals which are most 
responsive to valid signalling and which are most likely to 
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be proximate to signal sources, have higher survival rates. 
The consequence of this is that as species evolve more 
visual signalling capabilities, they also become more 
spatially compact in the distribution of individuals. In 
other words as we trace the development of visual (and 
auditory) signalling systems in a species, we expect to 
find the contemporaneous development of some form of social 
structure. 
As the development of behaviour specialised for 
signalling occurs, at the same time as it provides a selective 
advantage to those individuals more disposed to social 
living, there is an increased advantage for associating 
affective responses (in particular signalling) with a 
broader range of situational inputs. Such an advantage 
could result in changes in several ways including -
a) A broadening of affect elicitors to include situations 
which, while they do not actually include emotionally 
significant objects (such as predators or prey), are 
precursors of situations containing these elements. 
b) A tendency to replace highly specific, innate, object 
related emotion elicitors, with classes of learned emotion 
elicitors. 
c) Emotions being conditional more upon information 
characteristics than upon information content. For instance 
the rate of density of neural stimulation (as suggested by 
Tomkins (1962; 1980)), rather than the specific object 
involved might be the necessary encoding for affect 
instigation. 
d) A widening of the range of emotions displayed to the 
extent that there is an available repertoire to encoding all 
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situations encountered by the organism. (In terms of the 
functional language of Plutchik (1980), an increase of the 
number of functions to include functions such as reintegration 
which is advantageous for a social animal). 
This broadening of the range of affect elicitors will 
be dependent on the development of a higher level of 
cognitive functioning, and its connection with emotional 
processes. The cognitive expansion will be advantageous 
because it will result in more sophisticated categories 
that allow a fine discrimination between objects that merit 
affective response, and those similar objects to which 
affective responses would be disadvantageous. With the aid 
of cognitive analysis to such a fine level of discrimination, 
the costs of broadening the application of emotional 
processes will not be too high. Rather than an increase in 
the incidence of emotion that evolution without an element 
control 
of cognitive control would result in, evolution with cognitive A 
simply increases the potential evocation of emotion. 
" 
The possible evolutionary path towards final cognitive-
emotion interactions is difficult to specify because of the 
potential complexity of such interactions. However, several 
clear trends evident in the forms of human emotion-cognition 
interactions can be listed: 
(1) In what Tomkins (1980) refers to as the 'unmodulated, 
ungraded innate response!, where there is minimal deviation 
from prototypical patterns of response because of cognitive 
input, attention allocation to the objects of affect will 
be enhanced. 
(2) In the modulated innate response, where there would 
appear to be more cognitive control, the initiation of more 
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primal action patterns will be inhibited. Substituted will 
be one of a set of global encodings about causation and the 
associated reequilibriation conditions. The substitution of 
such a global encoding, henceforth referred to as a PER 
(prototypical emotional relations), is a powerful motivator 
and guide to the solution of the situational danger. 
(3) As well as the emergence of PER type control schema, 
there is an increase in the use of monitoring-diagnostic 
schema which reduce the extent of feeling if events are 
going to plan. 
(4) The extent to which affect producing conditions have 
influence on the qualitative processing of other situations 
will increase. Thus, the effect of the kind of weather 
conditions presently enjoyed can have an influence upon 
other jUdgements (Schwarz and Clore, 1983). 
This increase in the pervasiveness of affect is easy 
to understand if the direction that evolutionary movement 
takes is seen as away from fixed patterns of behaviour in 
order to effect survival functions, and towards non predictable 
behavioural sequences that achieve survival functions via 
intermediate goals. The effect of suppression of fixed 
action patterns by intermediate goals, is to enable the 
individual organism to be operating on multiple matters of 
concern at any point in time. This is possible by relaxing 
the strong binding between emotions and their action patterns, 
and replacing them with weak bindings between emotions and 
goal-action sequences. The advantages for the organism of 
this substitution are 
(a) The functional goals that lie behind affect can 
be worked towards prior to the situation to which 
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the action patterns are adapted to. It is obviously 
advantageous to start avoidance planning prior to 
the immediacy of the danger. 
(b) The possibility of operating on multiple 
matters of concern, is advantageous in terms of 
the economic use of multiple environments. For 
instance, the loss of a companion in the heat of 
the battle provides stimulus conditions for both 
rage, and sadness. However, sadness can be reserved 
until affiliation conditions are more optimal 
(e.g. the military funeral). Thus, the danger of 
being overcome by sadness is reduced by setting up 
an intermediate, environment-specific, comfort goal. 
(c) A loose binding between emotions and goal-
action sequences, will permit the fundamental 
relationship established in the information processing 
that caused the emotional experience, to bring about 
immediate changes in the priorities of a whole set 
of concerns. The activation in the goal effecting 
schema brought about by the PER, in not remaining 
specific, results in a set of behavioural imperatives 
that do not reach cessation until a satisfactory 
level of coping is achieved for all related concerns. 
An example of how this might be advantageous 
to the individual organism, is the way in which the 
evoking of a PER for fear by say the presence of a 
predator, might also at a later point produce an 
increased likelihood of fear of floods. Such a 
cycling through safety related concerns, and the 
adequacy for their goal-action sequences, will favour 
the location of a more than 'satisficingly' safe 
environment when escape occurs. 
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(5) The development of an attributional search process 
that follows affect onset. The fact that affect is no 
longer tied to obvious environmental relations, but can be 
the consequence of the success/failure of a series of goal-
action sequences, means that complicated ways of deriving 
the 'cause' of an emotion must be allowed. Most probably 
the particular attribution heuristics are learned, but the 
possibility of their development is a consequence of an 
evolutionary parsing of the possible affect-cognition 
relations. 
The emotion-cognition interactions suggested by the 
evolutionary pathway outlined also carry certain implications 
for the culture preserved ways in which emotions are 
employed. There are obvious 'content based' distinctions 
which condition emotional and cognitive functioning for a 
particular cultural group. For instance, aesthetic 
preferences are most probably culture relative (Mandler (1982)), 
and are partially transmitted by emotional contagion processes 
occuring between child and significant care givers. It is 
highly functional for care givers to transmit knowledge 
intergenerationally with the help of affective encodings 
provided by the contagion process. Transmitting information 
in this way, gives a receiver a readily useable set of 
categories, by which knowledge can be structured and action 
tendencies established. It would be considerably more 
traumatic and dangerous for the individual to establish 
his/her own affective structure on the transmitted information. 
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Of course, the transmission of an evaluated knowledge 
base is not totally fixed, and the individual's experiences 
can modify the value associated with information. One 
example of where the slow process of value modification has 
occurred is in the area of sexual values: effective means 
of contraception now mean that taboos on sexuality outside 
of contractual arrangements are slowly being relaxed. A 
new positive value to knowledge about contraception and 
sexual functioning has replaced the negative value previously 
associated with such knowledge. 
Emotibn and Cognitive Skills 
As well as the species common, biologically evolved 
links between emotions and information processing systems 
suggested above, there is also the consequent characteristics 
of the acquired cognitive structure that also reflects the 
importance of emotion in knowledge acquisition. Several 
theorists (e.g. Mehrabian & Russell 1974; Heise 1979) have 
taken advantage of the pervasiveness of the semantic 
differential factors (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum 1957) and 
have equated them with affective dimensions, and used them 
to form the basis of a means of predicting behaviour in 
various situations. The success of such approaches suggests 
that an evaluation process that might result in affect is 
an integral part of all normal information processing, and 
that it might be an important determinant of just what is 
learnt. 
An empirical relationship between affect and learning 
has been well demonstrated in several studies. For instance, 
Brown & Kulik (1977) have shown the phenomena of flashbulb 
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memories, Loftus and Burns (1982), have shown that mental 
shock can lead to retrograde amnesia, and various studies 
by Bower and his colleagues (e.g. Bower, 1981) have shown 
the influence of congruent affect at encoding on the recall 
of to-be-remembered material. What is missing, is an 
understanding of the way in which the emotion system plays 
a part in normal as well as exceptional learning. The 
existing results do not explain how the emotional dimensions 
of the semantic differential can be a ubiquitous presence 
across various semantic domains. Here, we try to look at 
the influence of emotion on normal learning processes by 
analysing where it might be accommodated within the theory 
of the acquisition of cognitive skills advanced by Anderson 
(1983) and Anderson, Kline and Beasley (1980). It will be 
argued that the pervasive link between emotion and meaning 
as demonstrated by the semantic differential, is because the 
fundamental direction of cognitive skill acquisition is 
determined by emotional plan heuristics, and that the 
development of cognitive skills requires encodings (meanings) 
that can be characterised in terms of the relevance of new 
information to these heuristics. 
The ACT Model of Cognitive Skills 
The theory developed by Anderson sees the development 
of cognitive skills arising in three stages. The initial 
stage termed the declarative stage, is one where knowledge 
in a new domain starts out in a declarative form, and is 
used to generate productions according to whether it is 
called upon by general problem solving procedures. The 
second stage in Anderson's theory of cognitive skills is 
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that of knowledge compilation, where the system develops 
productions that apply directly without the need of prior 
interpretation. The final stage of the theory, is that of 
procedural learning, where the sets of available production 
rules are 'tuned' to the requisite level of specificity and 
strength with respect to particular environments. The full 
sequence of learning stages is outlined in Figure (6-1). 
In terms of emotion theory, the analysis of complex 
learning suggested by Anderson is important because in 
acknowledging the importance of a heirarchical goal structure 
involved in complex learning, the theory makes a provision 
for an important link between emotion theory and cognitive 
learning theory. There is quite a degree of agreement 
between emotion theorists that some kind of goal structure 
is involved in human affect. For instance, Bower and Cohen 
(1982), suggest that the information processor has a class 
of events called "goal events", and that these goal events 
play important parts in emotional interpretation of production 
rules. Bower and Cohen note that "The importance of goals 
is that they direct processing in the system." (p.312). 
Thus, the production system model of emotion that they 
employ, has much in common with the production system model 
of learning of Anderson and his colleagues. Another theorist 
that finds a close tie between emotion and goal structures 
is Pervin (1983), although his formulation is more in terms 
of traditional learning theory. 
FIGURE (6-1) 
STAGES OF LEARNING FOR THE ACT PRODUCTION SYSTEM. 
(1) Declarative Stage. 
Information 
+ 
Actional Goals 
Propositional 
Encoding 
ProblE;!m Solving 
Productions 
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New 
Productions 
Behaviour 
( Note: New information or 'facts' are given a propositional encoding 
prior to being used by the general problem-solving productions. ) 
(2) Compilation Stage. 
Information 
+ 
Actional Goals 
New 
Productions 2 
Behaviour 
( Note: New Productions--7 New Productions 2 • The latter productions 
do not require the actions of general problem-solving productions 
prior to use. ) 
(3) Procedural Learning Stage. 
, New -+----:;:......:;;:. Behaviour 
Productions 2 -Information 
+ 
Actional Goals 
~---.~~ Productions 
I Productions 
( Generalisation and discrimination increase or decrease the application 
of productions. Commonly used productions are strengthened, and are 
more likely to influence behaviour. ) 
Questions about the Influence of Cognition in the 
Development of Affect 
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The linking together of emotion and cognitive processes 
is an important theoretical endeavour, not just because 
of the virtues of scientific parsimony, but also because 
of the light that can be thrown upon the nature of the 
ontogenesis of emotion. Researchers from Darwin (1877) have 
studied the ontogenesis of emotion, and there is good 
evidence for a developmental sequence in the appearance of 
the primary emotions. Izard (1980, 1978) has given an account 
of such a developmental sequence. It is important that the 
cognitive prerequisites for an emotion to appear in the 
neonate be studied, both for its clinical implications, and 
also the light that it can throw on emotion theory. If as 
Izard has suggested at the neurological level " ••• a funda-
mental emotion is defined as a particular, innately 
programmed pattern of electrochemical activity in the nervous 
system. II (p.167, 1980), then the way in which the cognitive 
system might be involved in maintenance of the pattern of 
activity must be investigated. 
Another question that should be investigated is whether 
the maturational sequence of the emotions is innately 
programmed, or is instead a consequence of the emergence of 
a particular set of cognitive skills that enable the processing 
and action tendencies associated with emotions. That is, 
are there learning invariants that precede the formation of 
affective structures, or is it merely biological events 
that are necessary for the development of adult emotion? 
Some evidence discussed by Jones and Smith (1980) suggests 
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that there are similarities between animals with hippocampal 
damage, and animals reared in social isolation. They point 
out that these results can be interpreted as a consequence 
of a motivation related memory system impairment. If this 
is the case, then it would appear that the environment and 
some form of learning, play an important part in the 
development of appropriate emotion in the rat. 
There is certainly no doubt that an environment that is 
impoverished in terms of social stimulation, has a negative 
influence on emotional development. The work of Harlow 
(e.g. Harlow, H. & Harlow, M.H., 1966), of Bowlby (1969), 
and the studies of institutionalised children (e.g. Spitz 
(1946), Provence and Lipton (1962)), all point to the critical 
importance of social interaction for normal affective 
functioning. The data of such studies have been taken by 
most developmental psychologists to demonstrate the extreme 
importance of child-caregiver interactions in the realisation 
of the full potential of the child. Development of a theory 
of emotiop that is related to cognitive goals, could allow 
the specification of just what aspects of the environment 
are essential for emotional development and why. 
The Application of ACT to the Development of the 
Fear Production System 
To illustrate the application of ACT, consider the 
situation of fright (induced for example by seeing a masked 
man with a gun). Figure (6-2) provides an ACT solution 
structure that would be involved in such a situation. 
Table 6-1 lists in full the production set involved. Here 
we will step through the production sequence assumed to 
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FIGURE (6-2). A REPRESENTATION OF THE FLOW OF CONTROL 
IN REACTION TO AN UNEXPECTED FEAR INDUCING EVENT. 
PS 
Pll 
PI6 
Unexpected Event 
PO 
PI 
-->(-71 Arousal ) 
P3 
Perform appropriately to the 
event. (Get away. ) 
Success P8 P9 Failure 
Emit correct behaviour of 
flight. 
PI4 Failure 
Provide appropriate flight 
sequence. 
PI9 Failure 
Provide an appropriate plan 
for flight sequencing. 
22 Failure 
Encode situation to provide 
data for plan schema. 
P20 P2I 
p7 
p6 
PI2 
P2 
Fixed 
Behaviour 
Behaviour 
P4 
Recode plan 
into motor 
program 
PIO Plan using 
problem 
PI7 solving 
PI7 1 
schema. 
Plan 
revision 
using 
problem 
solving 
schema. 
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Table (6-1) 
Productions Eyoked in Fright Reaction. 
PO IF an unexpected event occurs, 
THEN set as subgoal to react appropriately to the event. 
P1 IF an unexpected event occurs 
P2 
P3 
THEN increase arousal level 
IF 
THEN 
IF 
goal is to react appropriately and action is not 
occuring 
set as subgoal to emit appropriate behaviour. 
goal is to perform appropriately and unexpected 
event has been coped with 
THEN POP the goal with success. 
P4 IF goal is to emit the correct behaviour for flight 
and there is no flight plan 
THEN set subgoal as providing an appropriate flight 
sequence. 
P5 IF goal is to emit the correct behaviour for flight, 
and flight sequence is completed 
THEN provide more flight sequences into motor control 
system. 
p6 IF goal is to emit correct behaviour and an 
appropriate flight sequence is completed 
THEN run the motor program. 
P7 IF goal is to emit correct behaviour and there is 
no motor program, and urgency is high; or plan 
impossible 
THEN use primitive behaviour programs. 
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P8 IF goal is to emit correct behaviour and a 
behavioural program has been run 
THEN POP with complete 
P9 IF goal is to emit correct behaviour and a 
behavioural program has not completed 
THEN POP with incomplete. 
P10 IF goal is to provide an appropriate flight sequence, 
and there is no plan 
THEN set as a subgoal to design a plan. 
P11 IF goal is to provide an appropriate flight sequence 
and more is called for 
THEN return to plan. 
P12 IF goal is to provide an appropriate flight sequence 
and plan is formed 
THEN recode the plan into a motor program. 
P13 IF goal is to provide an appropirate flight sequence 
and a motor program has been encoded 
THEN POP the goal with loaded. 
P14 IF goal is to provide an appropriate flight sequence 
and there is no sequence available 
THEN POP the goal with empty/imcomplete. 
P15 IF goal is to provide a~ appropriate plan for flight 
(p \6) (p\o."-v. ..... ~reA.L\c~) 
sequencing and there is insufficient data 
THEN set as subgoal to encode situation. 
P17 IF goal is to provide an appropriate plan for flight 
sequencing and there is sufficient data 
THEN plan using problem solving schema. 
P17 1 IF goal is to provide an appropriate plan for flight 
sequencing; and a plan exists 
THEN place data in plan, and dissolve plan if they 
have a poor fit. 
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P18 IF goal is to provide an appropriate plan for flight 
sequencing and a plan has been obtained 
THEN POP goal with success. 
P19 IF goal is to provide an appropriate plan for flight 
P20 
P21 
and no plan has been obtained within the time 
dictated by urgency 
THEN POP goal with failure 
IF 
THEN 
IF 
goal is to provide data for plan 
allocate attention according to demands. 
goal is to provide data for plan and plan is 
partially performed 
THEN provide data so as to compare projection with 
actual. 
P22 IF goal is to provide data for plan and data is 
THEN 
P23=O IF 
obtained 
POP goal with obtained. 
goal is to provide data for plan and data is not 
obtained 
THEN POP goal with uncertain/unexpected and increase 
arousal. 
294 
underlie such an event. 
Initially, the unexpected event which is not predicted 
(or predictable) within the current situation schema, is 
classified as such and the level of endocrine arousal is 
boosted (P1). The operative goal becomes that of 'getting 
away' from the event (in this case the man with the gun). 
At this stage, it is assumed that there has not been a full 
processing of the situation, and what has essentially 
happened is the interruption of other ongoing programs by 
the registration of an unexpected event. 
Production P2 sets the subgoal of emitting some form 
of behaviour that might result in the realisation of the 
first goal. Production P7 provides a fixed behavioural 
pattern that might be used in the situation in cases of 
1 great urgency. In cases of lesser urgency, the fixed 
behaviour patterns are not released, and behaviours associated 
with plans that provide more certain escape are substituted 
in production p6. 
If urgency is at a sufficiently low level, production 
P4 passes control to a subgoal of providing an appropriate 
flight sequence. This flight sequence is provided when a 
1 It is envisaged that urgency is a function of the level 
of arousal. The level of arousal is set by the integration 
of the seperate arousal increments produced by partially 
processed semantic features that are unpredicted by current 
anticipatory schema and plans. The levels of arousal 
produced by unmatched features is a function of the 
previous emotional significance of these features, and 
their relation to the current interpretative frame. 
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feasible plan is recoded into a motor program by production 
P12. In the event that there is no plan, production P17 
creates the plan(with the local variable of the goal of 
avoiding the object of fear bound as the objective of the 
general problem solving production set. In order to plan, 
from time to time there will be enactments of various problem 
relevant encoding goals and these are set by production P15. 
For the example of the man with the gun, the problem solving 
will quite likely have a solution of 'bolt if he starts to 
point it', and the possible escape routes. There will be 
behavioural contingencies such as freezing and making no 
sudden movements while the man is not obviously threatening. 
This scenario demands the constant monitoring of the 
situation to check that the predictability of the situation 
is being maintained by present behaviour. It is important 
that if the situation changes to be unexpected given the 
present prediction, that there is rapid advancement to the 
next stage of the plan or a rapid replanning. Production 
P16 provides for intermittant matching between current plan 
and data. Between them, productions P15 and P16 are 
responsible for the allocation of attention in the current 
situation. For the man with the gun, a disproportionate 
amount of processing resource might be allocated to the hand 
with the gun since the plan is contingent on what happens 
to that hand. Productions P20 and P21 are the productions 
that carry out allocation policy. 
Several other points should be made about the model. 
Firstly, it is an interactive model with the flow of control 
passing from higher level goals down to lower level goals 
and then back to higher level goals as the coping behaviour 
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develops. In this way as it takes multiple passes at the 
situation it bears a superficial resemblance to the model 
of stimulus matching developed by Krueger (1978). Productions 
P5, P11, P16 are concerned with the later passes t~rough a 
situation. 
Secondly, each level of subgoal has productions that 
return to the level of subgoal immediately above, when the 
outcomes of the other productions of that goal level and 
below furnish the necessary conditions for popping that 
immediate goal with success or failure. Thirdly, the model 
is couched in very general terms with no specification of 
the particular problem solving mechanisms (e.g. imagery 
algorithms, verbal algorithms) that are used. Allowances 
for individual differences in subjects can be made in the 
model by postulating that subjects develop their own unique 
problem solving heuristics for each emotion. 
Fourthly, a non obvious aspect of this model is the 
way in which it incorporates the suggestion of Tomkins (1962, 
1980), that arousal serves as the activation of affect. 
Tomkins suggests that the density of neural firing, and its 
variation with time determines the emotional meaning that is 
given to an event. In the model of figure (6-2), production 
P23 returns the signalling of an encoding failure - either 
because the data predicted by the plan was absent, or because 
the data required for planning was not available. In either 
case, the mismatch produces an arousal increment which if of 
sufficient magnitude may signal the occurence of an unexpected 
event and produce a rapid resetting of the performance goal 
of the production set. The mechanism by which pattern 
mismatches can produce rapid resets of encoding fields has 
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been discussed exten v y ~y Grossberg (1980, 1982b). 
It can be seen in light of this discussion that the production 
P1 that produces arou when an unexpected event occurs, 
is incluted only for the purpose of making an explicit 
connection between an event and arousal, and in fact the 
'unexpectedness! code is the level and rate of change of 
arousal. Thus, production P1 can be removed from the model 
provided it is understood t~an an unexpected event is by 
definition an event associated with a change in the arousal 
gradi ent. 
fthly, an understanding of positive affect in terms 
of coping is implicit in this model of affect. As is pointed 
out by Lazarus, Kanner and Folkman (1980), approaches that 
view positively toned emotions sol y as end-states of 
successful adaptation are erroneous, in that po ti vely 
toned emotions can also sig~al the need for coping, and can 
so sustain coping activity. The present mod can account 
for the positive affect projuced by mastering activities 
such as learn g movement skills, by assuming that any 
performance goal can set up a subgoal structure analogous 
to figure (6-2) and thus determine behaviour. Positive affect 
ses when a behavioural plan ls seen to cope with environ-
-rrental contingen es. Tradi anal reinforcement theory 
predicts a preference for r ~forced behavour (cf Hilner, 
1979). TIms the development of successful mastery of a skill 
will be its f the reinforcer of sustained use of that skill. 
Lazarus details three basic physiolo cal functions of 
positive affect: as breathers, as sustainers. and as restorers. 
IL the present ACT model there is a correspondence between 
these three functions and di erent points of time in 
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processing of a performance req~irement. Breathers occur 
when well learnt and actionable plans are engaged in, 
sustainers occur when plan segments are completed resulting 
in positive affect, and restorers are a contrastive effect 
of substitution of small, realisable plan sections for a 
previously failed plan. The production system model presented 
here, highlights the possibility that there is considerable 
cognitive control of the physiological consequences of emotion. 
Differentiation of Emotional States 
An important requirement of any theory of emotion is 
that it be able to specify the ways in which the states 
associated with various affect labels differ from each other. 
For at least one theory (Schachter & Singer, 1962), the label 
is implicated as the differentiation of emotions. Here, 
especially for positive affects the ACT model might seem to 
lead to the same conclusions. For, in postulating that 
positive affect is associated with plan formation, implementa-
tion, and a resulting coping perception, it would seem that 
there is little to differentiate affects apart from the 
situations that they apply to. But here, anyone who has 
felt negative affect in a patriotic sports crowd knows that 
there are no unvarying situation-emotion assignment rules, 
and so the stimulus cannot be a sufficient attribute set to 
differentiate emotions. Rather than succumb to a position 
that emotional states are what you label them, instead, the 
planning aspect of the model put forward here allows an 
account of the ongoing processes that differentiate emotions. 
Of course, the gradients of arousal have already been 
discussed as being differentiators of emotion, but it is 
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obvious that the limited set of these will not be sufficient 
to differentiate the bulk of emotions; accordingly the 
discussion will now consider the way in which the plan can 
characterise emotions. 
The proposition put forward here, is that the affects 
can be differentiated by the plan solution constraints which 
are associated with the various emotions. It is proposed 
that humans have such a wide range of affects, because culture 
and socialisation produce solution constraints which mimic 
the solution constraints associated with the biologically 
fundamental emotions. For instance, pride and satisfaction 
are both possible outcomes of goal completion, but in terms 
of the plans that led to the goal completion, it is plausible 
that prideful outcomes are associated with competitive goals, 
whereas satisfaction derives from more behavioural goals. 
Thus, while the goals set might result in equivalent plans 
in the case of pride and satisfaction, these goals will mean 
that the solutions incorporated in the plan are derived in 
different ways. The perfection of a basketball move by a 
basketball player will result in pride where the move provides 
a solution constrained to be in accord with an increase in 
degree of publicly agreed on worthwhileness. On the other 
hand, the same move perfected as part of a solution to 
increasing winning probability, might not produce feelings 
of pride, but rather feelings of satisfaction. Whether or 
not pride or satisfaction will be felt after a particular 
behaviour on mastery of the problem (the move), will be 
dependent on the specific objectives brought to the problem 
because these objectives define the encoding that will be 
given to the completed problem. 
300 
Some Puzzles Answered by the Model 
The present model makes clear the reason for the 
apparent strength of emotion relevant encoding as evidenced 
by the work of Bower and his Colleagues (e.g. Bower, 1981; 
Bower, Gilligan & Monteiro, 1981; Bower & Cohen, 1982), and 
Teasedale and his colleagues (e.g. Teasdale & Taylor, 1981; 
Clark & Teasdale, 1982). Encoding will be deepest and 
information most processed, for those parts of the information 
field that are most relevant to the problem of current concern. 
This is because the planning stage of the model calls for 
this kind of information both initially in plan formation, 
and later in plan monitoring. Therefore, it is predicted 
that mood at encoding will affect the content of the material 
of an episode, but apart from providing an intermediate 
association, mood at retrieval will not affect the proportion 
of correctly recalled material. 
The prediction is borne out, in that it has been found 
that there is a major influence of mood at encoding on recall, 
but it is very difficult to demonstrate an influence of 
mood at recall on recall success (Bower et.al., 1981; Bower, 
Monteiro & Gilligan, 1978). Even where a successful effect 
of mood at recall has been demonstrated, the effects can be 
subsumed as response bias effects (Natale & Hantas, 1982). 
The response bias towards recall of emotion congruent material 
most probably accounts for the effects of studies requiring 
recall of past experiences (e.g. Teasdale & Taylor, 1981), 
and in any case such .results cannot be compared with those 
of Bower and his colleagues as they do not require exhaustive 
search of a specific episode. One other piece of research 
(Teasdale & Russell, 1983), has found evidence of a recall 
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advantage for the mood congruent words in a word list. 
However, the list was not composed of only neutral words 
that had their emotional significance prescribed in an 
earlier episode manipulated by the experimenter, but trait 
words that are very likely associates to mood states. Thus, 
it was a list of words with members that could be associated 
to the current mood, and not surprisingly the subjects took 
advantage of the retrieval aid. (It is likely that the 
salience of mood as a retrieval aid was very high in this 
experiment, since the purpose of the experiment was explained 
prior to list learning). 
The ACT model explains the pervasiveness of the three 
dimensions of the semantic differential in the following 
manner. After information reaches the peripheral receptors 
of an organism, its amount of processing will be determined 
by the extent that it is relevant to current and stored goals. 
Thus the planning and plan monitoring nature of cognition 
demands the differentiation of relevant and irrelevant 
information. There are certain basic processes that perform 
, ::t-t i:, -\-he~ proce-:.5es '-'-.)\-'ic..v-- ::>ive r'::.e \c 
this differentiation. A ~he dimensions of the semantic 
differential The dimensions of the semantic differential 
reflect the kind of information which is important to plan 
monitoring processes. 
Consider the three response dimensions of the semantic 
differential seperatelY. Evaluation (good vs bad) is 
obviously of importance in deciding which environmental 
elements will threaten, and which facilitate plan performance. 
Potency (strong vs weak) has to be established in order to 
be able to assemble plan elements which are capable of 
achieving goals. Activity (lively vs still) is the type of 
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information which is relevant to the development of an 
efficient plan monitoring process. There is no utility in 
monitoring parts of the plan environment which have fixed 
performances. 
Thus, the ACT model of emotion suggests that there are 
fundamental information processes through which incoming 
information can be roughly matched with current concerns. 
The ubiquity of the dimensions of the semantic differential 
reflects the fact that all information undergoes these 
processes. The ACT model does not suggest that the dimensions 
of ·the semantic differential are the best dimensions for 
describing affect. Instead, the model suggests that the 
dimensions of the semantic differential are the most useful 
dimensions for relating information to the plan heuristics 
of the various emotions. 
Another puzzle that the ACT model helps to clarify is 
the influence of feedforward of sensation information on the 
level of emotion felt by subjects. The classic emotion 
misattribution paradigm of this kind is exemplified by a 
study by Nisbett & Schachter (1966), where a subject is 
given a placebo pill and the shock produced arousal symptoms 
are attributed to the pill by the experimenter (in the case 
of the misattribution condition). Under such conditions, 
the subject tolerates more severe shocks, and they are 
reported as less painful than for control conditions with 
symptoms other than arousal symptoms attributed to the pill. 
Leventhal (1980, 1979), and Calvert-Boyanowski and Leventhal 
(1975) have questioned the misattributionist interpretation 
of these results, and Calvert-Boyanowski and Leventhal's 
research has shown that it is the drawing of attention to 
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arousal symptoms that contributes to this lessening of emotion, 
and that a neutral attribution is not required. Leventhal 
(1980, 1979) argues that the results in the classic 
misattributionist paradigms have a confounding symptom 
information factor that coincides with the misattribution 
factor. Leventhal argues that it is the symptom information 
that often gives rise to the results. The impressive data 
that Leventhal has collected on distress control (reviewed 
in Leventhal, 1980), support his interpretation of the 
misattribution paradigm, and suggest that giving accurate 
feedforward of sensations, and a benign interpretation of 
sensation can result in pajn reduction. 
The ACT model also predicts that negative affect will 
be reduced, to the extent that'a plan or schema has been 
formed, with a coping outcome, and capable of integrating 
the information to hand. The ACT model does predict that 
it could be important whether attribution of arousal is made 
to a benign, or a noxious stimulus, but only in that the 
respective attributions will affect plans and plan success 
criteria. In accord with this prediction, Reinhardt (1979) 
showed that distress reduction in sensation monitors only 
occurred for those subjects who expected pain sensations to 
lessen over time. As interpreted here, it is only in the 
group with expectations of a pain buildup and decline that 
the occurrence of the build-up of pain and other physical 
in 
sensations isAaccord with a plan schema that predicts a 
coping outcome. 
One other puzzle, that the ACT model is relevant to, 
is the problem of identifying the stimulus conditions that 
will lead to positive and negative affect. It is far from 
304 
obvious how a strong emotion will originate. The conditions, 
in as much as they can be specified for positive affect, 
have to be expressed as generalisations which are referenced 
to the individual. There seems little in common amongst the 
goals that when realised result in positive affect. Two 
extreme examples demonstrate this point; Lazarus, Kanner 
and Folkman (19BO), relate how to Poincar~ the mathematician, 
creative mathematical ideas were those ideas which he found 
most emotionally moving; secondly, Leventhal (1982) discusses 
the case of a terminally ill patient who experienced great 
joy from the accomplishment of simple tasks mundanely easy 
to most people. In both these cases, the accomplishments 
were solutions to uniquely individual goals and the affect 
experienced seems proportional to the importance of the goals. 
The ACT model predicts the individuality of emotional 
stimuli, as the occurrence of positive affect is associated 
with goal completion, and as indicated by Anderson, much of 
learning is associated with fulfilment of general problem 
solving goals, applied to individual problems. The ACT model 
postulates a set of innate performance goals that give rise 
to the fundamental emotions, but it links affect with attempt-
ing any performance goal, and thus provides for the 
individuality of emotions. By linking affect and learning 
explicitly in this way, it goes further than most existing 
emotion theories which are hard pressed to explain such 
phenomena as those discussed above, and the more exotic 
entries in the cognitive literature such as 'flashbulb 
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memories' (Brown & Kulik, 1977), and 'mental shock' caused 
amnesia (Loftus, 1982). (Flashbulb memories are accounted 
for by the reprocessing of elements in the current situation 
in order to ascertain that the current plan is still coping. 
Mental shock caused amnesia is a consequence of differential 
reprocessing of event-central elements that because it 
limits rehearsal of non-central information produces 
retrieval deficits.) 
Experiments Report~d Here in Light of the ACT Model 
Briefly, to summarise the results of the three 
experiments reported earlier. 
1) It was found that under conditions of high arousal 
the disruptive influence of subliminal emotionally 
disturbing words was eliminated. (Chapter 3) 
2) Some evidence was found that suggested there might 
be an association between well-being/positive affect 
and a decrease in information processing of threat 
associated stimuli. (Chapter 4) 
3) It was found that attention in the visual field is 
allocated first to that region of the visual field 
that is congruent with the momentary affect. 
(Chapter 5) 
Together, these experiments point towards changes in 
the availability of certain types of information as a 
consequence of affect. They are consistent with late 
selection theories of information processing which suggest 
information is first processed automatically, and later 
this information base is selected from and a limited amount 
of information is made available to conscious processing. 
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The most comprehensive account of this position is provided 
by Marcel (1983), who postulates that automatic processes 
give rise to a variety of perceptual records at various 
levels, and these records are searched for elements that 
match current perceptual hypotheses. This idea of a full 
automatic processing of all sensory data has been suggested 
also by Deutsch and Deutsch (1963), and Norman (1968). Glass, 
Holyoak and Santa (1979) develop the idea to suggest that 
this processed but unattended input is monitored by an 
attention controller that will divert conscious attention 
to it, should it represent a significant change in input. 
The ACT model developed in this chapter, suggests 
what is meant by a 'significant change in input'. It suggests 
that a significant change in input is related to the heirarchy 
of plan schema, and the absence of input-matching expectancies 
generated from such plan schema will cause a change in 
patterns of attention allocation. The results of the above 
experiments are in accord with a second principle of the 
model; that information must be relevant to the goals of 
the current emotional state to be~efit from the allocation 
of attentional resource. The ACT model then, goes further 
than the semantic network model of Bower (1981), in that it 
predicts that associated with the occurence of a particular 
affect, a monitoring program will be implemented. The data 
of the current series of experiments especially the attention 
experiments are congruent with such a monitoring program 
having been implemented. 
The semantic network explanation might also predict 
the results of the three experiments listed here. It could 
do so, if it were supposed that attention is a function of 
307 
pathway activation (Posner, 1978), and excitation of an 
emotional node increases activation of all pathways connected 
with the node. However, two major criticisms of such an 
account, one philosophical and the other empirical, lead 
to the conclusion that in terms of scientific virtuosity, 
the semantic network model does not account for the current 
experiments as well as the ACT model. 
a) Firstly, the semantic network account of attention 
allocation is to some extent circular. What counts as 
evidence of pathway activation is also what counts as 
evidence for an emotional node being connected. For instance, 
while the subjects ratings might indicate the level of 
activation of an emotional node, the semantic network account 
rests easily with any pattern of results that show consequent 
deficits and benefits. The explanation in all cases is in 
terms of the activation pattern within the semantic network. 
Thus, no pattern of results is unpredicted by the semantic 
network account and the theory as applied to emotion is 
essentially unfalsifiable. 
This serious criticism of the semantic network theory 
does not mean that the use of a network model as a conceptual 
framework should be abandoned. It merely highlights that 
the semantic network model is primarily a metatheory 
(Sternberg,1983), that furnishes a language with which to 
develop theory. What is a requirement within any meta-
theoretical framework is the development of specific theory. 
The ACT model developed here does that, as does the black-
board model of Bower and Cohen (1982). However, the 
blackboard model is more limited because at present it only 
accounts for emotional memory, and it does not make specific 
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predictions about attention allocation. 
b) Some of the data of the present series of experiments 
are not abviously accomodated within semantic network theory. 
For example, the first attention experiment found evidence 
that an affective state will bias attention allocation in 
the processing of a field of letter stimuli. Now, prior to 
the experiment the letters would have had affectively neutral 
associations, so that the sudden emergence of a letter-emotion 
node connection seems fortuitous, even surprising. The ACT 
model predicts the formation of specific situational 
monitoring assemblies, and can far more readily accommodate 
the findings. 
As well, the correlation between the reaction time 
increases to anger stimuli, and the level of joy experienced 
in the second experiment of chapter four, was negative, 
indicating the more joy, the less interference from threat 
related stimuli. This result is consistent with a spread of 
inhibitory activation about the network for ~nger related 
nodes. But it is assumed that while emotion nodes operate 
inhibitorily with respect to one another, that they operate 
in an excitatory manner with respect to the network (Bower, 
1981). M Thus, the result can be acco~odated by a semantic 
network account, but it requires the existence of two types 
of activation within the network. The ACT model also has 
some problems with this result, because it predicts that 
most emotion incongruent material will be rejected by the 
monitoring program, and it is hard pressed to explain why 
for happiness states this seems to happen most for threat 
related stimuli. It could be that only for these stimuli 
was the immediate significance of the stimuli sufficiently 
309 
strong for a link with the conceptual node to be made early. 
The results of Chapter four were the least conclusive of 
those reported, and so should, possibly be overlooked. 
An Analysis of Two Real Life Elicitors of Emotion 
To demonstrate further, the usefulness of the ACT model, 
we now consider the application of the model to sport and 
gambling. 
Sport and Emotion 
In sport, a unique environment is provided for participants 
and a set of behavioural goals is furnished. Competitive 
sport has the ultimate goal of winning, and frequently, the 
winning or losing of a game is a point at which strong affect 
is felt. A wide range of emotions may emerge in sporting 
competition, from a sense of anger at ones opponents to a 
deep sense of joy. A bad shot played while practising may 
elicit an entirely different momentary affect state than 
the same shot played in a game. In practise, the bad shot 
may elicit disappointment/distress, while in a game there 
may be intense anger. 
According to the ACT model, the kind and intensity of 
emotion will be determined by three factors; the goal set, 
the problem solving heuristics, and the monitoring criteria. 
We demonstrate the influence that each might have on the 
emotions experienced during a sporting encounter. 
I Sporting Goals 
The sports arena foisters situationally determined 
sporting goals on the individuals involved. Often the 
superordinate goal is that of defeating the opponent, and 
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the moment to moment goal structure is composed of secondary 
behavioural goals to that end. To the extent that the 
secondary behavioural goals prove inadequate for achieving 
the superordinate goal of winning, the player will be 
experiencing negative affect states. This proposition is 
qualified by the fact that the superordinate goal of winning 
may not be a realistic goal, and there may be a replacement 
of that goal with more realistic goals such as gaining 
sporting experience. Thus, a large loss may be commensurate 
with sporting goals, or incommensurate with sporting goals. 
It is the goals, not the fact of loss that is critical in the 
extent to which events are unexpected, and the extent and 
direction of affect felt. 
II The Problem Solving Heuristics 
Where a mismatch between events and goals occurs, there 
is implementation of problem solving heuristics. Critical 
for determining which problem solving heuristic is implemented, 
is the attributional structure that surrounds the unexpected 
event. Weiner (1982) has detailed an attributional framework 
that provides the 'causes' preceding each major emotion. 
It is suggested here that one reason there is a causal 
structure associated with the emotions, is that the emotions 
have characteristic problem solving heuristics associated 
with them, and it is the causal structure of the situation 
that determines which heuristic is called into play. A 
number of other factors will influence what heuristic is 
used including (1) Availability of heuristics; a currently 
, 
used heuristic is more likely to be applied to a situation 
than a new heuristic. (2) Experience of previous applications 
of the heuristic; a previously successful heuristic is most 
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likely. (3) Compatibility of the heuristic with other 
aspects of the situation; heuristics associated with anger, 
are far less likely to be used when an encounter is with 
someone emitting signs of friendliness, than with someone 
nondescript or unfriendly. 
To make the considerations mentioned above more concrete; 
they are reflected in real life by the anger induced in 
intense sporting competition. It is predicted that early 
anger makes it much more likely that a fresh opponent will 
also be subject to anger. Secondly, where (say in a rugby 
match), anger has resulted in a more vigorous approach to 
play and consequent success, it becomes likely that entire 
matches corne to be played with its heuristics operational. 
Lastly, there is considerable emphasis placed on sportsmanship 
in most garnes, and a gracious opponent is far less likely 
to provoke intense ire, when he/she wins. 
III Monitoring Criteria 
Lastl~, the ease with which an intense affective state 
may be overcome will be a function of the monitoring criteria 
used to evaluate progress towards goals. These monitoring 
criteria vary depending on the extent to which plans can 
be composed that involve considerable sequences of actions 
and may be long-term in completion. Critically, what might 
be deemed as unsuccessful short-term behaviour can be taken 
as coping sufficiently towards long term goals. Accordingly 
if it is chosen to monitor short-term coping indicators, 
negative affect might be felt. Whereas, the same person, 
with the same information available might feel positive 
affect if they are monitoring long-term coping indicators. 
As a concrete example, consider the athlete running a 
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race in which he/she is not placed. There may be 
disappointment if the athlete uses placing as the critical 
variable for monitoring performance. But, if the athlete's 
goal is to win some later race, and the time taken is in 
line with that goal (given the training schedule), then the 
performance might be the source of considerable satisfaction. 
Thus, individual differences in choice of critical monitoring 
variables can produce considerable differences in the 
emotional state evoked by a situation. 
It should be made clear that when the last paragraph 
refers to 'choice' of monitoring variable, this is not to 
infer that there is a conscious decision on that matter 
made by the person. Rather, the choice of monitoring 
variable will be a consequence of the structure of the plan 
devised by the called problem solving heuristic and the set 
of monitoring skills which can be envoked~ That is to say, 
monitoring is envisaged as a natural part of plan implementa-
tion, and it proceeds automatically once a plan is implemented. 
This aspect connecting plan and plan monitoring means that 
the present model is congruent with the observation of 
Averill (1980) that emotions seem more reflexive and passive 
than does normal rational thought. In normal rational 
thought, an implemented plan will be monitored when the 
planner decides; under emotion, plan monitoring is compulsive 
in accord with the priority of the goal, and the need for 
rapid learning. (Simon (1967), notes the characteristics 
of emotion of goal priority, and rapid goal directed 
learning.) 
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Gambling and Emotion 
The analysis of gambling as an elicitor of emotion 
follows very much the same lines as that for sport. The 
gambling situation is characterised by the frequency with 
which goals are set, uncertainty induced planning to meet 
goals occurs, and plan fulfillment/failure is signalled. 
One aspect of the heuristics used to devise plans is 
demonstrated in gambling behaviour; typically intense 
considerations take place, not merited by the possibility 
of solutions that have any influence on positive outcomes. 
This compulsive planning indicates that the operating 
heuristics are set to work on ill defined problems and as 
suggested by Simon (1982), they employ weak methods to 
arrive at solutions which as a consequence may be inefficient. 
It would seem that anything less than a model of emotion 
that accords critical place to goal matching, will be 
hard-pressed to explain the range of emotions possible to 
interactions with things as impersonal as 'one armed bandits'. 
Certainly, analysis of gambling in terms of schedules of 
reinforcement, and the distinction between positive and 
negative reinforcers is not adequate to encompass the range 
of emotions that gambling situations evoke. At best, a 
behavioural analysis promises to explain the gamblers 
perserverance at gambling, but such an analysis of gambling 
falls short of being able to account for the patterns of 
thinking and attention allocation associated with the 
situation. The ACT model of emotion presented here promises 
to be capable of making predictions about these aspects of 
the gambling experience. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to expand a 
framework that links affect and cognition. The ACT model 
of emotion put forward, emphaSises emotion as having the 
function of facilitating the organisms pursuit of essential 
goals. It has much in common with the theory of emotion 
put forward by Simon (1967) in that it emphasises affect as 
intimately linked with the extent that important goals are 
matched. It is distinguishable from Simo~s model, by the 
emphasis on emotions as characterised by their plan heuristics 
rather than their goal resetting character. Indeed, the 
present model does not require that there be a resetting of 
higher level goals in order for affect intensity to be higher. 
The highest levels of negative affect will occur when the 
affect congruent goals are in place, and there is no evidence 
for coping by means of the current behavioural program. 
Thus, as with Scheier and Carver (1982), the present model 
places emphasis on 'expectancy assessment' rather than 
'goal-value'. It is the expectancy assessment (or in the 
terms of this model the plan monitoring), that is critical 
to the level of felt affect. 
The major consequences of a goal hierarchy of the kind 
proposed here, and the ongoing plan monitoring incorporated 
are -
a) The organism is equipped to react to urgent situations 
with plans/plan heuristics that have the most probable 
chance of extending organism survival. 
b) Attention is allocated in the perceptual and informational 
fields in such a way that the contingencies in the environment 
are referenced to certain key outcome parameters. In this 
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way, the learning of the environmental relationships of 
importance for essential survival functions is facilitated. 
It can be seen that in the two emotion mechanisms 
above, there is the integration of genetically encoded 
sources of information with information that accrues from 
behavioural and cognitive operations on the environment. 
This accords with the emphasis of the current chapter - that 
emotion facilitates adaptive learning, or perhaps reflects 
the organisation of the processes involved in learning in 
such a way as to ensure adaptive learning. 
The accounts of the earlier experiments were reviewed, 
and it was seen that these results are congruent with the 
ACT model, and an adaptive learning account of emotion. It 
was also demonstrated that the ACT model can be applied to 
sport and gambling to account for the intensity of emotion 
experienced by participants. 
I Implications of the Model for Emotion Theory and 
Personality Theory 
The ACT model' of this chapter bears resemblance in some 
ways to models put forward by Simon (1967), Klinger (1982), 
e 
Schier and Carver (1982), and Bower (1981). While it has A 
some elements in common with other models, there are 
implications of this model which are not easily derived 
from the others. Firstly, the present model avoids the 
separation of an emotion system from other cognitive and 
physiological systems. Thus unlike other approaches with 
a system philosophy such as that of Royce and Diamond (1980), 
the effects of emotion are not conceptualised as the 
operation of one system upon another, but are regarded as 
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essential attributes of a multifacited state of preparedness. 
This way of looking at emotion discourages pseudo explanations 
that are akin to word magic (cf Berkowitz, 1975, p.57), and 
encourages the analysis of the coordination of information 
processing and behavioural functions that is evident in the 
states which we label emotions. 
Secondly, in associating emotions with different 
prototypical plan heuristics, the ACT model of this chapter 
recommends the analysis of emotions in terms of specific 
problem solving sets. Apart from the work of Isen et.al. 
(1982, 1983) and work by Johnson & Tversky (1983), little 
research has been done into the way that emotional states 
influence decision making. The present model points towards 
a field for investigation that has not been indicated by 
the other models. A full program of research should be 
conducted into the variation in means-ends analyses that 
occur in attempts to solve various ill-defined real life 
problems. rifferent emotions will be associated with 
different means-ends analyses (Simon 1979) and different 
goal structures if the present model is correct. (One very 
good example of the way in which means-ends alter with 
emotional state, is seen in the behaviour of novice computer 
programmers. Persistent programming difficulties tend to 
lead to a personification of the computer, and a greater 
tendency to attribute the program failure to computer error. 
The coincidental emotion in this example is anger.) 
Thirdly, the present model suggests the basic framework 
of an integration of personality theory, ~emotion theory 
and learning theory. Chapter two, discussed personality. 
and suggested that there were sound reasons (to do with 
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system modelling), that a conceptualisation of personality 
in terms of the microprocesses underlying emotion should 
be attempted. In chapter two, it was considerations of the 
modelling of concrete systems that led to these conclusions, 
and differences in temperament seemed to correspond to a 
concrete system domain which could be perhaps modelled by 
a set of fundamental microprocesses. The second chapter 
noted that while the microprocess assembly model was pitched 
at the temperament end of personality theory, it could 
have implications for acquired personality characteristics 
as well. The ACT model of emotion makes it clear that 
acquired personality characteristics will arise as a 
consequence of the learning processes that are associated 
with the heuristics of goal attainment/attainment failure. 
For example, a trait of punctuality may arise because 
it is a part of a plan that overcomes rejection fear. 
Initially such a trait, and its monitoring pattern will be 
specific to situations which require time monitoring in 
order to minimize the danger of not meeting conventional 
situational requirements, and the trait will not always 
hold when fear relevant plans occur. But, if rejection 
fear is pervasive enough, then ACT's knowledge compilation 
characteristic will build time monitoring into the heuristic 
associated with rejection control. Such a modification of 
a coping heuristic will bring about shifts in the higher 
level behavioural goals over time, and eventually a 
pervasive influence of punctuality on behaviour. 
One final point should be made. A complex interactive 
model such as that put forward here is not easily established 
as preferable to simpler models. Without research into 
318 
whether solution heuristics can be discerned that 
correspond to the fundamental emotions, the only factors 
that really recommend the ACT model, are that it seems to 
account readily for the experiments into emotion reported 
here and e~sewhere, and it seems to describe the goal 
relatedness of much emotional experience and more readily 
than most other models. Certainly, much of the history of 
psychological theory is examples of the early putting 
forward of models that do not seem to have obvious advantages 
over others. The present model is put forward with that 
acknowledgement, but with the belief that future advances 
in cognitive learning theory and sociobiology will be more 
compatible with the ACT model of emotion than with most others. 
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Conclusion: Old questions, old answers, new methods. 
The Enquiry 
This thesis has enquired into two fundamental questions. 
It has asked what is an adequate theory of emotion? Secondly, 
it has asked how we should set about constructing a well 
founded theory of personality? Of course, since these 
questions are so fundamental, the enquiry and research 
presented in this thesis is just one of numerous attempts 
to analyse those questions. The present thesis has only 
scratched the surface of some of the issues involved in 
accounting for emotion and personality, but it has scratched 
it in a way that is perhaps a little different from most 
other approaches. There are three main ways in which this 
thesis can be considered to differ from other studies: 
1) It has attempted to utilise the foundational principles 
of sociobiology and behavioural genetics in theory 
construction. 
2) It has provided experimental evidence of the function-
ality of emotion as it relates to attentional/perceptual 
processes. 
3) It has used a convergent experiment to check the 
validity of semantic network theories of emotion. 
In terms of the extent to which the unique approaches 
outlined above have been fruitful in extending and clarifying 
knowledge, each approach has borne different fruits. The 
check on the semantic network theory produced results that 
were less than clear cut, and it is plain that further 
research into that theory is necessary. It is essential 
that semantic network accounts of the influence of mood on 
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memory be confirmed through data obtained by employing 
direct methods of showing network activity such as the 
Warren task ( Chapte~ four ) , or the lexical decision task 
Meyer & Schvandavelt, 1971). 
The experiments that demonstrated attention reallocation 
in the visual field as a consequence of emotion were more 
successful. Although considerable demands on experimenter 
ingenuity are required to research the attention allocation-
emotion relationship, the area looks particularly fruitful. 
In particular it is possible that the phenomenology of 
emotion can be accounted for in part by the evidence for a 
change in priority of inputs in the perceptual field. 
The first of the points of uniqueness listed above, is 
the most surprising one in many ways. It was surprising to 
find in looking through the range of approaches to human 
emotion .and personality that there was no major theory that 
took its account from a consideration of the evolution of 
emotional and cognitive behaviour. Many theorists (e.g. 
Izard 1977, Plutchik 1980, Lazarus 1980), incorporate 
considerations of the functionality of emotional behaviour, 
and emotion related cognitive states, but none have put 
forward specific proposals about the evolutionary history 
of the emotions. 
The demonstration of the functionality of a particular 
characteristic or trait is merely a demonstration of the 
usefulness of a structure, and cannot guarantee an insight 
into its essential nature. This point is made by Krebs 
and Davies (1981), when they refer to an illustrative 
example of G.C. Williams of a Fox making its way to a henhouse 
in heavy snow. The fox's feet will make a pathway in the 
snow which it will no doubt use again in later raids. 
However, it is wrong to conclude that because the feet 
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have acted as pathmakers, that foxes legs have been selected 
for that adaptive function. It most probably will prove 
impossible to show that the foxes legs have been adapted for 
that purpose, and so explanation of the structure of the 
fox along these lines amount to story telling and not science. 
In order to move from story telling to scientific explanation, 
it is necessary to consider the total set of functions and 
also to be able to trace the advantage enjoyed at anyone 
period of time to a particular structure. 
Theorists such as Plutchik have put forward feasible 
accounts of some of the ways that emotions can function, 
but unless there is a more rigorous evolutionary account 
then this is a social explanation of the emotions, and not 
a biological account. The account put forward in chapter 
six, built upon an account by Klinger (1982) and went on to 
consider the development of emotion as a signalling system, 
and the reduction of its stimulus specificity in favour 
of its application to internal goal structures. Obviously 
this evolutionary sequence, derived from consideration of 
the advantages bestowed by specific changes in behaviour and 
information processing at various places in the evolution 
of a species is highly speculative. However, attaching a 
statement of an evolutionary sequence to propositions about 
emotional functionality is justifiable on several counts -
a) It represents a legitimate use of evolutionary theory 
to derive ideas about how human beings could function 
(Patry, 1983). 
b) Since it is more specific in why and how functions 
emerged, it is more testable than a bald statement of 
functionality. 
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c) It derives more than accounts of functionality: it 
also suggests the structure of the mechanisms whereby 
functions are achieved. Thus, in the case of the theory 
presented in Chapter six, the nature of the interactions 
between the cognitive system and the emotional system are 
suggested. 
d) It is an attempt at a level of biological explanation 
that must ultimately be attempted. Tinbergen (1963) in 
noting that there are several different ways of answering 
'why' in biology suggests that an account in terms of 
evolutionary history is one kind of answer. For a complete 
explanation of any behaviour/information processing tendency, 
all levels of explanation should be attempted. 
Directions for Personality Research 
The attempt to look for evolutionary functions of emotion 
led to conclusions that are of relevance to a concrete 
system approach to personality. Chapter 2 argued that one 
of the vices of extant personality theory is the tendency of 
theories to be formulated in terms of abstract systems which 
while they may explain subsets of behaviour, cannot be linked 
to a general theory of living systems. The solution for 
personality theory suggested in Chapter 2, was to employ 
the constructs that derive from the operation of concrete 
systems (biological systems) in order to account for 
behaviour. A method towards this end was suggested; define 
the set of fundamental constructs of personality in terms of 
microprocesses that can be shown to have a demonstra 
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inherited component. Differences in personality might be 
accounted for in the characteristic ways such microprocesses 
are assembled for coping with the environment. Thus, 
Chapter 2 opted for analysing processes at the temperament 
end of personality theory. Chapter 6, with its theory of 
emotion has suggested just what kind of assemblage might 
underlie personality differences, and how the assemblages 
can influence the cognitive structures that represent the 
world and control action. 
Chapter six's ACT model of emotion suggests that there 
is a particular problem solving set associated with each 
emotion. In terms of the various manifestations of personality 
then, provision of a particular set of goals, and the means 
of affecting those goals by the emotional system is what 
underlies personality types. Personality types can result 
from temperament characteristic ways of employing heuristics 
when interacting with the world, or because of environmentally 
induced assemblies that act as solution heuristics. In both 
cases, the ACT model in incorporating the suggestion that 
emotions are more goal related than stimulus related, will 
suggest that associated with personality differences are 
patterns of environment-affect correspondences that are 
personality defining. 
The research that must be done to establish the 
usefulness of these ideas about personality and emotion 
linkages are -
1) Investigation of whether there is a correspondence 
between characteristic affect and behavioural tendencies 
within situations. (At a broad and general level such 
research has already been conducted by Mehrabian and Russell 
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(1974), who show that approach and avoidance tendencies are 
predicted by the affect producing characteristics of 
situations, and their interaction with personality variables 
such as neuroticism and extroversion.) The ACT model though, 
hypothesises that there are specific problem solving 
heuristics attendant upon affect, and that these heuristics 
are the determinants of action sequences. A more detailed 
afialys~s of why the affect-behaviour'linkage occurs _for a 
situation is required. Specifically, an examination of the 
problem solving nature of situational cognitions by some 
form of protocol analysis (cf. Simon,1979, needs to be done. 
2) The extent to which there is a major problem solving 
heuristic that can characterise an individual in their 
interactions with a wide range of situations. (See Newell 
(1980) for the suggestion that problem solving is 
characteristic of most information processing). 
3) Investigation of the influence of problem solving 
heuristics on the accessibility of the various kinds of 
stored information which is utilised in other similar 
situations. That is, does the emotion system produce an 
organisation of knowledge that will determine the pattern 
of encounters with new situations? The mood and memory 
research suggests that it might. 
Cognitive Learning, Genetic Learning and Personality 
The impetus towards genetically encoded traits and for 
the concrete system approach advocated here does not 
originate from a perspective that would minimise the 
importance of cultural and social learning influences on 
personality. The guiding principle of researchers of 
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behaviour who operate along the genetic - environmental 
causal continuum should be one of where the environment 
determines behaviour, not whether it determines behaviour. 
It is important that personality research acknowledge both 
proximal and distal explanations of behaviour in the same 
way that Vine (1983) has recommended for social psychology. 
The area of personality is where distal explanations are 
most sought, because traditionally it attempts to characterise 
the organismic properties rather than environment induced 
behaviour rules. (Though much of personality research 
since Mischels (1968) paper can be seen as less organism 
centred). Behaviour prediction is not the final goal of 
personality research (although it may be the final goal of 
an approach that integrates personality and learning theory). 
The final goal of personality research is to understand the 
functioning of the person, (cf. Royce & Diamond (1980) and 
here undoubtedly distal accounts are important. The caution 
of Petrinovich (1973) that the control of 'extraneous factors' 
pursued in systematic design should not blind researchers 
to the fact that such designs represent the demonstration 
of possibilities, rather than the probabilities of 
representative design, should be remembered. It has been 
advocated that evolutionary principles and sociobiology can 
furnish the framework to distinguish in the possibilities 
of other kinds of experimentation/research, the probabilities 
relating to functional organisation. 
Systems Theory Insights into Theory Construction 
The adoption of temperament properties as personality 
characterisers, and the emphasis un genetically encoded 
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Btructures and processes advocated in Chapter two receives 
support in recent analyses of science from within the 
systems theory literature. These analyses highlight the 
importance of establishing a framework that provides a 
universal insight into the behaviour of the object of 
consideration. Bordley (1983), suggests that science operates 
within implicit consistency premises, and scientific laws 
are those laws which provide the specifications for the 
maximisation of the utility of behaviour. For Bordley, an 
entity described by scientific theory maximises a utility 
function by following the set of laws congruent with such 
maximisation. Scientific theory can be viewed as specifying 
the utility of various acts for the entity, the range of 
possible acts, the set of states and their probability and 
influence on acts. The problem that this account presents 
is that the function specifying the utility of acts is almost 
certainly culture specific at the micro level of behaviour. 
Thus, there can be little hope of a theory of personality 
that can account for proximal and distal causes of behaviour 
across cultures. (The possibility of a proximal and distal 
account within a culture is not ruled out, but the mapping 
from culture to individual psychology is not understood or 
pursued at present by psychologists). The universal 
framework that might be pursued is one of concentrating on 
the distal functionalist organisation of the person through 
the use of an evolutionary approach. 
This conclusion is congruent with the work of another 
system theorist (Glanville, 1982) and his analysis of the 
explanation and whitening of behaving objects. More so than 
most other examples, the personality theorist trying to 
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understand behaviour across cultures is confronted with the 
problem that his/her means of analysis creates a Iwhiteningl 
of a black box (the subject) only by introduction of himself 
as an interacting black box. Thus, Glanville argues that 
any whitening creates a new dyadic black box opaque to a new 
observer. Only by the introduction of the transcendental 
observer who has simultaneous access to two levels of a black 
box can the series of boxes and observers be demonstrata~\~ 
recursive and know o.'o\e... The analysi sof personality in 
biological functionality terms, would seem to permit 
scientific consensus at least at the distal level of 
personality (and emotion). 
Forerunners of the ACT Model of Emotion 
The aside into the justification of the evolutionary 
analysis of personality and emotion, does not mean that the 
model of emotion presented in chapter six is so new that it 
needs justification in terms of epistemological considerations. 
One of the striking things about the ACT model of chapter 
six, is the resemblance that it bears to Spinoza1s account 
of affect. Neu (1977) provides a fascinating analysis of 
the theories of emotion of Spinoza and Burne, and the 
therapeutic implications of these and other theories. 
Neu points out that Spinoza1s theory of emotion and the 
primary emotions that it postulates, must be understood in 
relation to the Spinozist concept of conatus which can be 
interpreted as an effort at self maintenence or in cybernetic 
terms as the mechanism of homeostasis. Thoughts are 
essential attributes of emotion, which include thoughts 
relating to the cause of emotion. Spinoza differentiates 
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between active and passive emotions which are distinguishab\e 
by the adequac~_ and inadequac~: (respectively) of the 
thoughts associated with each. The distinction between 
adequate thought where the mind acts, and inadequate thought 
where it reacts or suffers, is difficult to provide a 
definition for. An illustration of inadequate thought 
leading to fear is 'an inconstant pain rising from the idea 
of something past or future, where of we to a certain extent 
doubt the issue' (Spinoza taken from Neu p.84). This can 
be contrasted with the manner of adequate thought that 
overcomes fear; by the way in which we "often enumerate and 
imagine the common dangers of life, and think upon the manner 
in which they can best be avoided and overcome by presence 
of mind and courage' (p.84). Neu goes on further to suggest 
that 'adequate ideas and their various associated emotions 
all lead to pleasure in the contemplation of adequate ideas 
and our power; and this pleasure is part of what makes the 
associated emotion active.' (p.98). 
The parallels between Spinoza's theory of emotion, and 
the mechanisms of the ACT model of chapter six are remarkable. 
In both cases, emotions are part of the self regulating 
nature of the individual. In both cases, it is obtaining 
of an adequate predictive schema that quiets the negative 
affect, and characterises positive affect. Furthermore, the 
other aspects of Spinoza's philosophy of mind, makes it 
certain that accompanying a change in emotion will be a 
change in action tendencies, and the monitoring of the 
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environment. (This last point is not straight forward, 
but derives from the fact that causal beliefs are contained 
within an emotion and will give rise to the illusion of 
willed action. The causes contained within the emotion 
thus will determine the way in which the person monitors 
the environment). 
The modern day legacy of the Spinozist theory of emotion 
is to be found in Action Theory accounts of emotion. Boesch 
(1984) provides an account of the develop~ent of affective 
schemata in action theory terms. Beosch defines feelings 
and emotions as 'secondary actions' and states that these 
function to regulate the primary or goal-directed actions. 
The Action Theory account of emotion differs somewhat from 
the ACT model but it does have an important parallel. The 
emotional schemata that action theory postulates gives rise 
to general goal concepts (associated with object valences) 
termed fantasms, and the individual tries to transform these 
into concrete goal-specific fantasies. Thus, in parallel 
with the ACT model, emotion and planning are linked, with 
the power of goal completion as a source of positive affect. 
The Value of the ACT Model 
The ACT model of chapter six was developed without 
knowledge of Spinoza's theory of emotion, or of the Action 
Theory account of emotion. It is gratifying that the degree 
of parallelism between it and these other models is high. 
At the very least it means that it is congruent with the 
observational sets which gave rise to the earlier models. 
But, in order to be of much value, a model should not only 
be able to account for the subsets of data that it was 
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designed for, it should be intelligable to people wanting 
to extend and use the model. This is especially important 
one would argue in the case of emotion theory. For instance, 
even if the Schachter account of emotion was true, it is 
likely that a therapist would have to provide a client a 
different account of change in emotional states than a 
relabelling. To be therapeutically most useful, a model 
must explain the phenomenology of affect convincingly to 
the extent that a client is willing to adopt the strategies 
suggested by the model. The extent to which one model will 
be preferred over another model will thus be determined 
partially by the social applicability of the alternative 
models. 
The present model preserves a number of insights into 
emotion that philosophers and phenomenologists have made. 
Strongman (1978) reviews a number of theories of emotion from 
philosophers and phenomenologists, and we find that the 
ACT model of chapter six is compatible and explanative of a 
number of the essential characteristics of emotion noted 
by these theorists. Peters (1970) view that negative emotions 
in particular are passive, corresponds to the fact that when 
a viable coping plan is obtained in the ACT model, negative 
affect is allayed. On the other hand, the coincidence of 
emotion and plan formation corresponds to the firm linkeage 
between emotion and action put forward by Louch (1966), 
Finally, the present model predicts that with emotion, 
there is a transformation of the world as suggested bySartre, 
(1971); the ACT model explicitly suggests that the solutions 
for coping with emotion provoking situations have monitoring 
results that will affect the way in which the environment 
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is processed and hence consciousness. The ACT model thus 
provides some mechanisms that explain the nature of phenomenal 
experience under emotion. This must be regarded as a 
strength of the model. 
A Reservation q bou t .. the ACT mQdel 
There is a reservation that must be made about the ACT 
model, and that is that it does little to explain the way 
that the self schema is involved in emotion and personality. 
In chapter one, it was concluded that any complete theory 
of emotion would have to explain how affect was related to 
the operation of the self-schema. The ACT model of chapter 
six does not develop an account of the way in which the 
self-schema is involved in the setting of goals, and the 
choice of the means of solving and monitoring the plans to 
achieve these goals. The relationship between the ACT model 
and personality through the assembly of problem solving 
heuristics lacks the connection of a statement of how agency 
and self is involved in these processes. No expansion of 
the ACT model to solve that problem is proposed here, but it 
is noted that there is a need for such an expansion. 
Concluding Comments: Directions for Cognitive Psychology 
In conclusion, this thesis by following a cognitive 
approach as it aired the issues of emotion and personality 
theory, has highlighted that affect is a much neglected area 
of study by mainstream cognitive psychologists. It is hoped 
that in the future more cognitive psychologists will use 
their research methods and theories to explore the puzzle 
of the relationship between emotion and cognition, discussed 
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in this thesis. It is an emotional world, and if we hope 
to understand people's relationship to their world, we must 
recognise that it becomes an emotional world through the 
way that people process the world. There is no deviation 
of course involved in this recognition for cognitive 
psychologists; the fundamental categories of cognition are 
emotional. It is time for cognitive science to study its 
fundamental categories. In doing so, it might be laying 
the essential foundations of a 'concrete' theory of personality. 
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NOTES 
Note 1 : STRONGMAN, K.T., & RUSSELL, P.N. Saliance 
of emotion in recall. Unpublished manuscript: Depart-
-ment of Psychology, University of Canterbury,1983. 
Note 2 Versa Computing Inc, Newbury Park,California 
91320. (887 Conestoga Circle, California.) Versa 
Writer Manual. 
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Example stimulus blocks and the words used in the Warren 
task experiments (Chapter four). 
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SUN t'1EAN C' '";, E -..! .... 
LETTEF.: FEAR E: E 
HAPP ..... ' LEMON .~ ,-' 6 N 
PAIN r-1It...JUTE 4 .., E i 
MIST MAD 5 '-, .:. E 
TERROF: SECOI'~D 1 7 I"~ 
DAY' DREAD 7 1 N 
JOY NOTE 3 8 E 
STORt··1 SCF:EAtvl C' 1 t·..J ~I 
WIN WH..JD '-, .,:. 5 E 
DESPAIR PLAY 4 c' '-' N 
HOUR FUN 7 3 E 
SCARED APPLE 1 6 E 
r:--
-.0 
C"'"\ 
Stimulus words used in the Warren task experiments of Chapter four. (Numbers refer to 
frequency count) 
A. List 1 words 
CATEGORY = FEAR ANGER JOY DISTRESS 
Scared 37 Rage 49 Delight A Despair 38 
Dread 45 Anger A Happy AA Worry A 
Dark AA Mean AA Smile AA Loss AA 
Fail AA Enemy AA Win AA Pain AA 
CATEGORY = WEATHER FRUIT TIME LITERATURE 
Snow AA Apple A Minute AA Play AA 
Wine AA Lemon 27 Month AA Article AA 
Sun AA Grape 34 Year AA Book AA 
Hot AA Plum 23 Day AA Story AA 
00 
--0 
c<"\ 
B. List 2 words 
CATEGORY = FEAR ANGER JOY DISTRESS 
Fear AA Temper 39 Joy AA Distress 38 
Terror 48 Mad A Glad AA Sad A 
Scream 47 Hurt AA Friend AA Hunger 37 
Noise A Fight AA Fun A Accident A 
CATEGORY = WEATHER FRUIT TIME LITERATURE 
Rain AA Pear 21 Hour AA Poem A 
Clouds AA Berry 29 Century AA Note AA 
Mist 29 Banana 13 Second AA Letter AA 
Storm AA Peach 29 Week AA Novel 39 
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APPENDIX 2 
This page: Emotion scales administered after the 
Warre~ task Experiments I & II. 
Next page: Emotion scales administered after Warren 
task Experiment III. 
Emotion state scales 
DIRECTIONS: A number of emotion words that people have 
used to describe themselves are given below. Read each 
statement and then circle the appropriate number to the 
right of the emotion word to indicate how you feel right 
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend 
too much time on anyone emotion word but give the 
.:o.n S.I,' . .!e r' t h .:<. t '::e em':· be .:. t t c' de s·c r' i be ;,'ou r' fee 1 i n'~ sa':· ;>·'C,U 
r·e':.:'.l1 them. 
1 . repen t ·:o.n t 
2. de 1 i gh ted 
.-, 
.~ .. dC'\A.ln hear' t e ,j 
4. ·:·U r' p r' i ·:.ed 
0= 
,_I. shEtep i ·:.h 
L CI. t ten t i !.)€, '_I • 
-::' s·c ·:'.r·ed i . 
.=. 
...... enr·CI.ged 
I;:' h.:..pp:: ... 
Hi 
· 
cc,ncen tr·.:<' t i 
1 1 ·:o.ma.:z e oj 
1 2 fe.:;'.r·fu 1 
1 '-' a.ngr· y .... ' 
· 1 4 
· 
-:.-:<.d 
1 c:; gu i 1 t ; ... 
.... ' 
1 IS 
· 
b·:<.·:·h fu I 
1 7 
· 
.j o:~"fIJ 1 
1 c' 
'-' 
· 
b1 ·:'.m e V,I c' r' t h::.' 
1 .;:-
· 
a.s.ton i '::h e oj 
20 
· 
.:..1 er' t 
21 
· 
mad 
2:2 
· 
d i s·c ou r' a.ge d 
2:3. ·:.h >., 
24 .:'.tr·.:.. i d 
n,~ 
t'·jot at 
all 
(1 
(1 
(1 
~3 
(1 
(1 
(1 
(1 
(1 
(1 
(1 
(1 
(1 
(1 
~:::1 
(t 
(1 
(1 
(1 
(1 
(1 
(1 
(1 
(1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
~'loder.:'.tel >' 
2 .,,:. 4 ~, 
2 3 4 
~, 
.:.. 3 4 
.j 
.... 
'j 
'-' 4 
'j 
.... :3 4 
.-. 
.:.. :3 4 
2 .::. 4 ..... 
2 'j 4 
'-' 
~. .:. 4 .:.. ...... 
'j 
.... 
. j 
.... ' 4 
'j .:. 4 .... '-' 
--:. -:, 4 .... ';-' 
2 .-. 4 -=, 
. -. .-. 4 .:.. 
-= . 
"") ~: 4 "-
2 :=: 4 
'j 
.... 
-:. 
..... 4 
'j 
L. 
.-, 
-=. 4 
2 .-. .,:. 4 
2 .-. 4 
-=. 
--:. .j 4 L. .... 
'j .:' 4 .... ..... 
'j 'j 4 .... ~. 
--:. .,:, 4 .... 
'-' 
Ex tr'eme 1 :: .. , 
0= 6 
... ' 
0= L 
...' '-' 
5 .: . 
5 6 
5 ~I 
5 I~' 
5 I~I 
5 I~' 
5 I!I 
5 6.. 
5 6.. 
5 L 
'-' 
5 i!1 
0:::: I~' ... ' 
0= I~' 
'-' 
c t. 
'-' 
0= 
~, ..:; 
'-
c L 
....' '-' 
c 
.... ' 
.::.. 
0= ,~, 
'-' 
C 
.!I 
.... ' 
0= L ~, 
'-' 
C ~I I~' 
c 
,-' I:::' 
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Emotion trait scales 
DIRECTIONS: A number of emotion words t~at people have 
used to describe themselves are given below. Read each 
statement and then circle the appropriate number to the 
right of the emotion word to indicate how you feel on 
average during a typical moment in a typical day. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too 
much time on anyone emotion word but give the answer that 
·:·eem·:· be·:.t tc:r cha.r·acter· i se YCIIJr' typ i cal feel j ng':' a':· >"CIiJ 
r' e C a.l 1 them. 
I'·Jot at 
a. I I 
1'"10 de r' a. te 1 Y Ex tr'eme 1 y 
--------------------------------------------------------
1 repen tan t 13 1 'J '-:' 4 C" 6 
· 
~ ~. ~I 
2 
· 
de I i gh ted 0 1 2 ~. .;:. 4 C" ~I ~. 
:::: 
· 
dov,ln h e a.r· ted Ij 1 2 .-. .;:. 4 5 6 
4 
· 
SIJ r'p r' i ·:.ed 0 1 'J L. .-:' ,-' 4 C" ~I 6 
C" 
._1 
· 
sheep i sh 0 1 'J ~ 3 4 5 6 
L co. t ten t i ve 0 1 'J .-, 4 C" ~, '.-. L. ,;;, ,-I 
7 s·c ·9.r· e Ij I} 1 2 '"". 4 t:= 6 
· 
,;;. ~I 
c· enr'aged 0 1 .-. .::' 4 C" 6 '-' .:. ~, ._' 
9 happ:;.·· (1 1 oJ .:' 4 5 t" 
· 
~ 
'-' 
1 (1 
· 
cClncen tr' ·9. t i ng (1 1 'J ... '::1 ~, 4 5 6 
1 1 
· 
ama.zed (1 1 'J L. :3 4 t:= ._1 .:5 
1 '-;1 fear· f u 1 (1 1 2 .::. 4 5 .5 ..:... 
· 
~, 
1 . -, a.n gr· / . (1 1 2 .:: . 4 t:= ~, .;:. 
· 
. ..; ._1 
1 4 
· 
~ .. 9.d (1 1 2 .::. ,-' 4 C" • _1 ,! . 
1 C" gu i 1 t ~ .. , (i 1 ,.... .:. 4 t:= t. ._1 .:. 
'-' 
~, 
1 6 
· 
b.9.·:·h f u i (1 1 2 .::. ,-' 4 ::; 6 
1 "7 J o/'fu 1 Ij 1 2 -':, 4 t:= I~' i ~. ._1 
1 E: bl ':'.m e IAI CI r' th:;.·· , (1 1 2 .::' 4 5 L 
· 
~. 
'-' 
1 .- a.':· t on j ·:.h e.j I) 1 .-:. :3 4 C" 15 "7 
· 
.... ~I 
2[1 
·9.1 e r· t [1 1 '"". .::' 4 C" ~, 
· 
.:. ,-' .... 1 
21 
· 
rT,.:..(j (1 1 2 ,,:. ,-' 4 C" ._1 I~t 
22 d i s·c CIU r' .9.ge d (1 1 'J :3 4 5 tl L. 
.":a.::, 
·:.h :,' (1 1 2 .-:' 4 t:= C-' ~'-' 
· 
'-' 
._1 
24 
· 
afr.:.. i d (1 1 2 .:' ,-' 4 C" ._1 ,!t 
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APPENDIX 3 
This page: Operating program 
Next 3 pages: Program for the Warren experiments 
discussed in Chapter four. 
113 F:Et-'1 klARREhj E)<PT 
20 REM ======)==== 
~:B F:H-j 
40 REM BY: G. RITCHIE 
50 RH1 
60 RH-1 
70 REM ************* 
80 RH-1 * SET LQI--1Et--j * 
90 REM ************* 
100 RH-j 
110 PRINT ~CHR$ (4)"BRUN LOMEM:"_ 
: & LOMEM: 24576 
120 F:H-j 
130 REM *************** 
140 REM * LOAD TIMERS * 
ISO REM *************** 
1613 RH1 
170 PRINT CHR$ (4);"8LOAD VTIME 
p" 
180 REt1 
1 '7' (1 R Et-'1 
** 
2613 REt-1 
* 216 F:Et-'1 
** 220 REt'-j 
********************* 
'* LOAD CHAF:ACTER FONT 
********************* 
230 PRINT CHR$ (4) ;"8LOAD SHAP, 
AS-CeO" 
240 pm<E 2:::2! 0 
250 POKE 233,12 
260 REt---1 
270 REM *************** 
280 REM * R~~ PROGRAM * 
290 REM *************** 
300 REt---1 
310 PRINT CHR$ (4);"RUN VOICEWA 
RF:H-j" 
:=:20 H.JD 
la REM ************************ 
******** 
5a REM THE WARREN TASK- AN EXPE 
RIHENTAL 
90 REM PROCEEDURE FOR THE INVES 
139 
179 
219 
2S9 
299 
339 
3713 
4113 
4S9 
4913 
5313 
5713 
699 
7ge 
705 
719 
739 
779 
819 
815 
816 
818 
82e 
8313 
849 
85B 
86B 
8713 
88B 
885 
8913 
9313 
9713 
9913 
10eB 
11319 
11358 
1130 
1140 
1141 
TI GATI ON 
REH OF SEMANTI C RELATI ONS. 
REH THIS IS A HODIFIED VERS 
ION OF 
REM THE WARREN (1972) PARID 
IGH THAT 
REM ALLOWS THE EXPERIHENTER 
TO 
REM INVESTIGATE THE ATTENTI 
ON 
REM CAPTURE CHARACTERISTICS 
OF 
REM THE STIHULUS ,IN ADDITI 
ON TO 
REM THE SPEED THAT THE STIH 
ULUS 
REM ACCESSES A NAME CODE. 
REM ********************** 
REM * OECLARE VARIABLES * 
REM ********************** 
REM 
OIH WRDS(S9,4),CS(S9,4),REAC 
N(50) ,HIST/.(59) ,OHHIS%(S9) ,B 
lY.(22),COL%(3) 
REM 
PRINT "INPUT THE FOLLOWING D 
ETA I LS ABOUT" 
PRINT "THE SUBJECT I NAHE • 
SEX, AGE, CONDN" 
INPUT SUS: HOME 
REM ********************** 
* REM * READ IN WORDS 
* REM ********************** 
* INPUT "VOICE TIHERS (Y OR N) 
" jVT$ 
IF LEFTs (VT$,I) = "Y" THEN 
VT = 1: GOTO 829 
IF LEFTs (VTS,I) < > "N" THEN 
815 
INPUT "INPUT THE NUMBER OF S 
LOCKS "jBL%(I) 
INPUT "INPUT THE STIHULI PER 
SLOCK "jSL%(2) 
PRINT "INPUT THE ORDER THAT 
THE BLOCKS WILL" 
PRINT "SE APPEARING": PRINT 
FOR IN = I TO SL%(I) 
!PRINT "SEQUENCE "jINj", "j 
INPUT "BLOCK ";BL%(2 + IN) 
NEXT 
HOME IBL%(e) = 1 
PRINT CHR$ (7) 
INPUT "ENTER INPUT FILE NAME 
:' j F$ 
GOTO 14913 
POKE 216,B: INPUT "ENTER IN 
PUT FILE NAME :"jF$ 
PRINT CHR$ (4);"OPEN"jF$ 
PRINT CHR$ (4)j"READ"IF$ 
IF BL%(IN + 2) = I THEN INPUT 
NUMB 
P = (BL%(IN + 2) - 1) * SL%( 
2) * 4 + 1 
IF BL%(IN + 2) = 1 THEN P = 
o 
1143 P$ 
1145 R$ 
1147 Q$ 
STR$ (P) 
"R" + PS 
'POSITION • + F$ + ",' + 
R$ 
1150 
1160 
1179 
1219 
1250 
1299 
1330 
1370 
1410 
14313 
1459 
1490 
1530 
1579 
1619 
1650 
1690 
17313 
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PRINT CHR$ (4) 10$ 
PRINT CHR$ (4)j"READ"jF$ 
POKE 216,9 
FOR I - 1 TO BL%(2) 
FOR K - 1 TO 4 
INPUT WROS(I,K),CS(I,K) 
NEXT K 
NEXT I 
PRINT CHRs (4) j "CLOSE" jF$ 
RETURN 
REM 
REM ********************** 
REM 
REM 
REM 
HCJ1E 
* OUTPUT FILE NAME * 
********************** 
PRINT CHRS (7)j 
INPUT "ENTER OUTPUT FILE NA 
HE:"jGIS 
1735 PRINT I PRINT CHRS (7): INVERSE 
. I FLASH , 
1740 PRINT "NOW INSERT THE DISK 
THAT YOU" ~ '- \ 
1742 PRINT "WANT YOUR DATA ON": NORMAL 
1744 PRINT: PRINT "IF YOU WANT 
A RANDCJ1 FIXATI ON " 
1746 INPUT "PRESS R, ELSE N ";RS 
_. . ._( 
1747 
1748 
IS09 
1819 
1829 
IB39 
1835 
1840 
1843 
IB45 
1847 
1859 
1999 
2919 
2959 
2999 
2139 
2149 
2159 
2169 
2199 
22139 
2339 
2379 
2419 
2450 
2490 
2570 
2610 
26513 
26913 
2730 
27713 
28113 
2850 
GCTO 2019 
HCJ1E 
REM **CREATE RES FILES** 
PRINT CHRs (4) 
PRINT CHRS (4);"OPEN";GIS 
PRINT CHRs (4)j"WRITE" ;GI$ 
PRINT SUS 
PRINT NUMB 
FOR I = 1 TO BL%(l) + 2 
PRINT BL%(I) 
NEXT 
PRINT CHRS (4);"CLOSE"jGI$ 
RETURN 
POKE 216,9 
REM ** EMOTION CONDITION** 
HOME 
PRINT "INPUT THE KIND OF EM 
OTION CONDITION " 
PRINT "THAT YOU PREFER." 
PRINT "(HAPPY,ANGRY,FEARFUL 
,DISTRESSED,NON)" 
INPUT EM$ 
PLS = "HIGHER":NE$ = "HUCH" 
IF LEFT$ (EMS,I) = "N" THEN 
PL$ "WORSE":NE$ = "LITTLE" 
REM 
REM ******************* 
REM *GET DELAY TIHE * 
REM ******************* 
REM 
HOME 
INPUT "ENTER DELAY TIHE (MS 
) BETWEEN SUBJECTS RESPONSE 
AND THE ONSET OF THE NE><T ST 
IMULUS"jDLAY 
IF (DLAY > 60ee9) THEN 25713 
HOME 
PRINT "ENTER THE LENGTH OFT 
IHE(MS) THAT THE" 
PRINT "CUING TO BE REMEMBER 
ED STIMULUS " 
PRINT "SHOULD REMAIN ON THE 
SCREEN" 
INPUT SF 
2890 
2895 
2900 
2930 
2970 
3010 
3050 
3090 
3130 
3170 
3210 
3220 
3230 
3250 
3290 
3330 
3370 
3410 
3450 
3490 
3530 
3570 
3650 
3678 
3690 
3700 
3710 
3712 
3714 
3720 
3730 
3758 
3770 
3Ble 
3850 
3870 
3890 
3930 
3970 
4010 
'4050 
4090 
4110 
4130 
4150 
4170 
4210 
4250 
4290 
4330 
4340 
4350 
4370 
4410 
PRINT "IF THERE IS NO PRECU 
E FED IN WITH THE " 
PRINT "DATA FILE ,INDICATE 
WHETHER YOU WANT " 
INPUT' A FIXATION STIMULUS 
BY TYPING X °jHA$ 
REM **THIS PLACE RESERVED 
FOR OELAYTIMER OPTION** 
REM ******************** 
REM *OUTPUT INSTRUCTIONS* 
REM ********************* 
REM 
HOME 
PRINT "INSTRUCTIONS' 
GET AS 
IF LEFT$ (HAS,I) = 'X" THEN 
HA '" 2 
IF HA$ '" •• THEN HA '" 1 
REM 
REM ********************* 
REM * START LOOP * 
REM ********************* 
REM 
POKE - 16302,0 
HGR 
SCALE= 1 
ROT= e 
FOR IN '" 1 TO BLX(l) 
X = FRE (8) 
BLY.(0) '" (BLX(2 + IN) - 1) * 
BLX(2) + 1 
GOSUB 20000 
GOSUB 1010 
GET AS 
IF A$ > 
IF IN '" 
FOR I so 
IF HA = 
'XXXXX" 
< '0" THEN 3712 
1 THEN GOSUB 1800 
1 TO BLX(2) 
2 THEN WRD$(I,I) = 
HGR : HGR2 
HCOLOR= :3 
COLX(I) '" INT ( RNO (37) * 
:3 + 1> 
IF C$(I,2) = ." THEN 3930 
IF ASC (C$(I,3» = ASC (C 
$(1,2» THEN GOTO 4090 
COLX(2) '" INT ( RND (37) * 
2 + 1) 
SC = COLX(I) + COL%(2) 
IF SC > 3 THEN SC = SC - 3 
COL%(2) = SCI GOTO 4110 
COL%(2) = COL%(I) 
IF C$(I,4) = "" THEN COLX(3 ) = 1: GOTO 4460 
IF ASC (C$(I,4» = ASC (C 
$(1,3» THEN GOTO 4410 
IF C$(I,4) = ". THEN COL%(3 ) = I: GOTO 4460 
IF ASC (C$(I ,4» = ASC (C 
$(1,2» THEN GOTO 4450 
COL%(3) = INT ( RND (37) * 
1 + 1) 
SC = COL%(3) + COL%(2) 
IF SC > 3 THEN SC = SC - 3 
IF SC = COL%(I) THEN SC S 
C + 1: GOTO 4290 
IF SC '" COL%(2) THEN SC S 
C + I: GOTO 4290 
COL%( 3) '" SC 
GOTO 4460 
COL/;( 3) = COL%( 2): GOTO 4460 
4450 
4460 
4463 
4465 
4470 
4474 
4476 
4478 
4480 
4490 
4495 
4500 
4530 
4570 
4600 
4610 
4650 
4690 
4730 
4770 
4810 
4850 
4B90 
4930 
4970 
5010 
5050 
5090 
5130 
5170 
5210 
5250 
5290 
5330 
5378 
5410 
5450 
5498 
5530 
5570 
:5610 
56:58 
5690 
5700 
5710 
5730 
5770 
5810 
5850 
5890 
5930 
59('0 
5990 
6010 
6050 
6090 
6130 
6170 
6210 
6250 
6290 
COLX(3) = COLX(I) 
FOR K '" 1 TO 3 
373 
IF C$(I,K + 1) THEN eo 
LX(K) = 8 
ON COL%(K) + 1 GOTO 4478,44 
70,4474,4476 
COL%(K) = 1: GOTO 4480 
eOLX(K) =.5: GOTO 4480 
COLX(K) 6: GOTO 4480 
COL%(K) = 8:HO = 8 
NEXT 
K = 1 
COL%(0) = 3 
PI = 0:P2 = 0 
POKE 230,32 
CALL 62450 
IF WRD$(I,I) = "" THEN eoLX 
(0) '" 0 
GOSUB 5930 
TIME = OLAY 
GOSUB 5130 
POKE - 16300,0 
REM 
REM ****************** 
REM * OELAY * 
REM ****************** 
REM 
TIME = SP 
GOSUB 5130 
TIME = DLAY 
GCTO 5370 
POKE 6,8 
POKE 819, INT (TIME / 256) 
POKE 818,TIME - INT (TIME / 
256) * 256 
CALL 820 
RETURN 
REM 
CALL 62450 
GOSUB 5130 
REM ********************* 
REM * WRITE WORDS * 
REM ******************** 
REM 
POKE 230,64 
CALL 62450 
POKE - 16302,0 
PI = 0:P2 = 0 
IF R$ '" "R" THEN PI = INT 
( RND (34) * 90 - 45):P2 INT 
( RND (35) * 90 - 45) 
FOR K = 2 TO 4 
P = K 
GOSUB 5890 
GOTO 6410 
HeOLOR: COLX(K - 1) 
ez = 0 
CA = 0 
IF COL%(K - 1) = 0 THEN 637 
o 
IF K = 1 THEN P = 3 
ST = INT «28 - LEN (WRDS$ 
<I,K») / 2) - 1 
FOR J = 1 TO LEN (WRD$(I,K 
) ) 
LTR: ASC ( LEFT$ ( RIGHT$ 
(WRD$(I,K), LEN (WRD$(! ,K» + 
1 - J), I » 
IF (LTR) = 65) AND (LTR < 
90) AND (GA = 8) AND (CZ : 
0) THEN LTR = LTR - 64 
CA : 0 
IF LTR > 26 THEN 6330 
DRAW LTR AT ST * 5 + J * 15 
+ Pl,90 + 20 * (P - 3) + P2 
6330 NEXT J 
6370 RETURN 
6410 NEXT K 
6450 
6490 
6530 
6570 
6610 
6650 
6690 
6730 
6770 
6810 
REM 
REM *.*.********.* •• * •••• 
REM * SET UP REACT TIMER* 
REM *** ••• * ••• ** •••••••• * 
REM 
POKE 6,0 
POKE 818,0 
.POKE 819,9 
REM 
REM ********************** 
6850 REM * DISPLAY WORDS * 
6890 REM ********************** 
6930 
6979 
6990 
7010 
7050 
7090 
7130 
7170 
7210 
7250 
7290 
7330 
7370 
7410 
7420 
7430 
7432 
7435 
7440 
7450 
7455 
7460 
7470 
7490 
7579 
7610 
7650 
7670 
7690 
7739 
7770 
7810 
7850 
7855 
7860 
7861 
7863 
7865 
7870 
7875 
7878 
7880 
7881 
7882 
7888 
7889 
7890 
REM 
POKE - 16299,0 
POKE - 16368,0 
REM 
REM ******************** 
REM * START TIMER * 
REM ******************** 
REM 
CALL 768 
REACTN(I) PEEK (819) * 25 
6 + PEEK (818) 
REM ******************** 
REM * RECORD REACTI~ * 
REM * TIME * 
REM ***~**************** 
IF VT < > 1 THEN 7490 
CALL 62450: HGR I TEXT : HOME 
IF HA > 9 THEN GOTO 7450 
VTAB 12: HTAB 12 
PRINT ·CUE WORD?" 
VTAB 21: PRINT "PRESS ANY K 
EY TO CONTINUE" 
GET RS$ 
VTAB 1 I HTAB 1: HOME 
GOTO 7888 
GET RSS 
CALL 62450 
HGR 
IF VAL ( LEFT$ (RS$,I» < 
> VAL ( LEFT$ (CS(I,3),I» 
THEN HIsr/.(I) = 1 
IF HA > e THEN 7855 
TEXT : HOME : PRINT "NOW TY 
PE IN WHAT THE WHITE CUING W 
ORO" 
PRINT "THAT YOU HAD TO REME 
HBER WAS ?": PRINT: PRINT 
INPUT" ";C$(I,2): PRINT 
: PRINT 
PRINT "SATISFIED WITH THE S 
PELLING? (Y/N) "I GET YS 
IF ASC (Y$) < > a9 THEN ,HOME 
: GOTO 7690 
HOME : HTAB 5: VTAB 6 I PRINT 
CHR$ (7) 
IF VAL ( LEFT$ (RS$,I» = 
COL%(2) GOTO 7870 
MIST%(I) = VAL ( LEFT$ (RS$ 
,1» 
~ HTAB 5: VTAB 6: PRINT CHR$ 
( 7) 
PRINT ·WRONG COLOUR BE MORE 
CAREFUL" 
IF HA > e THEN GOTO 7888 
IF LEFT$ (C$(I,2), LEN (WR 
0$(1,1») = LEFT$ (WRD$(I,I 
), LEN (WRD$(I ,I») THEN 788 
8 
HTA8 5: VTAB 12:OMMIS%(I) = 
1 
PRINT "YOU HAVE MADE A MIST 
AKE IN YOUR 
PRINT "IN YOUR RECALL OF TH 
E FIRST WORD" 
INVERSE : ~INT "TRY HARDER 
TO REMEMBER "I PRINT "THE N 
EXT WORD": FLASH 
FOR K = I TO 1000: NEXT 
NORMAL 
REM * END OF LOOP 
7930 
7970 
7990 
~19 
a0:Z0 
8050 
8090 
a130 
8170 
8219 
8250 
a270 
8290 
8330 
8410 
8450 
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REM ********************** 
** 
NEXT I 
GOSUB 8219 
NEXT IN 
GOTO 8570 
REM 
~EM *******************~ 
** 
REM * WRITE RESULTS 
* 
REM ********************** 
** 
REM 
Hcr1E 
PRINT CHRS (4) 
PRINT 
.. 
CHR$ (4) 1 "APPEND" IGI 
PRINT CHR$ (4);"WRITE ";GI 
.. 
FOR I =.1 TO BL%(2) 
PRINT C$( 1,1);"," ;REACTN( I) 
a4ge NEXT I 
8491 PRINT CHR$ (4)I·CLOSE";GI$ 
8550 
857e 
8610 
8650 
8690 
9491 
RETURN 
TEXT 
Hcr1E 
PRINT 
END 
PRINT 
"EXPERIMENT ENDS" 
CHR$ (4);"CLOSE·;GI$ 
, \ 
·200e0 REM ** SUBROUTINE FOR EMOT 
. ION *** . \ 
20020 TEXT 
:Z0050 PRINT "THIS IS A BREAK BET 
WEEN COND IT I ONS,": PRINT 
2910e PRINT "YOUR TASK IS TO TEL 
LA" ;: IMJERSE : PRINT EM$: 
NORMAL : PRINT 
201 50 PR I NT • EMOT I aNAL STORY ABO 
UT THE PICTURE": PRINT 
20200 PRINT "THAT THE EXPERIMENT 
ER WILL SHOW YOU,": PRINT 
20250 PRINT "PLEASE TRY TO SHOW 
AS "JNE$I" EMOTIONAL "I PRINT 
2030e PRINT "IMJOLVEMENT AS POSS 
IBLE IN THE STORY": PRINT 
20320 IF LEFT$ (EM$,I) = "N" THEN 
20420 
20350 PRINT "-JUST LIKE YOU WERE 
ONE OF THE ": PRINT 
:Z0400 PRINT "CHARACTERS,": PRINT 
: GOTO 29450 
20420 PRINT "-JUST AS HATTER OF 
FACT AS YOU CAN ": PR I NT 
204~ PRINT "HAKE IT,·: PRINT 
20450 PRINT "THE £XPERIHENTER WI 
LL RECORD YOUR STORY": PRINT 
20500 PRINT" , AND SCORE IT .;p 
LS" FOR THE DEGREE": PRINT 
20520 IF LEFT$ (EM$,I) = "N" THEN 
HE$ = .": GOTO 20550 
20530 HE$ = EM$ 
20550 PRINT ·OF .; 
20560 IMJERSE I PRINT ;HE$;I NORMAL 
20570 PRINT" EMOTIONAL INVOLVEM 
ENT THAT ": PRINT I PRINT "Y 
au SHOW.· 
20580 GET AS; HOME : HGR : HGR2 
20600 RETURN 
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1 (1 
20 
3£1 
40 
50 
t.0 
713 
8£1 
f.:H1 
RH'j 
RHi 
F~EH 
F:H'1 
RH1 
F:H'l 
RHi 
RH'l 
REI"'1 
Experiments discussed in 
Chapter five. 
T REl St1AN EXPT 
-----------
-----------
BY..: _ G~ ~Rl TCHI E. 
************* 
************* 
108 
110 PRINT CHR$· 
: t~ LOt"'lEt'1 : 
(4) II BF.:Ur··.j LOI'1EI"1: II 
1 20 F.: El'j 
130 REM *************** 
140 REM * LOAD TIMERS * 
150 REM *************** 
161;1 RH1 
170 PRINT CHR$ (4) ;"8LOAD VTIME 
F.: II 
18f; F:H'l 
190 RHi 
** 
* 2113 REt1 
** 228 F:H1 
********************* 
* LOAD CHARACTEF: FONT 
********************* 
2:30 PR II'IT .LHR$': 4) ; II BLOAD SHAP, 
A$.C00II 
248 PDKE 2::::2, (1 
2513 POKE 23:3,12 
260 HEi"l 
270 REM *************** 
280 REM * RUN PROGRAM * 
298 REM *************** 
:::: (1 I) F: a'l 
318 PRINT CHR$ (4);"RUN TREIS E 
><P" 
320 END 
375 
10 ROT= 0: SCALE= I 
20 DIM DE(16,2) ,PA(26) 
30 CU = 400:SU = - 16336:BT = 0 
~0 FOR I = 1 TO 4: READ CO(I),CO 
$( I) I NEXT 
60 DATA 1 ,'GREEN",2,'VIOLET",~, 
"ORANGE",6,"BLUE" 
70 PRINT "FOR THE COURSE OF THIS 
EXPERIMENT YOU WILL BE TA 
XED OR RECEIVE BONUSES ON 
ABOUT 20X OF TRIALS" 
80 PRINT: PRINT "NOW ROLL THE D 
ICE AND SEE WHETHER YOU WI 
LL BE TAXED, OR RECEIVE BONU 
SES, " 
90 PRINT: INPUT "TAXES OR BONUS 
ES? ";RT$ 
92 IF LEFTS (RTS,3) = "BON" THEN 
RT = 1: GOTO 100 
94 IF LEFTS (RT$,3) = "TAX" THEN 
RT = - 1: GOTO 100 
95 IF LEFT$ (RT$,3) = "CON" THEN 
RT = 0: GOTO 100 
96 GOTO 98 
100 REM INPUT PHASE 
110 INPUT "NAME OF INPUT FILE? 
; I P$ 
120 INPUT "NAME OF OUTPUT FILE? 
130 
140 
" lOPS 
PRINT 
PRINT 
CHR$ (4)j"OPEN "lOPS 
CHR$ (4)j"CLOSE "lOPS 
150 PRINT CHRS (4);"OPEN ";IPS 
160 PRINT CHR$ (4);"READ ";IP$ 
170 INPUT L 
175 DIM PS$(l) 
IB0 FOR I = 1 TO L 
190 INPUT PS$(I) 
28e NEXT 
210 PRINT CHR$ (4)j"CLOSE "jIP$ 
220 R = 8 
230 R = R + 1 
235 S6$ HID$ (PS$(R),3,1) 
240 SI$ HIOS (PS$(R),4,2) 
245 S2$ HID$ (PS$(R),6,1) 
250 REM TARGET STIMULUS 
255 SI = VAL (51$) 
256 S2 = VAL (S2$) 
260 01 = VAL ( HID$ (PS$(R),SI + 
9,1» 
270 S3 VAL HIO$ (PS$(R),7,1) 
) 
275 S2 = VAL HID$ (PS$(R),6,1) 
) 
30e REM STAKING PART OF THE PRO 
GRAM 
310 HOME: VTAB 5: INVERSE: PRINT 
"YOUR TOTAL AMOUNT IS "jCUj" 
": 'NORMAL 
320 ST = VAL ( MIO$ (PS$(R),8,2) 
) 
330 VTAB 10: PRINT "~O YOU WANT 
TO BET THE HIGH AHOW~T OR 
THE LOW AMOUNT ON THIS TRIAL 
340 VTAB 15: HTAB 18: PRINT "LOW 
=" JST + 10; TAB( 20); "HIGH=" 
j ST + 20 
345 VTAB 20: HTAB 5: PRINT "LOW( 
1) OR HIGH(2)?" j: GET SC$ 
350 VTAB 23:SC = VAL (SC$) 
355 IF SC < I THEN 360 
356 IF SC < 3 THEN 380 
360 HOME: FLASH: PRINT "INPUT 
ERROR TRY AGAIN,": NORMAL 
365 GOTO 330 
380 NORMAL : HOME 
376 
400 REM COLOUR CH~E 
410 VTAB 10: PRINT "WHICH OF THE 
. ;:ULLv..;iN~ CULUU~S AKt ~;uu· 
GOING TO BET ON? • 
420 PA(I) c INT ( RND (97) * 2 + 
1> 
440 PA(2) = 3 - PA(I) 
450 VTAB 13: PRINT "(I) "jCO$(PA 
(1) ) 
460 VTAB IS: PRINT "(2) "jCO$(PA 
(2» 
478 VTAB 19: INPUT "WHICH DO YOU 
CHOOSE? "tCC 
480 IF CC < 1 THEN S00 
490 IF CC < 3 THEN SI0 
S00 POKE 34,17: HOME: VTAB 22: FLASH 
: PRINT "INPUT ERROR TRY AGA 
IN,": NORMAL I POKE 34.8; GOTO 
470 
S10 REM SUCCESS OR OTHERWISE 
520 TE = RND (97) + RNO (97) + 
RNO (97) 
530 TE = 1 + INT eTE / 1.5) 
535 IF CC s TE THEN CC$ = "W":WF-
- I: GOTO 550 
540 CCS = "L":WF = 0 
5S0 HCOLOR= CO(PA(CC» 
552 IF CC$ - "W" THEN C2 = CO(PA 
eCC»: GOTO 560 
555 C2 = CO(PA(3 - CC,) 
560 HOME: HGR :'HGR2 I POKE 230 
. - ,32 ,'-.. - - ! 
S70 FOR I R 1 TO 18: HPLOT 7~,70 
575 
589 
590 
~ I TO 92,70 + I: NEXT 
POKE - 16300,0 
FOR I = 1 TO 1000: NEXT 
HOME I HGR : HGR2 : CALL 624 
S0 
600 REM ROUTINE FOR DISPLAYING 
602 POKE - 16300,9: POKE 230,64 
603 HCOLOR= CO(PA(CC» 
604 FOR I D 1 TO 19: HPLOT 72,70 
+ I TO 92,70 + I: NEXT 
606 KF - 56 
619 FOR I = 1 TO 8 
620 OD = VAL ( HID$ (PS$(R),9 + 
1,1» 
636 ·IF 00 < 0 THEN 760 
640 HCOLOR= 3 
670 DRAW 00 AT «1 - 1 + INT (I 
/ 5) - INT « 1 - 1 + INT 
(I / 5» / 3) * 3) * KF + 13 
+ C2 - 1), ( INT <<-I - 1 + INT 
(1 / 5» / 3) * KF) + 18 
700 DRAW S2 + 7 AT «I - 1 + INT 
(1 / 5) - INT « I - 1 + INT 
(I / 5» / 3) * 3) * KF) + C 
2 - 1. ( I NT « I - 1 + INT ( 
I / S» / 3) * KF) 
710 NEXT I 
720 XDRAW 52 + 7 AT «51 - 1 + INT 
(SI / 5) - INT «SI - 1 + INT 
(SI / 5» / 3) * 3) * KF) + 
C2 - 1, ( INT «51 - 1 + INT 
(51 / 5» / 3) * KF) 
730 DRAW 53 + 7 AT «SI - 1 + INT 
(SI / 5) - INT «SI - 1 + INT 
(51 / 5» / 3) * 3) * KF) + 
C2 - 1,( INT «51 - 1 + INT 
(SI / 5» / 3) • KF) 
740 POKE - 16299,e 
751 f<EM TIMER PART 
769 POKE 6,0 
779 POKE 818,0 
789 POKE 819,9 
799 CALL 768 
792 FOR I ~ 1 TO 28B0: NEXT 
800 REACN = PEEK (818) * 256 + PEEK 
(819) 
840 REM UPDATE STRING 
S50 RE$ ~ RIGHTS ( STR$ (REACN + 
100000),5) 
S60 SC$ = STR$ (SC) 
S70 PSS(R) = RES + CC$ + SC$ + LEFTS 
(PS$(R),3) 
900 REM REPORT THE RESULT 
986 HGR2: TEXT I HOME 
90S IF RT c 0 THEN ST = ST + (SC 
- 1) * 10 + 10: GOTO 930 
910 IF RND (97) > ,2 THEN BO = 
0: GOTO 920 
915 BO c INT ( RND (97) * 10 + 1 ) * RT 
920 ST = ST + (SC - 1) * 10 + 10 
930 IF WF = 0 THEN 960 --
940 HTAB 10: PRINT "YOU a;: FLASH 
: PRINT "WON a;: NORMAL I PRINT 
5T -
950 GOTO 965 
960 HTAB 10: PRINT "YOU a;: FLASH 
I PRINT "LOST a;: NORMAL I PRINT 
ST \-
965 IF BO > 9 THEN INVERSE: VTAB 
15: HTAB 10: PRINT "BONUS = 
. ";BO: NORMAL 
970 IF BO < 0 THEN INVERSE: VTAB 
. )5: HTAB 10: PRINT "TAXES = 
"I - BO: NORMAL 
975 BT = BT + BO 
9S0 VTAB 20: PRINT TAB( 9);"PRE 
55 ANY KEY TO CONTINUE," 
990 GET Q$ 
1000 WF = WF * 2 - 1 
1010 CU = CU + ST * WF + BO 
1060 IF ( INT (R / 40) - R / 40) 
< > e THEN 1190 
1070 HOME: VTAB 5: PRINT "HAVE 
A SMALL REST" 
10S0 X = FRE (0) 
1100 IF R < L THEN GOTO 230 
1200 REM OUTPUT AT END OF EXPT 
1210 GOSUB 2500 
1220 LET [)$ = CHRS (4) 
1240 PRINT [)$j"OPEN ";OP$ 
1260 PRINT [)$ j "t,JRITE '; OP$ 
1280 PRINT R 
1300 FOR I = 1 TO R 
1320 PRINT PS$(I) 
1340 NEXT 
1350 PRINT W$(I),WS(2),W$(3),W$( 
4),W$(5),BT 
1360 PRINT O$j"CLOSE "/OP$ 
1365 PRINT : PRINT 'YOUR AMOUNT 
IS" ; CU 
1370 END 
'377 
2000 REM COLOUR TARGET ROUTINE 
2050 XDRAW S3 AT «SI - 1 - INT 
«SI - 1) / 4) * 4) * 3 + INT 
(S2 - 1 - -INT «S2 - 1) / 2 ) * 2» * I<F,( INT «51 - 1) 
/ 4) * 3.3 + INT «S2 - 1) 
/ 2) * 1.25) * I<F 
2055 IF ce$ = OW· THEN e2 = CO(P 
A(eC»:CI = CO(PA(CC»: GOTO 
2068 • 
2060 C2 = CO(PA(3 - ee»:Cl = CO( 
PA(ee» 
2068 HeOLOR: el 
2070 DRAW 53 AT 240,( INT «51 -
1) / 4) * 3.3 + INT «S2 -
1) / 2) * 1.25) * I<F 
2073 HeOLOR= C2 
2075 DRAW 01 AT «51 - 1 - INT 
«51 - 1) / 4) * 4) * 3 + INT 
(52 - 1 - INT «52 - 1) / 2 
2080 
2090 
2500 
) * 2» * KF,( INT «51 - 1) 
/ 4) * 3.3 + INT «52 - 1) 
/ 2) * 1.25) * I<F 
FOR lEI TO 1000: NEXT 
RETURN 
HOME I VTAB 7: PRINT "Q>j A 
SEVEN POINT SCALE AS SH()I...t.j, 
RATE YOUR FEELINGS ON THE 
CATEGORIES THAT THE FOLLO 
WING WORD TRIPLES COME FROM. 
" 
2510 READ W$(I),W$(2),W$(3),WS(4 
),W$(5) 
2515 DATA "DELIGHTED,HAPPY,JOYF 
UL","D()I...t.jHEARTED,SAD,DISeOUR 
AGED","ENRAGEO,ANGRY,IRRITAT 
EO","ANXIOUS,TENSE,NERVOU5', 
"5CAREO,FEARFUL,AFRAID" 
2516 POKE 34,12 
2520 FOR lei TO 5 
2530 HOME 
2540 VTA8 13: HTAB 6: PRINT W$(I 
) 
2550 VTAB 17: PRINT "NOT AT ALL" 
-; TAB( 25);"VERY STRONGLY' 
2559 VTAB 20 
2560 FOR K = 1 TO 39 
2580 I F I NT (K / 5) - I< / 5 = 0 
THEN PRINT K / 5;: GOTO 26 
20 
2600 PRINT ","; 
2620 NEXT 
2622 PRINT 
2625 VTAB 22: INPUT "HOW WELL DO 
E~ THIS CATEGORY APPLY? ";WS 
cn 
2640 NEXT 
2645 POKE 34,0 
2660 RETURN 
